A comparative study between Buddhism and Nyaya

by Roberta Pamio | 2021 | 71,952 words

This page relates ‘Perception according to Vishvanatha’ of the study on perception in the context of Buddhism compared to Nyaya (a system of Hindu philosophy). These pages researches the facts and arguments about the Buddhist theory of perception and its concerned doctrines while investigating the history of Buddhist epistemology (the nature of knowledge). The Nyaya school (also dealing with epistemology) considers ‘valid knowledge’ the means for attaining the ultimate goal of life (i.e., liberation).

3.2. Perception according to Viśvanātha

[Full title: 2. The Navya-Naiyāyika Theory of Perception—Perception according to Viśvanātha]

The scholar of Navya-Naiyāyika, Viśvanātha defines perception as:

“The cognition which is not produced through the instrumentally of another cognition.”[1]

It is direct as well as immediate cognition. He maintains that it is called jñānākaraṇakajñāna because it does not depend on other knowledge. This new epithet has been inserted by the Navya-Naiyāyikas so that God’s perception may also include in the domain of perception.[2] Viśvanātha’s definition like Gaṅgeśa is applicable to both human and divine perception. It does not include inferential knowledge, analogical knowledge, memory and verbal knowledge. Inferential knowledge is generated by the help of universal concomitance. Analogical knowledge is generated by the help of knowledge of similarity, verbal knowledge is generated by the help of knowledge of words, and memory is generated by the help of previous experience (anubhava).[3]

Here, one may argued about the inclusion of the words “sense-organ (indriya)”, “contact (sannikarṣa)” and “object (artha)”. In the physiological sense, the Sanskrit word indriya does not mean sense-organ. For Viśvanātha, the union of indriya with manas which is an attribute inheres in the sense-organ as well as in the mind. Hence indriya is the substratum of that conjunction which is one condition of perception. Again, it is not the substratum (anāśraya) of manifest specific quality other than sound. The first part of the definition (i.e. not being the locus of the manifest specific quality other than sound-śabdetarobhūta viśeṣaguṇānāśrayatve sati) has been given so that self or ātman does not come under sense-organ. However, soul is the place of the contact of the mind, the cause of knowledge, it is the place of the manifest specific quality other than sound. So the definition of sense-organ does not unduly extend to self. The definition of sense organ is not applicable to the ear because it is the place of sound, which is the manifest specific quality. So, the epithet “other than sound” (śabdetara) has been added in the definition. The particular qualities like colour etc. is already there in the eye etc, the definition of sense-organ is not applicable to them and thus the word “manifest” (udbhūta) has been included in the definition.

The sense-organs are divided into two categories: external and internal. The external sense-organs are five in numbers and the internal sense-organ is one in number. The perception generated by external sense-organs is called olfactory (ghrāṇaja), the gustatory (rāsana), the visual (cākṣuṣa), the cutaneous (spārśana) and the auditory (śrautra) organs. Perception generated by internal sense-organ is called manasa. Every sense-organ has a specific object of its own. For instance: the work of olfactory senseorgan is to get smell which is the object of this sense-organ etc.[4]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

G.P. Bhatt, op.cit., p.155.

[2]:

Sinha. J, op.cit., p.114.

[3]:

SM., pp. 237-240.

[4]:

ghrāṇasya gocaro gandho. Bhāṣāpariccheda , v.53.

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