Sūtra 7.2.20 (Intuition of object from word proceeds from convention)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 7.2.20:

सामयिकः शब्दादर्थप्रत्ययः ॥ ७.२.२० ॥

sāmayikaḥ śabdādarthapratyayaḥ || 7.2.20 ||

sāmayikaḥ—conventional; According to direction. śabda-artha-pratyayaḥ—intuition of object from word.

20. The intuition of Object from Word (takes place) according to the direction (of God).

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

If there is neither conjunction nor combination between Word and Object, then by what relation does a word establish a determinate object? To this, he gives the answer:

[Read sūtra 7.2.20 above]

“‘Sāmayikaḥ:’ ‘Samaya’ means the direction of God, in the form that such an object should be understood from such a word. Whatever word has been assigned by God to a particular object, denotes that object. It is then the will of God which supplies the link between word and object. The same is convention, dependent upon the will of God; as, for example, “Whatever plant the ichneumon touches with its teeth, is an antidote to poison” This is the meaning.

This convention is learnt sometimes from usage; e.g., when an employer gives the order “Bring the water-pot,” and an employee brings an object possessing a tubular neck, a boy standing near by infers the knowledge of the latter in this way. This his activity is produced by knowledge, because it is activity, like my activity; that knowledge again is produced by the words of this order, because it follows immediately after it; and the subject-matter of this knowledge, namely, this object with a tubular neck, is the denotation of the term, water-pot. By such processes of transposition of verbs and cases, the boy becomes informed in respect of the object, water-pot, cloth, etc.

Sometimes the convention is learnt directly from testimony alone; e.g., that this tubular-necked object is designated by the term, water-pot. Sometimes it is learnt from comparison; e.g., from a comparison of resemblance in such cases as, that a gayal is that which is like a cow, that as is mudga, so is mudga-parṇi (a kind of bean), that as is māṣa, so is māṣaparṇi (a leguminous plant), etc. Sometimes (knowledge of objects is derived) from condemnatory passages also; e.g., “O, the camel with too pendulous upper lip and long neck, the eater of hard thorns, the vilest of animals”—when after hearing this condematory [condemnatory?] sentence, one sees a body of this description, knowledge arises in one, viz., “This is that camel.” Sometimes it springs from community of substratum, or synonymy, with words of known import; e.g., “The honey-bee is sipping the honey within cloven lotus-blossoms”—after hearing this proposition, (the knowledge arises), “This is what is designated by the term, honey-bee, because it is the sipper of honey within cloven lotus-blossoms,” or as in the case of the proposition, “The cuckoo-sings sweetly in the mango-tree.” Here, in the above instances, it is-either a case of inference, or a case of word itself being productive of knowledge through the force of synonymy with words of known import, or only a particular mode of comparison or analogy, inasmuch as the being the agent in drinking honey infers resemblance to other individuals such as the bee, etc.

The convention, again, has reference to classes only, individuals being brought home by means of special characteristics,—such is the view of the followers of Tutāta. According to the followers of Prabhākara, the force of word is in respect of both the class and the individual, but so far as it refers to the class, it denotes the object by the word, by being known, and so far as it refers to the individual, by being its proper form. The teaching of the ancients or elders is that convention is the force itself and that classes appearing in the forms of the individuals are the objects denoted by words. This is the case with words like cow, etc., but the objects denoted by words expressive of attribute and action are both classes and individuals as detailed in the Mayūkha.—20.

Commentary: The Vivṛti of Jayanārāyaṇa:

(English extracts of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana’s Vivṛti or ‘gloss’ called the Kaṇādasūtravivṛti from the 17th century)

He now points out the connection between words aud objects, which is the means of verbal knowledge.

* * * * ‘Samaya’ is arbitrament or convention. It is twofold, eternal and modern. Eternal arbitrament is called force (of words), and modern arbitrament is called definition. Arbitrament has for its form, This object is to be understood from this word, or Let this word convey this signification.

Accordingly it has been said,

ājānikaścādhunikaḥ samayo dvividhaḥ smṛtaḥ |
nitya ājānikastatra yā śaktiriti gīyate |
kādācitakastvādhunikaḥ śāstrakārādibhiḥ kṛtaḥ ||

Convention has been declared to be two-fold, original and modern. Therein the original is the eternal, which is called force; whereas the modern is the occasional, imposed by scientific writers and others.

The apprehension of the force of words proceeds from conduct, etc. So it has been said,

śaktigrahaṃ vyākaraṇopamānāt
kośā[g?]navākyādvyavahārataśca |
sāṃnidhyataḥ siddha padasya vṛddhā
vākyasya śepādvibṛtervedanti ||

The elders declare the apprehension of the force of words to proceed from grammatical analysis or etymology, from comparison or analogy, from lexicography, from authoritative sayings or testimony, from conduct (of the employer who gives an order which is carried out by the employed), from contiguity to a word of well-known import, from context, and from explication or description.

* * * * The doctrine of the force of the word to denote primarily the class is not sound, for, in such instances as “Bring the cow,” the fact which is established by experience, namely, that the individual is the object of verbal cognition, cannot be explained except on the theory of the force of the word primarily to denote the individual. Nor does the knowledge of the individual arise from implication or derivatively, for in the absence of a primary use a derivative use is impossible. Nor is the knowledge of the individual possible even by the equivalence of the act and the object of cognition (in verbal knowledge); for, inasmuch as the being an object of verbal cognition, standing in the position of an effect, must be produced by a cause, the equivalence of the act and the object of cognition (in verbal knowledge) which is supposed to be the condition, cannot be the condition there, as is desired We should, therefore, respect the doctrine that the force of the words, cow etc., lies in denoting the individual charaterised by, or possessing, the generic form and the class or the universal. It has been accordingly Laid down in the aphorism of Gautama, “The individual, the generic form, and the universal are, however, the object of the word.” (Nyāya-Sūtra, II.ii.63).