A comparative study between Buddhism and Nyaya

by Roberta Pamio | 2021 | 71,952 words

This page relates ‘Definition of Perception’ of the study on perception in the context of Buddhism compared to Nyaya (a system of Hindu philosophy). These pages researches the facts and arguments about the Buddhist theory of perception and its concerned doctrines while investigating the history of Buddhist epistemology (the nature of knowledge). The Nyaya school (also dealing with epistemology) considers ‘valid knowledge’ the means for attaining the ultimate goal of life (i.e., liberation).

Perception is an essential source of valid knowledge which makes us reach to reality directly while other sources make us reach to reality indirectly. It is known as an independent pramāṇa. Other sources of knowledge cannot negate perception as it is the basis of all sources of knowledge. It is considered as the root of all other sources. Knowledge which is produced by the contact of a sense-organ with an object is called perception. Perception in Sanskrit is known as pratyakṣa. The word “Pratyakṣa” is composed of two words, “Prati” which means before or near and “akṣa” which means eye which together mean “immediate knowledge”. It is used in two senses as an adjective, it indicates either knowledge or source of knowledge and as a noun, it shows of five sense-organs with their objects.

According to Buddhism, there are only two means of knowledge, Perception and Inference. They call perception as the direct source of knowledge while inference the indirect one. These two sources are opposed to each other. The direct thing cannot be indirect and the indirect cannot be direct. Buddhists maintain the theory of pramāṇavyavasthā[1] which is also known as “the limitations of sources of knowledge”. The arena of one source of knowledge is completely different from the other source. There is no joint function of the two sources of knowledge. Their processes to reach at reality are also different and exclusive. Similarly, their objects are also different. The object of perception is cannot be the object of inference and vice versa.

The theory of pramāṇa-vyavasthā is completely a unique theory which Buddhists contributed to epistemology. Even though many scholars have identified perception and inference as the merely two means of knowledge, they have not identified the thing that their spheres are completely different. Some non-Buddhist philosophers could not make distinction between perception and inference as Buddhism did by their definitions of perception and inference. In this respect the definition of perception has more importance as it is the backbone of not only the Buddhist’s theory of pramāṇavyavasthā, but also of the Epistemology of every school.

In Early Buddhism there were no systematic writings on logic in the field of Buddhist philosophy. In the beginning of the 2nd middle part of 4th century some thinkers, named Maitrēya, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu etc. began to work on logic in their writings as an essential part of their discipline. In the medieval period a new school of logic which had been completely different from general philosophy was established. This new school was founded by Diṅnāga. In his time Buddhist philosophers started showing their interest in logical issues.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

C.L. Tripathi, op.cit., p.84.

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