Yoga-sutras (with Vyasa and Vachaspati Mishra)

by Rama Prasada | 1924 | 154,800 words | ISBN-10: 9381406863 | ISBN-13: 9789381406861

The Yoga-Sutra 4.3, English translation with Commentaries. The Yoga Sutras are an ancient collection of Sanskrit texts dating from 500 BCE dealing with Yoga and Meditation in four books. It deals with topics such as Samadhi (meditative absorption), Sadhana (Yoga practice), Vibhuti (powers or Siddhis), Kaivaly (isolation) and Moksha (liberation).

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 4.3:

निमित्तम् अप्रयोजकं प्रकृतीनां वरणभेदस् तु ततः क्षेत्रिकवत् ॥ ४.३ ॥

nimittam aprayojakaṃ prakṛtīnāṃ varaṇabhedas tu tataḥ kṣetrikavat || 4.3 ||

nimittam—incidental causes. aprayojakam—are those which do not move into action. prakṛtīnām—the creative causes, varaṇa—of the obstacle. bhedaḥpiercing through, tu—but. tataḥ—from that. kṣetrikavat—like a husbandman.

3. The creative-causes are not-moved-into-action by any incidental-cause; but that pierces-the-obstacle from it like the husbandman.—163.

The Sankhya-pravachana commentary of Vyasa

[English translation of the 7th century commentary by Vyāsa called the Sāṅkhya-pravacana, Vyāsabhāṣya or Yogabhāṣya]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

The incidental causes in the shape of virtue, &c., do not move the creative causes into action; because the cause is not moved into action by the effect. How then? ‘That pierces the obstacle like the husband-man.’

As, the husbandman desirous of carrying water from an already well-filled bed to another, does not draw the water with his own hands to places which are on the same or a lower level; but simply removes the obstacles, and thereupon the water flows down of itself to the other bed, so it pierces through vice which is the obstacle to virtue, and that being pierced through, the creative causes pass through their respective changes.

Or, similarly, the same husbandman does not possess the power of transferring the earthy and watery juices to the roots of rice in the same bed. What then? He weeds the ‘ring,’ the ‘Gavendhuka’ and the ‘Śyāmaka’ out of the common bed, and when they have been weeded out, the juices themselves enter the roots of rice.

Similarly virtue only becomes the cause of the removal of the vice, because purity and impurity are diametrically opposed to each other. It is not that virtue becomes the cause of the creative causes moving into action. On this point Nandīśvara, &c., are illustrations. On the other side, too, vice counteracts virtue and thence comes the change to impurity. Here too Nahuṣa, the Ajagara, &c., should be taken as illustrations.—163.

The Gloss of Vachaspati Mishra

[English translation of the 9th century Tattvavaiśāradī by Vācaspatimiśra]

It has been said, ‘By the filling up of the creative causes.’ Here the doubt arises. Is this filling up of the creative causes natural, or due to some incidental cause such as virtue and vice? What is proved? Well, because the creative causes, notwithstanding existence, fill up only sometimes, and because it is said that virtue and vice are the incidental causes; it is, therefore, proved that virtue, &c., are the incidental causes of the creative causes moving into action. For this reason he says:—‘The creative causes are not moved into action by any incidental cause; that pierces the obstacle like the husbandman,’

It is true that virtue, &c., are the incidental causes, but they do not set the creative causes into action; because virtue and vice are themselves the effects of creative causes. And the effect does not move the cause into action, because the birth of the effect depending upon the cause, it is subject to the action of the cause. What is self-dependent can only set an action in something which is dependent on it. The jar which is desired to be made or which has already been made, cannot certainly use the clay, the wheel and water for that purpose without the potter. Nor is it similarly the object of the Puruṣa that sets the creative causes into action. It is only Īśvara who does this with that object in view. The object of the Puruṣa is said to be the power which sets in action, by virtue of its being the aim thereof. Further, if it were so, the tending of the aim of the Puruṣa towards fulfilment would very properly become the cause of the stopping of the operations of the phenomenal world.—3.

But it is not by this much that virtue. &c., cease to be the means of change altogether. Because they become the means of effecting changes even by removing the obstacles only, like the husbandman. As to Īśvara, His action too should be understood to be of the nature of the removal of obstacles, so that virtue may be practised. This is what has been commented upon by the Commentary already explained.

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