Chapter 9.3k - According to the ‘Saṃkṣepaśārīraka’

[Full title: Niyamavidhi in Śravaṇa according to the ‘Saṃkṣepaśārīraka’]

Sarvajñātmamuni composed ‘Saṃkṣepaśārīraka’. The followers of this composition say that śravaṇa means that kind of mental disposition or state of the mind (cittavṛtti which is of the form of logical consideration. This mental disposition is favourable to the production of certain knowledge—‘all the upaniṣadic sentences convey the meaning of the non-dual Brahman’. By the word ‘cittavṛtti ’ we must understand the action caused by effort; for knowledge can not be accomplished by action and it can not be enjoined also. When Brahman is reflected upon the mind (antaḥkaraṇa), the mind gets transformed. This transformation (pariṇāma) is the ‘cittavṛtti ’. It is a mental action. The unchangable eternal Brahman does not change. Its transformation is imposed because of illusion.

We have understood the meaning of śravaṇa (a kind of cittavṛtti). Now, this śravaṇa does not produce direct or indirect knowledge regarding Brahman; for that knowledge is produced from the verbal testimony, perception etc. Śravaṇa means logical consideration (vicāra) and it is not included in the six proofs i.e. perception, inference, analogy, verbal testimony, implication and non-recognition. So, it can not produce any knowledge.

Objection: Such meaning of śravaṇa can not be accepted. Rather it means the verbal understanding characterized by the purport or meaning obtained from logical consideration of the Upaniṣadic sentences. This śravaṇa verily leads to brahmajñāna.

Reply: No. Śravaṇa does not mean any knowledge. It means consideration. If śravaṇa were to mean knowledge, then there would not be any injunction regarding śravaṇa. There is no scope of injunction with regard to knowledge. Knowledge depends on its object. It is not subject to any person or any injunction. It can not be done, nor it can be a matter which is undone, nor it can be done otherwise.

So, Śaṃkara says—

“ataḥ jñānaṃ kartum, akartum, anyathā vā kartum aśkakyaṃ, kevalaṃ vastutantram eva tat; na codanātantram, nāpi puruṣatantram”.^[1]

So, knowledge can not be enjoined by any injunction. For this reason, śravaṇa can not mean knowledge.

Moreover, it is accepted that the śravaṇavidhi is the base of the aphorism ‘athāto brahmajijñāsa’ which sanctions the obligation of consideration. The word ‘jijñāsā’ means logical consideration. This consideration is not a kind of knowledge. It is a kind of action.

It is a mental activity consisting of:

1. ‘ūha’ (showing a complete argument or syllogism) and
2. ‘apoha’ (wiping out of the semblance of syllogism—‘nyāyābhāsanirākaraṇa).

This is the meaning of śravaṇa.

Objection: Let consideration (vicāra) produce a result which can be the producer of brahmajñāna through the ascertainement of the purport or meaning of the upanisadic sentences or through eradicating the sins like delusion regarding the purport (tātparyabhrama) etc. produced from that consideration. The sentences of ‘Chāndogyopaniṣad ’starting from ‘sadeva somya’^[2] give the meaning of the non-dual Brahman. Here consideration leads to the ascertainment of the purport of sentences thorugh destroying the obstructing factors like ‘tātparyabhrama’ etc. This is the direct result of consideration. If the obstructing factors (pratibandhakas) are destroyed, then the upaniṣadic sentences directly causes the knowledge of the non-dual Brahman. So, consideration can indirectly result in brahmajñāna. If the obstructing factors are absent, then a person gets the direct knowledge (aparokṣajñāna) of Brahman from ‘tattvamasi ’ etc. directly.

Reply: This objection also does not stand. Because the ascertainment of the purport of sentences is not accepted as the cause of verbal understanding. The absence of impeding factors is not also said to be the cause of any action.

‘tātparya’ (purport) means the intention of the speaker. It is not the cause of verbal understanding; for though there is not any intension in the words uttered by a parrot or uttered by a boy, yet a person can understand the meaning of that words. In fact, expectation (ākāṃkṣā), capability to be connected with another word (yogyatā) and proximity (sannidhi) are the causes of verbal undestanding. But if impeding factors are there, then consideration plays its role. So, consideration is not the cause of understanding the purport, but it destroys the impeding factors. Consideration can not be the cause of verbal understanding through the destruction of the impeding factors. Because the absence of the impeding factors is not the cause of any action. The Naiyāyikas admit the absesnce of pratibandhakas as the cause. But the question is—what is the nature of pratibandhaka ? If it is said that pratibandhaka is different from cause, then there will arise the fallacy of ‘anyonyāśraya’ (reciprocal dependence). Again, if it is said that the defectiveness of the assemblage of causes (kāraṇasāmagrī) is pratibandhaka, then there will also arise the previous fallacy. In both cases the causes are included in the definition.

The defectiveness of the assemblage of causes can not be regarded as pratibandhaka. The paddies stored in the corn-bin do not transfer into sprout, because there is the absence of the assemblage of causes (kāraṇakūtābhāva) i.e. there is the defectiveness of the assemblage of causes (kāraṇasāmagrī ) in those paddies. But no one says that the coriander (bījadhānya) is the impeding factor of sprout. Actually, the absence of pratibandhaka is ‘anyathāsiddha’ (an unessential cause or a concomitant circumstance) to an effect like ‘daṇḍatva’ (the state of being a stick) to a pot.

From this discussion, it is proved that the knowledge of the purport of sentences or the absence of the obstructing factors produced from the consideration of the purport, can not be the cause of effect.

If it is accepted that the brahmajñāna is produced from consideration which is different from the varbal testimony and which is of the form of inference, then the validity of that brahmajñāna will depend on another cause. It will lead to parataḥprāmāṇyavāda. But the Advaitins and the Prābhākarins admit the ‘svataḥprāmāṇyavāda’ with reference to validity of knowledge. According to them, the authencity of knowledge is produced with that knowledge and it is realised at the time of acquiring of that knowledge. There is no necessity of admitting a seperate cause for the validity of knowledge.

Therefore, according to the followers of ‘Saṃkṣepaśārīraka’, brahmajñāna is not produced from consideration. Consideration only helps in the ascertainment of the purport of sentences and through this it eradicates the obtructing factors. For the eradication of the obstructing factors like sins, niyamavidhi is accepted in śravaṇa i.e. vicāra. The word ‘draṣṭavyaḥ’ in the injunction is also meant for the praise of the soul. It is used for instigating the striver in the realization of the soul or Brahman. The result of śravaṇa is not mentioned here by the word ‘draṣṭavyaḥ’.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Śāṃkarabhāṣyam on Brahmasūtra—1.1.4.

[2]:

Chāndogyopaniṣad 6.2.1.

[???] to ‘tat satyaṃ sa ātmā tattvamasi ’ [Ibid 6.8.7.]