Text 154

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 154:

अथ सामान्यपदार्थनिरूपणम् । सामान्यं द्विविधं परम् अपरं च । स्वविषयसर्वगतम् अभिन्नात्मकम् अनेकवृत्ति एकद्विबहुष्वात्मस्वरूपानुगमप्रत्ययकारि स्वरूपाभेदेनाधारेषु प्रबन्धेन वर्तमानम् अनुवृत्तिप्रत्ययकारणम् । कथं प्रतिपिण्डं सामान्यापेक्षं प्रबन्धेन ज्ञानोत्पत्तावभ्यासप्रत्ययजनिताच्च संस्काराद् अतीतज्ञानप्रबन्धप्रत्यवेक्षणाद् यद् अनुगतम् अस्ति तत् सामान्यम् इति । तत्र सत्तासान्यं परम् अनुवृत्तिप्रत्ययकारणम् एव । यथा परस्परविशिष्टेषु चर्मवस्त्रकम्बलादिष्वेकस्मानिलद्रव्याभिसम्बन्धात् नीलं निलम् इति प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिः तथा परस्परविशिष्टेषु द्रव्यगुणकर्मस्वविशिष्टा सत् सद् इति प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिः सा चार्थान्तराद् भवितुम् अर्हतीति यत् तद् अर्थानतर्ं सा सत्तेति सिद्धा । सत्तानुसम्बन्धात् सत् सद् इति प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिः तस्मात् सा सामान्यम् एव । अपरं द्रव्यत्वगुणत्वकर्मत्वादि अनुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिहेतुत्वात् सामान्यं विशेषश्च भवति । तत्र द्रव्यत्वं परस्परविशिष्टेषु पृथिव्यादिष्वनुवृत्तिहेतुत्वात् सामान्यं गुणकर्मभ्यो व्यावृत्तिहेतुत्वात् विशेषः । तथा गुणत्वं परस्परविशिष्टेषु रूपादिष्वनुवृत्तिहेतुत्वात् सामान्यं द्रव्यकर्मभ्यो व्यावृत्तिहेतुत्वात् विशेषः । तथा कर्मत्वं परस्परविशिष्तेषूत्क्षेपणादिष्वनुवृत्तिप्रत्ययहेतुत्वात् सामान्यं द्रव्यगुणेभ्यो व्यावृत्तिहेतुत्वाद् विशेषः एवं पृथिवीत्वरूपत्वोत्क्षेपणत्वगोत्वघटत्वपटत्वादीनाम् अपि प्राण्यप्राणिगतानाम् अनुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिहेतुत्वात् सामान्यविशेषभावः सिद्धः । एतानि तु द्रव्यत्वादीनि प्रभूतविषयत्वात् प्राधान्येन सामान्यानि स्वाश्रयविशेषकत्वाद् भक्त्या विशेषाख्यानीति ॥ १५४ ॥

atha sāmānyapadārthanirūpaṇam | sāmānyaṃ dvividhaṃ param aparaṃ ca | svaviṣayasarvagatam abhinnātmakam anekavṛtti ekadvibahuṣvātmasvarūpānugamapratyayakāri svarūpābhedenādhāreṣu prabandhena vartamānam anuvṛttipratyayakāraṇam | kathaṃ pratipiṇḍaṃ sāmānyāpekṣaṃ prabandhena jñānotpattāvabhyāsapratyayajanitācca saṃskārād atītajñānaprabandhapratyavekṣaṇād yad anugatam asti tat sāmānyam iti | tatra sattāsānyaṃ param anuvṛttipratyayakāraṇam eva | yathā parasparaviśiṣṭeṣu carmavastrakambalādiṣvekasmāniladravyābhisambandhāt nīlaṃ nilam iti pratyayānuvṛttiḥ tathā parasparaviśiṣṭeṣu dravyaguṇakarmasvaviśiṣṭā sat sad iti pratyayānuvṛttiḥ sā cārthāntarād bhavitum arhatīti yat tad arthānatarṃ sā satteti siddhā | sattānusambandhāt sat sad iti pratyayānuvṛttiḥ tasmāt sā sāmānyam eva | aparaṃ dravyatvaguṇatvakarmatvādi anuvṛttivyāvṛttihetutvāt sāmānyaṃ viśeṣaśca bhavati | tatra dravyatvaṃ parasparaviśiṣṭeṣu pṛthivyādiṣvanuvṛttihetutvāt sāmānyaṃ guṇakarmabhyo vyāvṛttihetutvāt viśeṣaḥ | tathā guṇatvaṃ parasparaviśiṣṭeṣu rūpādiṣvanuvṛttihetutvāt sāmānyaṃ dravyakarmabhyo vyāvṛttihetutvāt viśeṣaḥ | tathā karmatvaṃ parasparaviśiṣteṣūtkṣepaṇādiṣvanuvṛttipratyayahetutvāt sāmānyaṃ dravyaguṇebhyo vyāvṛttihetutvād viśeṣaḥ evaṃ pṛthivītvarūpatvotkṣepaṇatvagotvaghaṭatvapaṭatvādīnām api prāṇyaprāṇigatānām anuvṛttivyāvṛttihetutvāt sāmānyaviśeṣabhāvaḥ siddhaḥ | etāni tu dravyatvādīni prabhūtaviṣayatvāt prādhānyena sāmānyāni svāśrayaviśeṣakatvād bhaktyā viśeṣākhyānīti || 154 ||

Text (154): Community is of two kinds—‘higher’ and ‘lower.’

It pervades over all its objectives; has identically the same form (in all cases) inhering in many individuals; it brings about the idea of its own form in one, two or many things; and it is the cause or basis of the notion of inclusion, inhering as it does in all its substrates simultaneously.

Question: “How so?”

Answer: It is so because as a matter of fact we find that when we cognise each individual objects as belong simultaneously to a particular class, and we have such cognitions repeatedly, then there is produced in our minds an impression; and when in view of this impression we review those past cognitions, we some to recognise a certain factor that inheres in every one of the objects cognised; and it is this factor that constitutes the Community.—(I-ii-3).

The Community of ‘Being’ is the highest; in as much as it is the cause of inclusive cognitions only. In the case of a number of totally different things, such, for instance, as pieces of leather, of cloth, of blanket and so forth,—if all of them are possessed of the same quality of ‘blueness,’ with regard to each one of these vie have the notion that ‘it is blue’; and in the same manner, in the ease of the totally different categories, Substance, Quality and Action, we find that with regard to each one of them we have the notion that ‘it exists;’ and this all-inclusive notion could not but be due to something apart from the three categories themselves; and this something is what we called ‘Sattā’ or ‘Being.’ And it is by reason of the presence of ‘being’ that we have the inclusive notion of a number of things as ‘existing’; hence this ‘Being’ cannot but be regarded as Community.—(I-ii-4, 7 to 10, 17).

The Lower Communities are, the classes of ‘Substance’ ‘Quality’ ‘Action’ and so forth. As these give rise to inclusive as well as exclusive notions, they are regarded as Communities as well as Individualities. For instance ‘Substance’ is a Community, in as much as it serves as the basis of an inclusive notion with regard to such mutually different things as earth, water and the like; and it is an Individuality in as much as it serves as the basis of notion exclusive of Qualities and Actions. Similarly ‘Quality’ is a Community by reason of its giving rise to a notion including all qualities such as colour and the rest; and it is an individuality, on account of its serving as the basis of a notion exclusive of substances and actions. In the same manner, ‘Action’ is a Community by reason of its serving at the basis of a notion inclusive of all the several actions of ‘Throwing Upwards’ and the rest, and it is an individuality, in as much as it is exclusive of qualities and actions.

In this same manner, in the case of such Communities as ‘Earth’ ‘Colour,’ ‘Throwing Upwards’ ‘Cow,’ ‘Jar’ ‘Cloth’ and so forth,—which inhere in animate and inanimate beings,—we find that they serve as the basis of inclusive as well as exclusive notions; and as such these also, are Communities as well as individualities, Such classes however as 'Substance,’ ‘Quality’ and ‘Action’ include many individuals; and as such they are primarily regarded, as Communities; and it is only indirectly or secondarily that they are regarded as individualities, by reason of their serving to exclude their substrates from oṭher similar Communities.—(I-ii-5).

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

May the High-souled Brahmā, Viṣṇnu and Mahesware (Maheśvara); the causes of the origin the continuance and destraction of the universe,—be ever victorious!

The author proceeds to describe Community: It is of two hinds &c.—these we have already explained before in the section wherein these several categories to be mentioned by name.

Some people bold that all Communities are all-pervading; and with a view to deny this view the author proceeds to explain the nature of Community.

It pervades over all its objectives. When a certain Community resides in a certain object, this latter becomes its ‘objective’; and over all such objectives it pervades. That the Community does not exist in all things (its objectives as well as other things) is proved by the simple fact of its not being perceived to be so.

It has identically the same form—that is to say; the form in which it resides in one object is the same in which it resides in another object also; and that such is the case is proved by our having exactly the same notion of the Community in both cases. Then again, the fact of the Community inhering by the same form in many objects can be proved by our own experience. Nor can there be any incongruity in this, when it is distinctly cognised by some means of right knowledge; in fact we find such things as ‘duality’ and the rest inhering in many objects at one and the same time.

It might be argued that if such were the case then there would be no difference between Duality &c. and Community. And in order to remove this misconception the author adds,—It brings about the idea of its own form &c, &c. For instance, whether we see a single cow, or two cows or many cows, we have the notion of the “cow” in all cases. Such however is not the case with Duality &c. (Each of which exist only in a definite number of objects).

Thus the definition of ‘Community’ comes’ to be this:—That which, while inhering in many objects, brings about the idea of itself in one, two or many objects,—is ‘Community.’ This the author proceeds to explain:—And it is the cause or basis &c., &c. That is to say, as a matter of fact we find that the form that is in one object is present in another object also; and hence the Community comes to be the cause of the inclusive notion of the sameness of its form inhering as it does, in exactly the same form, in a number of objects, simultaneously—i.e., when it subsits in one, it subsists also in the other.

A question-having been put as to how it is known that Community inheres in many objects at one and the same time, the Author explains:—When we cognise &c., That is to say, having cognised the Community as subsisting in one object, when at some future time, we happen to see another object and find the same generality in it, recognise it to be the same as the one cognised in the previous object,—then we distinctly recognise the fact of the Community inhering in many objects. And as this is a distinctly perceptible fact, it sets aside all notions to the contrary.

The author now proceeds to describe separately the Higher and Lower Communities spoken of above:—The Community of ‘Being’ is the highest &c., &c. Even though ‘Being’ is distinctly perceived, yet there are some people who deny that they perceive any such thing; hence for such people the author brings forward an inferential argument:—In the case of a number of totally different things &c., &c. This is quite clear; the argument being thus stated formally:—The inclusive notion that ‘it exists,’ which we have with reference to substance &c., must be regarded as based upon the cognition of something apart from these things themselves,—because we find a common inclusive idea extending over different things,—like the notion of ‘blue’ with regard to the leather, the cloth &c; And as ‘Being’ serves to bring about only the inclusive notion of substance &c., and nob any notions of exclusion, it must be regarded as a Community only, and not an Individuality.

The Lower Communities are the classes of ‘Substance’ &c., &c. and these are the cause of notions of inclusion as well as exclusion...............................

Question: “Are the classes ‘substance’ and the rest then in reality Communities, or individualities, or both?”

Answer: Such classes as substance de., include many individualities &c., &c. That is to say, the word ‘Sāmānya’ indicates the character of being common; and as the classes of ‘substance’ &c., have this character of being common to. many individuals, the name ‘Sāmānya’ or ‘Community’ applies to them exactly; as for the name ‘Viśeṣa’ or ‘individuality’ however, this could not apply to them exactly; as a Viśeṣa is that which distinguishes its substrate from all other things (and the classes in question do cot distinguish any one of their substrates from all other things), Fur this reason it is only the name ‘Community’ that can apply to these classes, primarily; and the name ‘individuality’ is applied to them only secondarily or figuratively,—this application being based upon the similarity that the class, ‘substance’ &c, also serve to distinguish their substrate from the objects of other classes,— just as the Viśeaha distinguishes its substrate from all other things.