Buddhist Theory Of Momentariness Refuted

We have already noted that Udayana was a strong critic of the Buddhist. In another of his major works he has exclusively refuted most of the important basic doctrines of them. Here also he finds an opportunity to refute at least one such view, namely, the doctrine of momentariness. It is also shown that the discussion is relevant. The idea is as follows. Cārvāka cannot logically defend his own position. But he cannot also accept the Nyāya position that there is a permanent self. So he takes the help of the above Buddhist doctrine. It may be shown that if the Buddhist view is accepted there will be no need to accept the Nyāya position. Thus it becomes necessary for Udayana to refute the Buddhist view.

Briefly the Buddhists argue in the following manner. All the things in the world are momentary, nothing can be permanent. Whatever is existent is capable of performing some specific function. What cannot perform a specific function is not existent. A jar or a piece of cloth is existent, because a jar can be used for bringing water or a piece of cloth can be used for covering the body. But a lotus in the sky has no existence, because no one can use it to serve any purpose. All this is proved by general experience. But if this position is accepted one will have to accept also that all existent things are momentary. A thing performs different functions at different moments. So the question arises, does the power to perform such functions reside in the thing at the same time or at different moments? The first alternative cannot be admitted because in that case all the functions should be performed at the same moment. But it is not found to be so. Therefore, it is to be admitted that the thing is characterized by different powers at different moments and that is why the effects appear at different moments. In other words, the nature of the thing is different at different moments. The powers are opposed to one another. Thus it cannot be said that the same thing is present all the time. Actually different things are produced at different moments.^[1]

The body is not something different from its parts. There is nothing called a whole over and above the parts. Every object is a combination of parts only. So ultimately the body is nothing but a collection of atoms. Collections of atoms are produced continuously from one another, the first produces the second, the second produces the third, and so on. Previous atoms are the causes for the following atoms. Previous atoms are the material for the following atoms, which are the effects. Because of this special relation between the previous and the following collections of atoms the properties of the one are transferred to the other. These atoms may be considered as conscious and thus it may be explained, without admitting a self, that the difference of agents in perceiving and remembering does not occur.

Refuting the doctrine of momentariness Udayana says that if the Buddhists really want to establish their position they will have also to admit a special potency conducive to the production of an effect (kurvadrūpatva). It is observed that a seed in the basket does not produce a sprout, but a seed put into the ground produces it. So there must be some difference between the seed in the basket and the seed in the ground. According to the Buddhist, a seed is not a permanent thing, it is a different seed at every moment. If the seeds are all of the same kind or of a similar nature it cannot be explained why a particular seed produces an effect, but another particular seed dose not do so. That is why in the particular seed which is followed by the production of the sprout a special potency is to be admitted. Without admitting such a potency, the doctrine of momentariness cannot be established.^[2]

Against the above, Udayana says that the admission of a potency is quite unnecessary. A seed in the basket does not produce a sprout because the cooperating causes are not present there, while a seed in the ground produces it because those causes are present there. No effect can be produced by a single cause. There may be one principal cause, but it alone cannot be productive, it must have assistance from other causes. For the production of a sprout the seed is the principal cause. But it cannot produce it without the help earth, water, sun and so many other things. It is not that the seed in the basket is different from the seed in the ground. The seed is the same, but the situation becomes different only because of the presence or the absence of cooperating factors. Thus the seed can be accepted as a lasting thing and there is no ground to consider it as momentary.^[3] Udayana further argues that even if it is admitted that potency is logically established there will be other difficulties for the Buddhist. Unlike the Cārvāka the Buddhist accepts inference as a source of valid knowledge. They also claim that inference may be of three kindsbased on identity, based on causality and based on non apprehension. Udayana in his prose commentary shows in detail that these three forms of inference cannot be defended if potency is accepted. Moreover, this potency cannot also be considered a universal. In short, the doctrine of momentariness is unacceptable.^[4]

The opponent may still argue that even if it is admitted that there is neither perception nor inference proving the momentariness of things it cannot be claimed that things are permanent, because there may be doubt in this regard. If it is said that there is no proof establishing momentariness it does not follow that things are permanent. It can only be shown that things are not momentary, but it is not certain that they are permanent. That the things are so may be a matter of doubt. To this, Udayana says that there cannot be any doubt regarding the permanence of things, because there is perception in the form of recognition which proves that the same thing is lasting for a long time. It is a matter of general observation that one thing perceived previously at a particular time and place may again be perceived later at a different place and time. When this happens a person has a distinct form of awareness in the form: This is the same thing which was perceived earlier. There the identity of the thing is clearly known. One does not know in the form that I am perceiving an object similar to the one perceived earlier. There is no ground to deny the validity of such recognition. So things must be permanent.^[5]

The opponent may point out that recognition does not always prove identity. In many instances it is found that actually the thing is different, but there is recognition pointing to identity. For example, a person shaves off his head and then after sometime hair grows over the head as before. The hair which has been shaved off and the hair which has grown afterwards are different. But the person refers to the new hair as the same, as before. Or, another example may be given. The flame of a lamp cannot be a single thing. Every moment a new flame is being produced. But everybody considers it to be a single thing. Similarly, it may be argued that everything is momentary, every moment a new one is being produced. But each one is exactly similar to the other. So there is no notion of difference, but there is produced a notion of identity. Udayana rejects all this also. He says that even if the opponent admits momentariness he has to give some proof to explain why a thing is considered as one or single. That everything is considered as a single unit is proved by general experience. Thus it may be claimed that the same proof which establishes the oneness of momentary things also proves the oneness of a thing which is really permanent.^[6]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 1.16.

[2]:

Ibid.

[3]:

Ibid.

[4]:

Ibid.

[5]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 1.17.

[6]:

Ibid.