Sūtra 3.1.18 (Mark of Inference of Soul)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 3.1.18:

आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षाद्यन्निष्पद्यते तदन्यत् ॥ ३.१.१८ ॥

ātmendriyārthasannikarṣādyanniṣpadyate tadanyat || 3.1.18 ||

ātmā-indriya-artha-sannikarṣāt—from contact of the soul, the sense, and the object; yat—which; niṣpadyate—is produced; tat—that; anyat—other, different.

18. That (i.e., knowledge) which is produced from the contact of the soul, the sense, and the object, is other (than a false mark).

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

He now points out the result of the analysis of fallacies:

[Read sūtra 3.1.18 above]

From the contact of the soul, the sense, and the object, it is knowledge that is produced. And it is a mark of the existence of the soul, and, as such a mark, is different from the unproved, the contradictory, and the many-sided, that is to say, is not a fallacy. Thus, knowledge is, in two ways, a mark of the existence of the soul; either by the inference that knowledge must reside somewhere, because it is an effect, like colour, etc., or by assuming the form of recognition, e.g., “I who saw am the same as 1 who am touching.” In the former case, effectness belonging to knowledge is not unproved, because of the assertion “(that) which is produced nor it is contradictory, for here, as in all other instances of analoguous inference or inference from a sāmānya-todṛṣṭa or commonly-observed mark, there can be no contradiction nor is it many-sided, for the very same reason. So that by means of the commonly observed characteristic, appertaining to it, viz., of being an effect or an attribute, knowledge truly becomes a mark of the existence of the soul. Recognition, again, resiling from other agents, resolves into having but one agent or cause.

(The Bauddha theory criticised.)

Objection.—Recognition may be also due entirely to the relation of effect and cause subsisting between understanding and consciousness.

Answer.—This cannot be, as it would entail recognition also, of the understandings of the disciple and the preceptor.

Objection.—But relation of the matter (i.e., knowledge which causes activity or inclination) and the form does not exist there; and that relation is the exciting cause of recognition.

Answer.—‘Matter,’ having the property of Substance, cannot possibly exist in the understanding (which is an attribute). Even if its existence were possible, understandings being momentary, recognition of what was perceived before, would not be possible. For, no impression is thrust into subsequent understandings by a previous understanding, since you do not admit the existence of an abiding impression. And if it consists of the form of a stream of temporary understandings, it cannot be the cause of recollection at another time, nor of recognition.

Objection.—The stream of subjective consciousness, which is really different from the stream of objective consciousness, is that which recollects as well as that which recognises.

Answer.—If it is permanent, then our object is fulfilled. If it is of the form of a stream of temporary understandings, then it has not yet freed itself from the fault already pointed out; for then even there-can be no permanent impression. Moreover, proof is wanting that it is something different from objective consciousness.

Objection.—Proof is supplied by the stream of understandings, ‘I am,’ ‘am,’ and so on.

Answer.—May be. But if here states of objective consciousness-take in or receive as their matter, only the subjective consciousness, then, in the absence of the characteristic of being the matter, from the states of objective consciousness, their efficient causality also will disappear; for efficient causality is derived from the characteristic of being pervaded by the characteristic of the material cause.

Objection.—Let there be no efficient causality also.

Answer.—In that case, their existence also is gone. For the characteristic of an entity or real substance is that it is the means of serving necessary purposes.

Objection.—Both the streams are received, as material, jointly by the stream of objective consciousness and the stream of subjective-consciousness.

Answer.—If it is so, then what fault has been committed by conjunction of wholes made up of parts, etc., when you also admit that a cause can operate at a different place?

Therefore, recognition proves, as being permanent, the soul which is inferred by knowledge, as its substratum. Hence nothing remains unproved.

Or, the sūtra,—“ātmendriyārtha sannikarṣād yanniṣṣadyate [yanniṣpadyate?] tadanyat” is calculated to refute the Sāṃkhya theory that the understanding, being eternal, is not fit to infer the soul as its cause. It should be, then, interpreted thus: what you call the principle or entity, viz., the understanding, is nothing but knowledge; for, there is the statement of synonyms, namely, “understanding, comprehension, knowledge.” And it is produced from the contact of the soul, etc., and is really other than the inner sense the existence of which you admit. This is the meaning. The import, therefore, is that that does become the mark of the existence of the soul.—18.

Commentary: The Vivṛti of Jayanārāyaṇa:

(English extracts of Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana’s Vivṛti or ‘gloss’ called the Kaṇādasūtravivṛti from the 17th century)

He gives another proof of the existence of the Soul:

From ‘contact, i.e., of the mind with the ‘object of the sense,’ which is the ‘soul,’ in other words, from the conjunction of the soul and the mind, the ‘knowledge which is produced,’ in the form of “1 am happy,” etc., is ‘different,’ i.e., other than inference, as a proof of the existence of the Soul. This is a roundabout way of indicating that knowledge-produced by the cognition of the soul and the mind, is perceptual,, since the definition of perception is knowledge produced from tho contact of the senses ond objects. Altough such perception does not prove the soul as different from the body, etc., yet, as it proves the soul in general, it is unobstructed. This is the import.

Or, the sūtra states that the mark which infers the soul, is not a false mark.