Sūtra 3.1.17 (Above continued)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 3.1.17:

यस्माद्विषाणी तस्माद्गौरितिचानैकान्तिकस्योदाहरणम् ॥ ३.१.१७ ॥

yasmādviṣāṇī tasmādgauriticānaikāntikasyodāharaṇam || 3.1.17 ||

yasmāṭ—because, Visāṇi, (it) has horns; tasmāt—therefore; gauḥ—a cow; iti—such, this; ca—and.

Anaikāntikasya, of a not-one-pointed or many-sided mark. Udāharaṇam, an example.

17. And, “Because (it) has horns, therefore (it is) a cow,” such is the example of a many-sided (mark).

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

He illustrates multifariousness:

[Read sūtra 3.1.17 above]

Where, taking a buffalo as the pakṣa or subject, it is concluded that it is a cow because it has horns, there is general many-sided-ness. But when it is concluded that Ether is eternal because it is the seat of Sound, then there is particular many-sided-ness. So also in such examples as “Sound is non-eternal because it is sound,” there being no universal relation, there is only particular many-sided-ness. But when the sādhya or the middle term is proved (to exist) only in the paṣka or the minor term, by bringing forward arguments which exclude vipakṣa^[1] or contrary instances, it is then, that is, when co-existence with sapakṣa^[2] (or objects of the same class as the pakṣa), becomes known, that the mark of inference is a valid mark, for a pakṣa^[3] also must be a sapakṣa.

There, (i.e., in the fifteenth Sūtra above), the unproved is that which is not proved by pervaded appearance in the pakṣa. And it is three-fold: (a) unproved in point of being pervaded, (6) unproved as such or by itself, (t. e., in respect of the form attributed to it), and (c) unproved by substratum or situation. Of these, the unproved in point of being pervaded, is that of which the pervasion or invariable co-existence has not been observed, whether from the non-observation of actually existing pervasion, or from the non-existence of pervasion. Hence the non-existence of favourable arguments, etc., are different kinds of the unproved. And this invalid mark has a thousand divisions according to the diversity of impossibility of predicate, impossibility of subject, impossibility of both, uncertainty and impossibility of predicate, uncertainty and impossibility of subject, uncertainty and impossibility of both, and so on. And in all these cases, only absence of proof can be discerned.

Here the idea is this: The mark of inference is of three kinds only, according to its division into the purely positive, the positive-and-negative, and the purely negative. Amongst these, the purely positive is an attribute belonging to all subjects of attributes, (i.e., objects); .e.g., knowableness, nameableness, qualifiability, predicability, absolute non-existence of annihilation in attributes etc., destructible by the destruction of the subtratum of the absolute non-existence of eternal substances, etc. For, no such thing exists, as that in which these attributes do not exist. The characteristic of the purely positive, therefore, is that it penetrates everywhere, or that it is the counter-opposite of absolute non-existence. Though these exist in themselves also,.(and so that uniformity of the mutual distinction of the container and the contained, is violated), that is no fault ; for it has been said, “In the case of appearance or existence (of one thing in another), recourse should be had to proof, and not to that which establishes difference and non-difference.”

That mark is purely positive, of which the sādhya is purely positive. Of this there are four forms, namely, existence of the pakṣa, existence of the sapakṣa, unobstructedness, and the not being confronted with a satpratipakṣa or equally valid argument to the contrary, which are the means of leading to inference. The same, together with the non-existence of the vipakṣa are the five forme of the positive-and-negative. With the exception of the existence of the sapakṣa the remaining are the four forms of the purely negative. That mark, therefore, is a mere semblance, i.e., a false mark, which is void of one or another of all the forms which, as a true mark, it might possess as the means of leading to an inference. Accordingly, the characteristic of being a false mark or fallacy, is the being void of one or another of the forms which are the means of leading to an inference. Hence doubt also, like certainty, about the voidness of one or another of these forms, is an obstruction to inference, and proof of the inconclusiveness of the mark put forward by the speaker. But the purely positive and purely negative mark, do not become fallacies by being void of one or another of their forms; because, in the case of the purely positive, non-existence of the vipakṣa, and in the case of the purely negative, existence of the sapakṣa, lack the characteristic of being the means of leading to an inference. Similarly, the unproved by situation (e.g., a castle in the air), the unproved by itself (e. 7., a golden lion), and the unproved in part, are fallacies by reason of the absence of that form which is existence of the pakṣa; the unproved in point of being pervaded, the contradictory, and the general many-sided, are fallacies by reason of defect in that form which is non-existence of vipakṣa; the particular many-sided and the inconclusive are fallacies by reason of defect as regards existence of the sapakṣa; the obstructed and the confronted with an equally valid argument to the contrary, are fallacies by reason of the absence of the characteristics of not being obstructed and of not being confronted with an equally valid argument to the contrary. So also, accidentalness and inapplicability do not load to inference, because of the absence of certainty of the non-existence of the vipakṣa; absence of favourable argument, and unfavourable argument, also do not lead to inference because of the absence of certainty of the non-existence of the vipakṣa. In like manner, apparent (but fallacious) examples, inadequate in regard to the sādhya, or in regard to the sādhana, or in regard to both, if invalid as being fallacies, are so through the uncertainty of the existence of the sapakṣa. If they are fallacious by themselves as being examples in appearance only, yet they are so mediately through the mark which is tire same uncertainty of existence of the sapakṣa.

Marks of which the positiveness or agreement is not manifest, and marks of which the negativeness or difference is not manifest, however, are resolved only into the insufficient, the inopportune, and the ground of defeat.

Self-dependence, mutual dependence, circle in an argument, and infinite regression, by unsettling the certainty of universal relation or pervasion, become deficient in respect of one or the other of the forms of existence of the sapakṣa and non-existence of the vipakṣa, and thereby acquire the nature of fallacies.

Amongst these fallacies, that is accompanied with non-co-existence, which causes doubt alternating between the existence and the nonexistence of the sādhya. The contradictory is that fallacy which produces certainty of the non-existence of the sādhya. The unproved is that which is void of pervasion, existence in the pakṣa and proving. According to Kāśyapa, obstruction and an equally valid argument to the contrary are not independent fallacies. Of these, obstruction resolves itself either as the unproved by situation, or as the many-sided; as it has been said, “In obstruction (bādhā), the mark is either non-existent in the pakṣa, or is many-sided.” An equally valid argument to the contrary, also by causing doubt in respect of pervasion or invariable co-existence, etc-, in other places, really resolves itself into the many-sided, etc.

The writer of the vṛtti, however, says that the word, ‘ca,’ in the Sūtra,—“aprasiddho'napradeśo'san sandigdhaścānapadeśaḥ”—(III, i, 15, ibid), has the sense of bringing forward bādhā (obstruction) and satpratipakṣa (an equally valid argument to the contrary), and thereby follows the view of Gautama as expressed in the sūtra, “Fallacies are five, that which is accompanied with non-co-existence, the contradictory, that which is identical with the pakṣa that which is identical with the sādhya and that which is post in time,”(Nyāya Sūtra, 1. ii.4). But, from such statements as “The contradictory, the unproved, and the dubious, declared Kāśyapa, are no marks,” it appears that the Sūtrakāra, i.e., Kaṇāda), himself was inclined to uphold the threefoldness of fallacy. The word ‘ca,’ however, has the object of bringing forward what has been stated before.

This is the idea. I have not dilated upon it for fear of increasing-the bulk of the book. More details should be sought in Mayūkha.—17.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Vipakṣa is that wherein the non-existence of that which has to be proved, is certain.

[2]:

Sapakṣa is that wherein the existence of that which has to be proved, is certain.

[3]:

Pakṣa or subject, is that wherein the existence of that which has to be proved, is doubtful.