by Ganganatha Jha | 1915 | 250,428 words
The English translation of the Padarthadharmasamgraha of Prashastapada including the commentary called the Nyayakandali of Shridhara. Although the Padartha-dharma-sangraha is officially a commentary (bhashya) on the Vaisheshika-Sutra by Kanada, it is presented as an independent work on Vaisesika philosophy: It reorders and combines the original Sut...
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 155:
लक्षणभेदाद् एषां द्रव्यगुणकर्मभ्यः पदार्थान्तरत्वं सिद्धम् । अत एव च नित्यत्वम् । द्रव्यादिषु वृत्तिनियमात् प्रत्ययभेदाच्च परस्परतश्चान्यत्वम् । प्रत्येकं स्वाश्रयेषु लक्षणाविशेषाद् विशेषलक्षणाभावाच्चैकत्वम् । यद्यप्यपरिच्छिन्नदेशानि सामान्यानि भवन्ति तथाप्युपलक्षणनियमात् कारणसामग्रीनियमाच्च स्वविषयसर्वगतानि । अन्तराले च सम्योगसमवायवृत्त्यभावाद् अव्यपदेश्यानीति ।। इति प्रशस्तपादभाष्ये सामान्यपदार्थः समाप्तः ॥ १५५ ॥
lakṣaṇabhedād eṣāṃ dravyaguṇakarmabhyaḥ padārthāntaratvaṃ siddham | ata eva ca nityatvam | dravyādiṣu vṛttiniyamāt pratyayabhedācca parasparataścānyatvam | pratyekaṃ svāśrayeṣu lakṣaṇāviśeṣād viśeṣalakṣaṇābhāvāccaikatvam | yadyapyaparicchinnadeśāni sāmānyāni bhavanti tathāpyupalakṣaṇaniyamāt kāraṇasāmagrīniyamācca svaviṣayasarvagatāni | antarāle ca samyogasamavāyavṛttyabhāvād avyapadeśyānīti || iti praśastapādabhāṣye sāmānyapadārthaḥ samāptaḥ || 155 ||
Text (155):—That these Communities belong to a category distinct from Substance, Quality and Action, is proved by the fact of their having a character totally different from these latter. For this same reason too they are eternal. These again are different from one another, by reason of each of them residing in a different set of things,—substances, qualities and actions,—and also by reason of people having a distinct notion with regard to each of them.
Each of these is regarded as one in all its substrates, because its character in all remains the same, and also because there are no marks of difference. Though Communities do not have their extension limited, yet they are regarded as extending over all their objectives; because of the definitely restricted character of the distinguishing features of the objects, and also because of the fact of these objects having definitely distinct causes of their own. As Communities do not exist, either, by conjunction or by inherence, in the intervals (of space between two individuals of the same classes), they are not spoken of as existing (in those intervals)—(I-ii-11 to 16).
Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.
Objection. “The class ‘ substance’ is nothing distinct from the individual substance; and hence it is not proper to describe the functions of the two as if they were distinct.”
In reply to this the author says—That these Communities &c., &c. That is to say, as a matter of fact we find that the class ‘substance’ is congnisable by such cognitions as are inclusive or comprehensive in their character, while the individual substance is cognised by a cognition that is wholly exclusive in character; and in as much as this constitutes a difference in their character, the classes cannot but be regarded as belonging to a category distinct from that to which the individuals belong,
For the same reason is the class eternal. That is, in as much as the class is different from the individual, it must be eternal; if it were not so, it would be produced when the individuals are produced, and destroyed when these are destroyed (which is not found to be the case); this predicament is avoided when the two are regarded as distinct.
Some people hold the following view:
“The Community serves to bring about a comprehensive or inclusive notion of diverse things. As a matter of fact, in the case of each individual thing, it does not bring about the cognition of two distinct entities,—one in the form of Community and another in that of an individuality,—independently of each other, as we have in the case of the man and the stick; nor is there any relation of qualification possible between the two entities; as it is not that, when ever we see a cow, we have the idea that ‘this is qualified by, or possessed of, the general character of the cow’; in fact the cognition that we have is that of the two being identical, in the form ‘this is a cow’; an expression wherein the general character of the cow is spoken of as identical with the individual cow seen by the eyes; specially as the two have no forms apart from each other. As for ‘inclusiveness’, this is a character that belongs to the Community of the ‘cow’, as also to all other Communities; and as for ‘exclusiveness’ this belongs to the individual cow, as also to all other individual things; but there is no doubt that the form of the Community of ‘cow’ is distinct form the forms of all other Communities; just in the same manner as the form of the individual cow is different form the form of other individuals; and all this could not be possible unless the two (the class ‘cow’ and the individual cow) were identical. Nor is it possible for one and the same thing (the Community) to be spoken of as the form of another thing, and also as something only related to it; as anything that has no form can have no relationship. Hence it must be concluded that the real truth is that the generality and the individual are both identical.
“It is this reasoning that serves also to prove the theory of ‘difference-identity’ (i.e. the theory that the two are different as well as identical). For instance, just as we have the cognition of the ‘piebald cow’, so also we have that of the black cow.’ Nor do we have any such notion to the contrary, as that, ‘it is the piebald one only that is a cow, and not the black one’; in fact with regard to all cows we have the same notion that this is a cow,’ ‘that is a cow,’ and so forth. And thus the Community ‘cow’ in the form of the piebald cow being found in this cognition to be identical with the black cow,—that Community comes to be different from the individual piebald cow; specially as the only point in which the Community differs from one individual object is that it is identical with other individual objects also (which the individual object is not); and the distinguishing feature of the Community also consists only in. its being identical with both (all) individual objects,.
“Objection: ‘To say that one and the same thing is both different and non-different is a contradiction in terms,’
“Reply; It is not right for you, versed as you are in the art of reasoning, to say this. That alone can be regarded as contradictory and absurd which is not found to be in keeping with, the real state of things; and in regard to that which is always in- keeping with the nature of things as cognised by the valid means of knowledge, the mention of absurdity itself would be an absurdity.
“Objection: ‘We have nowhere else found two things to be both different and non-different.’
“Reply: Is it necessary for sensuous perception to follow in the wake of another perception, as it is in the case of inferential cognition? Well, if it were so, then it would be necessary to postulate an unending series of perception after perception. If then, sensuous perception were to operate by its own inherent capability, then the nature of a thing must be accepted exactly as it happens to be perceived and this cannot be denied on the mere ground of its nob being seen elsewhere; as if this were to be negatived, then all perceptions would become open to negation!
“Thus we conclude that Community is not only eternal, but both eternal and transient; because it is producible and destructible by the production and destruction of individuals, and it continues in another individual (even on the destruction of one individual).”
To the above arguments, we make the following reply:—
(1) Is the perception cognisant of the Community and the individual, exactly in the same form? (2) or is it cognisant of a non-difference between them? (3) Or, does it cognise them in different forms? In the case of the first alternative, there would be only one thing (and not two things in the shape of the Community and the Individual); and it would not be that there are two things with one and the same form; as the non-difference of any two things only consists in their being cognised in one and the same form. In the case of the second alternative, there is a self-contradiction; as the cognition of difference is nothing more than the cognition of different forms; and when such a cognition is possible, there can be no cognition of non-difference; and as such, how could you ever establish the non-difference of two different things? If it is asked—“how then have we the idea of non-difference”?—we reply—we can have no such idea in any way. Thus then, if we are cognisant of only one form, then there is a single thing, and not two things; and if both forms are cognised, then there is no possiblity of the cognition of non-difference. As for the universally accepted cognition of the ‘cow’ in regard to all cows, this must be attributed to the inherence (of all individuals in the same Community). In the case of conjunction there would, be a distinct cognition of some sort of actual contact; while the character of inherence is such that in its case the two members related are perceived together in a single lump, just as we find in the case of the fire and the red hot ball of iron. The Community itself cannot be regarded as the form of the individuality; the fact is that though the two are really distinct, yet the individual is never perceived apart from the Community to which it belongs,—just as the plum in a ditch is not visible apart from the ditch; though the two are distinctly perceptible as different from each other; for instance, from a distance, even if we do not cognise the Community ‘cow’ we are cognisant of the individual cow; and even though any particular cow is not seen, we perceive the Community ‘cow’ in another cow that we see.
For these reasons we conclude that Community is something wholly different from the individual. Such is the process of reasoning adopted by the Logicians.
These again are different from, one another &c., &c. The Communities of ‘Substance’ ‘Quality’ and ‘Action’ reside only in substances, qualities and actions respectively; and with regard to each of these we have a distinct cognition; for these reasons they must be regarded as distinct from each other.
It has been stated before that Community is of the nature of non difference; and this same fact the author proceeds to prove by means of reasonings:—Each of them, is regarded as one &c., &c. The word ‘lakṣaṇa’ ‘character’ means that whereby a thing is distinguished; hence, in the present instance, the notion of inclusion (a comprehensive notion of one Community as extending over many individuals); this comprehensive notion is found to be exactly the same in each individual of a Community; nor are there any ‘marks’ or reasons for regarding them as different in different individuals; and from these two facts it is clear that the Community is one and the same in all individuals that are included in it.
It has also been stated before that the Community inheres in all its objectives only, and not in any other thing; and the author now proceeds to bring forward reasons in. support of this:—Though Communities &c. As a matter of fact it is found that a Community is related to many individuals appearing at all sorts of places; and hence its extension is by no means limited; yet in as much its manifesting cause, in the shape of the peculiar shape of the objects included under it, is one of particular kind, the Community itself becomes restricted in its scope; and then again, by reason of the limited character of the causes productive of the objects, the Community inheres only in its objectives, and in all of these. That is to say, the Community of the ‘cow’ is manifested or rendered perceptible by a body which consists of the dewlap and such other limbs; and the Community of the ‘horse’ is manifested by the body consisting of the mein and so forth; the Community of the ‘jar’ is manifested by a body having a peculiarly shaped neck; all this we- infer from the fact of our idea of such and such things being restricted to such and such forms. These various kinds of bodies too are not found bo be common to more than one class of objects; in fact each of them is restricted to one set of objects only; thus then, though every Community is capable of being connected with all such bodies as are its objectives, whenever and wherever such bodies might be produced,—yet it can inhere only in such an object as it happens to be endowed with the body manifesting that Community. In the same manner the scope of the Community would, be limited by reason of the particular nature of the causes tending to produce that particular shaped body; for instance, such is the nature of the yarns, that in a thing produced out of these only the Community of ‘cloth’ can inhere; and such is the character of the lump of clay that the generality of the ‘Jar’ can inhere only in objects produced out of them.
Some people hold the followiûg view:—“The Community being absolutely inactive, could never move from one place to another, and thereby become connected with different objects; hence in the case of an object that did not exist before, when it is brought into existence, the Community could not come to inhere in it; and yet as a matter of fact we find that whenever and wherever the individual object is produced the Community is always present in it; and this leads us to conclude that all Communities exist everywhere (are omnipresent or allpervading).”
With a view to refute this view, the Author adds,—As Communities do not exist either in conjunction &c., &c. The ‘interval’ here spoken of may be either (1) Ākāśa, or (2) the substance Space, or (3) Air not in motion, or (4) absence of corporeal substance; and in any of these the Communities do not exist either by conjunction or by inherence; nor is there any evidence for believing that they exist without any sort of relationship; consequently it is said that they do not exist in the ‘intervals’; and yet they become connected with the objects that happen to be brought into existence at these intervals,—this being due to the peculiar force of the causes. Conjunction comes about only when one object comes, from another place, and into contact with the other thing; or a thing remaining in its place could have conjunction with another thing that would move up to it. Inherence however is of a different character; and hence wherever the requisite causes are set going towards the producing of the object, there in that object we have the inherence of the Community which does not come from anywhere else, and yet which had no existence at that point of space before the appearance of the object; and this peculiarity we cannot take objection to; as we cannot object to the nature of things as they exist.
The Bauddhas hold that there is no such thing as ‘Community’; as we are never actually cognisant of anything as inhereing in a number of individuals, in the manner of the thread passing through all the beads strung on it’
But this is not right; because as a matter of fact we are cognisant of something that exist in all individual cows, and serves to distinguish them from all other animals, such as the horse and the like. If there were no such common character possessed by all the various kinds of cows, then one individual cow would be cognised to be as different from another individual cow, as it would be from- an individual horse; or conversely the cow and the horse would be regarded to be as like each other, as two individual cows; as there would be no difference in the two cases. As a matter of fact however, we find that all individual cows are perceived to be alike; and this distinctly points to a certain factor which is present in all cows, and is not present in horses and other animals; specially as this factor is found to serve one and the same useful purpose (that of differentiating the cow from other animals), and as it has one and the same cause (in all cases).
It might be argued that the unity is that of the individual cows. But this is not possible; as if there were no Community, there could be no unity either among the Individuals, or of the causes of these Individuals: as all these ate distinct from one another. Then again, if the unity were to be due to the mere unity of the cause, then there would be no sort of unity in the case of those individuals that have diverse causes. As a matter of fact however, we find that there are different causes for things of the same kind; for instance, fire is produced from such diverse sources as the rubbing together of two pieces of wood, electricity, the rays of the sun falling on the Sūryakānta gem and so forth. So also if unity of many things were due to the fact of their producing the same effect, then such unity would have to be admitted in the case of totally different objects; for instance milk is found to be produced from the cow, as from the buffalo; and thus the cow would be the same as the buffalo; and the non-milch cow would not be a cow at all 1
Then again, if there ware no Community, what would be the object of denotation by a word? The ‘specefic individuality’ of any thing could not, be such an object; as having a momentary existence and being excluded form all things, it could never form the object of any verbal convention (on which the denotations of words chiefly depend). Nor could the vikalpa, or ‘determinate concrete qualification of a thing’, be the object of denotation; as this also has only a momentary existence, and is not common to any number of things. It might be argued that “the denotation of the word would be of the form of the ‘concrete qualificatian [qualification?].” But in that case, is the ‘form of the concrete qualification’ something different from that ‘qualification’, or is it non-different from it? If it is different, then is it common to all such qualifications? or is different with each qualification? If it is common to all, then it does not differ from what we call ‘Community’; and the only slight difference that there is between you and ourselves is that you regard this ‘Community’ to belong to the cognition, while we attribute if to the object, on account of its being cognised as something outside of ourselves. If then, this form be regarded as distinct from the ‘qualification’, and changing with each cognition,—or even if it were non-different from the cognition,—in either case, it Would not be capable of any verbal relationship; as like cognition it would never form the object of any verbal convention.
It might be urged that, “what the ‘concrete qualification’ does is to indirectly impose its own external form on the cognition, and thus make it also concrete; as it is only thus that the cognition could come into existence, and this externality of form would form the basis of the verbal relationship.”
But in that case, the form of the concrete qualification externally imposed, having its character dependent upon a single thing (viz the qualification itself), would be destroyed as soon as it would be produced on the production of the ‘concrete qualification and thus being cognised as undergoing destruction, it would be different with each ‘concrete qualification’; and we have already shown that there can be no verbal convention with regard to any such thing as would differ with each individual.
Objection: “The ‘concrete qualification’ of the cow imposes its appearance externally; and the appearance imposed by another ‘concrete qualification would be similar to that imposed by the former. The concrete qualifications too are comprehensive of their own forms only; and as such they could never lead to the apprehension of the difference among the forms imposed by themselves; as the apprehension of difference depends upon the apprehension of both the members (between whom the difference exists). Hence as this difference is not apprehended, we come to look upon the forms imposed by the concrete qualifications to be all one only; and thus speak of there being a single objective for all these qualifications. It is this objective that constitutes the ‘Sāmānya’ or ‘community’; and this community is negative in its character, being devoid of any absolute difference from the externally iṃposed forms of the ‘concrete qualifications and combining with the four other factors—of (1) the ‘specific individuality; (2) the cognition, (3) the form of the cognition, and (4) the imposed form,—comes to be spoken of as ‘ardhapañcamākāra’ (with a four-and-a-half-fold form); and having externality imposed upon it, it becomes expressible by words, and thereby comes to be the objective of the verbal relation. And it is the cognition of this that consititutes the cognition of the ‘specific individuality’; ‘and the form in which the community is imposed is that of that individuality. This ‘community’ again has the character of the preclusion of all other things; it has both positive and negative forms, as is proved by such assertions as ‘the cow is’, ‘the cow is not’, and so with all other things; if the communi by expressed by the word ‘cow’ were only in the positive form, then we could not have the assertion ‘the cow is’; as such an assertion would be tautological (the idea of ‘is’ being contained in the word ‘cow’ itself); nor could we have the assertion ‘the cow is not’; as this would be a contradiction in terms (no negation being compatible with positive character); similarly, if it had a purely negative form, the assertion ‘the cow is not’ would be tautological, and that ‘the cow is’ would be a contradiction in terms; as has been declared in the following words:—‘We cannot say that the jar exists, as the jar is a real entity; nor can we say the jar does not exist, as there is contradiction between existence and non-exsistence, It is for this reason that even distinct individuals appear as one.
This ‘community’ is the objective of all ‘concrete qualifications’; and the singleness of this leads to the singleness of these qualifications; and the singleness of these latter leads to the singleness also of their origin in the shape of the abstract unqualified cognitions that we have with regard to each individual object; and this leads to the singleness of the origin of these abstract notions,—namely, the objects themselves. This has been thus declared:—‘The cognition being the cause, a single idea cannot be diverse; and as the cause of a single cognition the individualities must be one’”.
To the above we make the following reply: The above reasoning is not sound; as it would seem that the Bauddhas give the name ‘community’ to the unity that is imposed by reason of the non-apprehension of the difference among the forms of the ‘concrete qualifications,’—this non-apprehension being inferred from the fact of no other alternative being found to be possible. And on this point we have the following observations to make:—Does the ‘imposition of non-difference’ consist in the non-apprehension of difference among the forms or does it consist in the apprehension of non-difference? The former could not be the case; as in that case the imposition of difference too would be as likely; that is to say, just as the differences among the forms of the concrete qualifications are not apprehended, so also is non-difference not apprehended; and hence just as nondifference is imposed by reason of the non-appehension of difference,—so, in the same manner, would difference be imposed by the non-apprehension of non-difference; and thence there could be no usage based upon non-difference. Nor is the second alternative quite reasonable—viz; that the imposition of non-difference consists in the apprehension of non-difference. Because it is only when the existence of the soul is admitted that a single perceiver can apprehend both difference and non-difference; when however, the existence of the soul is denied (as it is by the Bauddha), there can be no one observer of many things; speceally as the ‘concrete qualifications’ are each restricted to their own individual forms. Even though there be a single observer of many things,—yet unless there be any ground for singleness, there can be no apprehension of non-difference among different things. In fact, even if there were such an apprehension, it would be possible also in the case of such different forms as those of the cow, the horse and the buffalo; as there would be no difference in the character of the differences in the two cases.
Objection: “In the case of the forms of the cows, we have such a ground for singleness in the form of the preclusion of non-cows.”
Reply: What are the ‘non-cows’ the preclusion whereof imposes singleness on the form of cows? It might be urged that those animals that are not cows are the ‘non-cows.’ But then, the question would arise—what are the cows that are not ‘non-cows’? And thus it would be necessary to determine the forms of the cow, the preclusion whereof would determine the form of the non-cow; and conversely it would be necessary to determine the form of the non-cow, the preclusion whereof would determine the form of the cow; and thus the ignorance of one would imply the ignorance of both. As has been thus declared by the great teacher (Kumārila): ‘It would only be the well-known cow that could be precluded; and as this preclusion would be in the form of the negativing of the cow, it becomes necessary to say what this cow is that is negatived; until the cow is known, there can be no non-cow; and when there is no non-cow, whence could there be the cow? (Ślokavārtika—Chapter on ‘Apoha’).
It might be urged that what constitutes the denotation of the word is the Apoha or negation of the contrary. To this we make the following reply: what is this ‘apoha’? Is the ‘apoha,’ ‘the negation of the non-cow’ a positive entity, or a negative one? If the former, then, is this positive entity of the same character as the individual cow? or is it in the form of the individual non-cow? If the former, then it becomes something specific (as pertaining to a definite individual) and not generic (pertaining to all individuals; and we have already shown that no verbal process can apply to any such specific entity. If however, it be held to be of the nature of the individual non-cow, then too the same objections would apply; and over and above these there would be the further objection than the cow in that case would cease to form the denotation of the word ‘cow’. If then the ‘Apoha’ be regarded as a positive entity apart from the particular individuals, and pertaining to all of these,—then the difference in our views would be only verbal (as in this case what you call ‘apoha’ we call ‘Sāmānya’).
Further, if Apoha be regarded as a negative entity, consisting as it does, of negation (or preclusion,—then (being a negative entity) it could never be apprehended by a direct positive sensuous cognition; as it is only that which produces a cognition that can have the apprehensible or coginsable character; and a negative entity is, by its very nature, wholly devoid of the productiveness of any effect. And when a thing is not cognised by Sense-perception, there can be no cognition of a verbal convention with regard to it; and thus no verbal process could apply to a negative entity. When a negative entity is cognised by means of a word, the person hearing the word could not, by its means, be moved to any activity towards a positive object; for the simple reason that the negative is wholly different from the positive entity, and the two are devoid of all relationship between themselves.
Objection: “The verbal process applying to the ‘specific individuality’ must be regarded as due to non-discrimination or ignorance; since the individuality is cognised in the negative form; that is to say, the cognition of the cogniser is mistaken, being due to their unifying the perceptible and the imaginary, and then attributing a character to a thing to which it does nob belong.”
Reply: This is not right; that which is not cognised cannot have imposed on it any thing as identical with itself, in the form of a negative entity. As a matter of fact, the person hearing the word uttered has at that time no cognition of the object signified; as the word (according to you) pertains to something wholly different; and there is no other means available for cognising it; and yet we find the word giving rise to an activity on the part of the hearer, towards a positive object. And hence we cannot regard a negation to be the denotation of a word.
Nor have we any other ground for singleness (of the forms of individual cows). If all positive entities were to be mere negations of one another, and appearing as a new object at every moment, then no such entity could be cognised by means of any word; and that which is not directly cognised cannot form the object Of avoidance or acceptance, as its capablities would be absolutely unknown. And yet as a matter of fact, we do find usage based upon words; and so have we also the activity of all living beings in the world tending towards the obtaining of the desirable and the avoiding of the undesirable, and proceding from direct sensuous perception. And it is this usage that establishes the existence of a community common among many individuals; and it is to these communities that we find the denotations of words to pertain; and when a man knows of the capabilities of a certain class, and he comes to know that such and such a thing belongs to that class, he acts towards the obtaining of that object, even though he may never have perceived the particular object before.
Thus then the comprehensive cognition pertaining to distinct Individuals serves as the basis for Community; and if this were a mere negation, then the whole activity of the world would be impossible.