Heuristic reasoning (yukti) [in Charaka philosophy]

One of the most striking features of Carakasaṃhitā in the matter of the description of the source of knowledge is the introduction of yukti. In no other systems of knowledge yukti is found to be accepted as a distinct source of knowledge.^[1] The description of yukti along with the other sources of knowledge is the original contribution of Caraka. It is a way of arriving at right judgment of things by an intellectual exercise which involves the right combination of manifold causes or reasons. Such right judgements are practically effective in all the three times and subserves in accomplishing the three ends of life (trivarga-dharma, artha, and kāma).^[2] Caraka cites several examples to illustrate yukti. One of them is the ascertainment of the sprouting of the plant from the combination of the causative factors, ploughed wet land, seed, and seasons.^[3] Cakrapāṇi says that yukti is not a separate pramāṇa. Since it subserves a pramāṇa in the form of ūha in discovering the truth, it is being treated as a pramāṇa.It is because of this reason, he says, that Caraka speaks of only three pramāṇās elsewhere. He does not see any difference between yukti and anumāna. He points out that cases like this, where a conclusion is reached by reasoning, are properly called ūha. It is an inference of a future effect from the plurality of causes. So it will not generate an inference of a present thing. As such it has no access to all the three times (trikāla).^[4]

P.V Sarma points out that “this is an attempt to undermine its importance due to misunderstanding of its real nature. Both anumāna and yukti are trikāla and are quite independent of each other. Their access to trikāla is because of their having been established on cause and effect relationship. Anumāna operates with single cause while yukti deals with plurality of causes. More over anumāna itself is dependent on yukti”.^[5]

Cakrapāṇi, further, cites the Buddhist logicians Śāntarakṣita (annotated by Kamalaśila) who refutes Caraka’s view of yukti. Referring to Caraka, Śāntarakṣita says that, yukti consists in the observation that, since, “when this is there, that happens”, and, since, “when this is not there, that does not happen”. Hence “this is the cause of that”. Those who conceive yukti as an independent source of knowledge may argue that, this is not a case of inference. But yukti is a different source knowledge for in this case there is no proposition equivalent to the proposition with an example to prove it.^[6] Interpreting this viewpoint, Kamalaśila expresses the view that there is no other idea than cause-effect notion (kārya-kāraṇatā) in the conception of “that happens when this is there”, (tadbhāva-bhāvitā) and if any particular example is suggested, then that would demand another example, and after that another and it will end in regressus ad infinitum (anavasthā). That is why Caraka consider it as a separate source of knowledge.^[7] Thus, construing Caraka's conception of yukti, they refute it. They point out that there is no separate cognitive process which links up the relation of “this is there, that happens” with the cause and effect relation, because both these convey the same concept. The cause and effect relation is the same as “this is there, that happens” and so yukti is not different from anumāna.

Cakrapāṇi, though opines that yukti is anumāna, does not agree with śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśila. He points out that their criticisms are all beside the point, for yukti according to Caraka, is not the deriving of cause and effect from “this is there that happens”. It is drawing up of a conclusion as a result of series of reasoning.^[8] However, we can concede that Caraka's idea of yukti is the logic of probability. That is, when from a number of events, circumstances or observations one comes to regard a particular judgment as probable, it is called yukti and it is different from inference or any other accepted pramāṇa.^[9]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

yukteḥ pramāṇasyānyaśāstrāprasiddhatvenodāharaṇānyeva tāvaddarśayati. Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, XI. 24.

[2]:

buddhiḥ paśyati yā bhavān bahukāraṇayogajān yuktistrikālā sā jñeyā trivargā sadhyate yayā, CS, Su, XI. 25.

[3]:

lbid., 23.

[4]:

"sā ca paramārthato'pramāṇabhūto'pi vastuparicchede pramāṇasahāyatvena vyāpriyamāṇatvāt......... tataśca trikāleti parāhataṃ syāt., Cakrapāṇi on ibid.

[5]:

PVS, p.164.

[6]:

See Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, XI. 25.The exact words of Śāntarakṣita are as follows: tasmin sati bhavati eva na bhavati asatīti ca tasmād ato bhavati eva yuktireṣābhidīyate pramāṇantaraṃ eveyaṃ ityāha carako muniḥ nānumānaṃ iyaṃ yasmād dṛṣṭānto'tra na labhyate' Quoted in HIPS, Vol. II, p.376, F. Notes.

[7]:

Cakrapāṇi on CS, Su, XI. 25.

[8]:

Ibid.

[9]:

HIPS, Vol. II, p.376, F. Notes.