Text 25

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 25:

पृथिव्यादीनां पञ्चानामपि भूतत्वेन्द्रियप्रकृतित्वबाह्यैकेन्द्रियग्राह्यविशेषगुणवत्त्वानि ॥ २५ ॥

pṛthivyādīnāṃ pañcānāmapi bhūtatvendriyaprakṛtitvabāhyaikendriyagrāhyaviśeṣaguṇavattvāni || 25 ||

Text (25):—To the five beginning with Earth, belong the characters of—being material, being the main material principle of the sense-organs, and being endowed with such specific qualified as are each perceptible by each of the external organs of perception.—(VIII-ii-5, 6)

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The author now shows the points of similarity among Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Ākāśa, with a view to differentiate them from the other substances. “Being material”—i. e., being expressed by the word ‘bhūta’ (‘material substance’). This single word ‘bhūta’ is applied to these Earth etc., even in the absence of any common ground for such denotation; just as the word ‘akṣa’ which denotes a dice, the sense-organs, the bibhītaka fruit and many other things, simply through the. general characters of these things,—in the same manner the word ‘bhūta’ is made by convention to apply to the Earth etc,—such application being based upon the general characters of “Earth,” “Water,” etc; as for Ākāśa, which is one only, the application of the word is based upon the individual alone; and the denotability (of Ākāśa) by this word is due to certain limiting conditions (of verbal convention); just as the idea of the word ‘akṣa is with regard to the dice and other things.

Being the main material principle of the sense-organs: that is the Earth etc. form the main principles of the particular organs of sense.

Objection:—“The sense-organs cannot be said to have the material substances for their main principles; as these organs are found to operate without getting at the objects of perception, while it is a characteristic of all material things that they can operate upon an object only when they get at it, and not otherwise; as we find in the case of the Lamp.”

Reply:—This is not right; as the sense-organs do not perceive things that are hidden from them (i.e., things lying behind certain obstructions). If the sense-organs were operative without actually getting at the objects,—then they could perceive things behind the wall also, as non-äpproach in this would exactly be similar to that in the case of a thing directly in contact with the organ.

Objection:—“The non-perception of the hidden object may be said so be due to the absence of capability, either in the sense-organ or in the object to be perceived.”

Reply:—As for the sense-organ, its capability, in the shape of an ability to perceive objects, is already present, as is shown by the fact of its perceiving, at that very time, things that are not hidden. Then as for the object, its capability consists in its largeness, in its being made up of many constituent substances; and the presence in it of a particular form and colour, does not cease to exist, on its being hidden; and as for its being before the sense-organ, this too remains the same, (even on the interception of the wall).

The following argument may be brought forward The absence of obstruction forms one of the causes of the perception of an object; just as the absence of conjunction is in the case of fatting; and certainly when there is an obstruction (in the shape of the wall), the absence of obstruction would naturally cease to exist; and as such, the cause of perception being wanting, there would be no perception.”

But there is not much in this argument either, as an obstruction is found to retard the perception of only such things as are perceptible to the touch. For instance, an umbrella is found to retard or throw off only the falling drops of water or the rays of the sun; and it does not merely remove its own absence.

Thus then, we easily gel at the following inference: The eye illumines that which it gets at,—(1) because it does not illumine that which is hidden, as we find in the case of the lamp; or (2) because it is an external sense-organ,—like the organ of touch

Question—“In that case how is it that we have a perception of distant objects.”

Answer—That perception is due to the proximity (or contact) of the object with the rays of light. That is to say, the rays of light proceeding from the eve. which have no manifested colour or touch, reach to a certain distance and there apprehend the object. And thus the sense-organ being found to be the illuminator of things large as well as small, why should not they be accepted as material? specially as such illumination is quite possible by means of the rays (proceeding from the eye) just as in the case of the lamp. The fact is that in a case where many particles of the rays come in contact with the object and its many particles, we have a clear perception of the object, because of the sense apprehending the object along with all its peculiarities; on the other hand, in a case where the rays come in contact only with certain parts of the object, the perception is not quite clear, as what is apprehended in this case is the object qualified only by its generic character.

Objection—“That which moves (as you hold the rays to do) is always found to get at things near and remote, gradually (i.e. one after the other); how is it, then, that we have a perception, at one and the same time, of the branch of a tree, and also of the moon?”

Reply—As a matter of fact, there is no actual similiarity? in the perception of the tree and the moon; the gradual stages are not perceived on account of the extremely swift functioning of the sense-organ; just in the same manner as we are not cognisant of any gradual stages of time in the piercing, by means of a needle, of a hundred lotus leaves of the lotus flower; so the notion of simultaneity in such cases must be regarded as a mistake.

Objection:—“If the sense-organs be held to get at the objects, there could be no such perception as that this is separated or removed (at a distance).”

Reply:—Not so; as this perception is capable of another explanation. The relationship of the senses being imperceptible by the senses, the ideas of separation or non-separation, cannot be due to the presence or absence, of that relationship; they must be due to the presence or absence of the relationship of the body. Thus then, in a case where we have the perception of an object that is in contact with the body, we have the idea that the object is not separated from (near) us; when however the perceived object is not ín contact with the body, we have the idea that it is separate (at a distance).

Being endowed with etc., That is to say the Earth &c., are endowed with such specific qualities, like Colour and the rest, as are capable of being perceived by each of the external senseorgans, the eye &c., In as much as these qualities are all perceived by the internal organ (mind), they could not be spoken of as perception by each one of the organs; hence the word ‘external’ has been added (which excludes the internal organ). The expression ‘each one’ has been added with a view to describe the real forms of the qualities.

Note:

“Indriyaprakṛti” is explained by the Kiraṇāvalī as being the ‘material cause of the sense-organs.’