Aims and scope of the Study

The aim of the work is to make an analytical study and to present some original basic facts as well as arguments about the Buddhist theory of perception and its concerned doctrines. The main objective of this study is to do a historical survey of Buddhist epistemology with special reference to the epistemological doctrines of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. It is an attempt to point out the utility for human existence of the study of the Buddhist theory of perception in ontological, epistemological and ethical senses. In the ontological sense, the Buddhist theory of Perception helps us to understand the reality of an external thing on which knowledge is based upon. In the epistemological sense, it provides truth or right knowledge to human beings, because it is the only Perception that directly cognise the certainty of an external object. And, in the Ethical sense, it teaches human beings to know how to see things. It is the way out of the net of all kinds of conceptions and imagination which leads to attachment that in turn causes suffering.

Some sign of Buddhist epistemology is discovered in many suttas and Abhidharma of Theravāda. These subjects, then, were mentioned and explained in Buddhist treatises of different pre-Mahāyāna schools. Some of these texts are the Abhidharma-vibhāsaśastra^[1], the Abhidharma-nyāyānusāra-śāstra^[2], the Samaya-bhedoparacana-cakra^[3], and the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya.^[4] Nāgārjuna was the first Mahāyāna scholar who did various discussions on Buddhist epistemology in his famous works like the Mūlamadhyamakakārika, the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra and the Vigrahavyāvartanī. It was Diṅnāga, who systematically developed Buddhist epistemology in his main treatises, such as the Pramāṇasamuccaya, the Ālambanaparīkṣā, the Hetucakraḍamaru and the Nyāyapraveśa. This task which was started by Diṅnāga was excellently followed by Dharmakīrti, whose Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇaviniścaya and Nyāyabindu are outstanding work on Buddhist logic and epistemology. Diṅnāga’s investigation of the logical doctrines of other philosophical systems in his work was criticised by other non-Buddhist scholars, like Uddyotakara and Kumārila (Ca.C.E.500). Dharmakīrti thus supported and modified the views of Diṅnāga, thereby building up the basis of Buddhist epistemology and logic. Dharmakīrti’s view was followed by Dharmottara (Ca. C.E.847) and subsequently by amongst others, Jñānaśrimitra (Ca. C.E. 1040). These developments show a fact that there had been non-stop analysis and examination on Buddhist epistemology from Theravāda to Mahāyāna tradition of Buddhism in India.

By comparing and contrasting Diṅnāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s epistemological theories with other Indian philosophical schools (especially Nyāya) we can identify their position and contributions to the history of Indian philosophy. I feel confident that this work will contribute something valuable to the academic study of Buddhist philosophy in India.