Text 143

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 143:

यद् अनियतदिक्प्रदेशसम्योगविभागकारणं तद् गमनम् इति ।। एतत् पञ्चविधम् अपि कर्म शरीरावयवेषु तत् सम्बद्धेषु च सत् प्रत्ययम् असत् प्रत्ययं च यद् अन्यत् तद् अप्रत्ययम् एव तेष्वन्येषु च तद् गमनम् इति । कर्मणां जातिपञ्चकत्वम् अयुक्तंगमनाविशेषात् । सर्वं हि क्षणिकं कर्म गमनमात्रम् उत्पन्नं स्वाश्रयस्योर्ध्वम् अधिस्तिर्यग् वाप्यणुमात्रैः प्रदेशैः सम्योगविभागात्न् करोति सर्वत्र गमनप्रत्ययोऽवुसिष्टस्तस्माद् गमनम् एव सर्वम् इति । न वर्गशः प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिदर्शनात् इहोत्क्षेपणं परत्रापक्षेपणम् इत्येवम् आदि सर्वत्र वर्गशः प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिव्यावृत्ती दृष्टे तद् धेतुः सामान्यविशेषभेदोऽवगम्यते । तेषाम् उदाद्युपसर्गविशेषात् प्रतिनियतदिग्विशिष्टकार्यारम्भत्वाद् उपलक्षणभेदोऽपि सिद्धः । एवम् अपि पञ्चैवेत्यवधारणानुपपत्तिः । निष्क्रामणप्रवेशनादिष्वपि वर्गशः प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिदर्शनात् । यद्युत्क्षेपणादिषु सर्वत्र वर्गशः प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिदर्शनाज्जातिभेद इष्यते एवं च निष्क्रमणप्रवेशनादिष्वपि । कार्यभेदात् तेषु प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिव्यावृत्ती इति चेत् न उत्क्षेपणादिष्वपि कार्यभेदाद् एव प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिप्रसङ्गः । अथ समाने वर्गशः प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिसद्भावे उत्क्षेपणादीनाम् एव जातिभेदो न निष्क्रमणादीनाम् इत्यत्र विशेषहेतुरस्तीति न जातिसङ्करप्रसङ्गात् । निष्क्रमणादीनां जातिभेदात् प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिव्यावृत्तौ जातिसङ्करः प्रसज्यते । कथं द्वयोर्द्रष्ट्रोरेकस्माद् अपवरकादपवरकान्तरं गच्छतो युगपन् निष्क्रमणप्रवेशनप्रत्ययौ दृष्टौ तथा द्वारप्रदेशे प्रविशति निष्क्रामतीति च । यदा तु प्रतिसीराद्यपनीतं भवति तदा न प्रवेशनप्रत्ययो नापि निष्क्रमणप्रत्ययः किन् तु गमनप्रत्यय एव भवति । तथा नालिकायां वंशपत्त्रादौ पतति बहूनां द्रष्ट्qणां युगपद्भ्रमणपतनप्रवेशनप्रत्यया दृष्टा इति जातिसङ्करप्रसङ्गः । न चैवम् उत्क्षेपणादिषु प्रत्ययसङ्करो दृष्टः तस्माद् उत्क्षेपणादीनाम् एव जातिभेदात् प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिव्यावृत्ती निष्क्रमणादीनां तु कार्यभेदाद् इति । कथं युगपत् प्रययभेद इति चेत् । अथ मतं यथा जातिसङ्करो नासित् एवम् अनेककर्मसमावेशोऽपि नास्तीत्येकस्मिन् कर्मणि युगपद् द्रष्ट्qणां भ्रमणपतनप्रवेशनप्रत्ययाः कथं भवन्तीति । अत्र ब्रूमः न अवयवावयविनोर्दिग्विशिष्टसम्योगविभागानां भेदात् । यो हि द्रष्टा अवयवानां पार्श्वतः पर्यायेण दिक्प्रदेशैः सम्योगविभागान् पश्यति तस्य भ्रमणप्रत्ययो भव्ति यो ह्यवयविनि ऊर्ध्वप्रदेशैर्विभागम् अधः सम्योगं चावेक्षते तस्य पतनप्रत्ययो भवति । यः पुनर्नालिकान्तर्देशे सम्योगं बहिर्देशे च विभागं पश्यति तस्य प्रवेशनप्रत्ययो भवतीति सिद्धः कार्यभेदान् निष्क्रमणादीनां प्रत्ययभेद इति । भवतूत्क्षेपणादीनां जातिभेदात् प्रत्ययभेदः निष्क्रमणादीनां तु कार्यभेदाद् इति ॥ १४३ ॥

yad aniyatadikpradeśasamyogavibhāgakāraṇaṃ tad gamanam iti || etat pañcavidham api karma śarīrāvayaveṣu tat sambaddheṣu ca sat pratyayam asat pratyayaṃ ca yad anyat tad apratyayam eva teṣvanyeṣu ca tad gamanam iti | karmaṇāṃ jātipañcakatvam ayuktaṃgamanāviśeṣāt | sarvaṃ hi kṣaṇikaṃ karma gamanamātram utpannaṃ svāśrayasyordhvam adhistiryag vāpyaṇumātraiḥ pradeśaiḥ samyogavibhāgātn karoti sarvatra gamanapratyayo'vusiṣṭastasmād gamanam eva sarvam iti | na vargaśaḥ pratyayānuvṛttivyāvṛttidarśanāt ihotkṣepaṇaṃ paratrāpakṣepaṇam ityevam ādi sarvatra vargaśaḥ pratyayānuvṛttivyāvṛttī dṛṣṭe tad dhetuḥ sāmānyaviśeṣabhedo'vagamyate | teṣām udādyupasargaviśeṣāt pratiniyatadigviśiṣṭakāryārambhatvād upalakṣaṇabhedo'pi siddhaḥ | evam api pañcaivetyavadhāraṇānupapattiḥ | niṣkrāmaṇapraveśanādiṣvapi vargaśaḥ pratyayānuvṛttivyāvṛttidarśanāt | yadyutkṣepaṇādiṣu sarvatra vargaśaḥ pratyayānuvṛttivyāvṛttidarśanājjātibheda iṣyate evaṃ ca niṣkramaṇapraveśanādiṣvapi | kāryabhedāt teṣu pratyayānuvṛttivyāvṛttī iti cet na utkṣepaṇādiṣvapi kāryabhedād eva pratyayānuvṛttivyāvṛttiprasaṅgaḥ | atha samāne vargaśaḥ pratyayānuvṛttivyāvṛttisadbhāve utkṣepaṇādīnām eva jātibhedo na niṣkramaṇādīnām ityatra viśeṣaheturastīti na jātisaṅkaraprasaṅgāt | niṣkramaṇādīnāṃ jātibhedāt pratyayānuvṛttivyāvṛttau jātisaṅkaraḥ prasajyate | kathaṃ dvayordraṣṭrorekasmād apavarakādapavarakāntaraṃ gacchato yugapan niṣkramaṇapraveśanapratyayau dṛṣṭau tathā dvārapradeśe praviśati niṣkrāmatīti ca | yadā tu pratisīrādyapanītaṃ bhavati tadā na praveśanapratyayo nāpi niṣkramaṇapratyayaḥ kin tu gamanapratyaya eva bhavati | tathā nālikāyāṃ vaṃśapattrādau patati bahūnāṃ draṣṭqṇāṃ yugapadbhramaṇapatanapraveśanapratyayā dṛṣṭā iti jātisaṅkaraprasaṅgaḥ | na caivam utkṣepaṇādiṣu pratyayasaṅkaro dṛṣṭaḥ tasmād utkṣepaṇādīnām eva jātibhedāt pratyayānuvṛttivyāvṛttī niṣkramaṇādīnāṃ tu kāryabhedād iti | kathaṃ yugapat prayayabheda iti cet | atha mataṃ yathā jātisaṅkaro nāsit evam anekakarmasamāveśo'pi nāstītyekasmin karmaṇi yugapad draṣṭqṇāṃ bhramaṇapatanapraveśanapratyayāḥ kathaṃ bhavantīti | atra brūmaḥ na avayavāvayavinordigviśiṣṭasamyogavibhāgānāṃ bhedāt | yo hi draṣṭā avayavānāṃ pārśvataḥ paryāyeṇa dikpradeśaiḥ samyogavibhāgān paśyati tasya bhramaṇapratyayo bhavti yo hyavayavini ūrdhvapradeśairvibhāgam adhaḥ samyogaṃ cāvekṣate tasya patanapratyayo bhavati | yaḥ punarnālikāntardeśe samyogaṃ bahirdeśe ca vibhāgaṃ paśyati tasya praveśanapratyayo bhavatīti siddhaḥ kāryabhedān niṣkramaṇādīnāṃ pratyayabheda iti | bhavatūtkṣepaṇādīnāṃ jātibhedāt pratyayabhedaḥ niṣkramaṇādīnāṃ tu kāryabhedād iti || 143 ||

Text (143): Gamana or Going is that action which brings about conjunctions and disjunctions with points of space in diverse directions.

All these five kinds of Action appear in connection with parts of the body and things in contact with it, and is ‘conscious’ as well as ‘unconscious.’ Any other action that appears in the aforesaid things and also in other things, without consciousness (on the part of any person), is only a form of ‘Going’.

Objection: “It is not right to divide Actions into five classes; because they are all of the form of ‘Going’. Every momentary action appearing in the form of ‘Going’ brings about the conjunctions and disjunctions of its substrate with even the minutest points of space either above, below or on one side of it; and every such action is equally regarded as ‘Going’; and all actions are only in the form of Going.”

Reply: It is not so; as we are distinctly conscious of each class of actions as inclusive of the like and exclusive of the unlike actions; for instance, we have such ideas as that ‘here we have the action of Throwing Upwards, and there of Throwing Downwards’; and it is on the basis of these notions that we become cognisant of the various classes and subclasses of Action. Then again, the presence of the particular prefixes ‘ut’ and the rest distinctly indicates that each of them produces effects in. distinct directions; and thus also is established the distinct characterestic genus of each set of actions.

Objection: “Then too it is not quite correct to say that there are only five kinds of action; as in regard to such actions ‘entering’ ‘coming out’ and the like also, we have exclusive and inclusive notions with reference to each set of them. Hence if in the case of ‘Throwing Upwards’ and the rest mentioned by you we have to admit of distinct classes by reason by our having inclusive and exclusive notions with regard to each set of them, then, for the same reason, we may have such distinct classes as ‘coming out’, ‘entering’ and the like also. If might be argued that in the case of Throwing Upward &c., the notions of exclusion and inclusion are due to the fact of their producing distinct effects. But then, in the case of ‘entering’ and ‘coming out’ also, we may attribute like notions to the same cause. And when the notions of exclusion and inclusion are found to be present equally in both cases, we find no special reasons whereby we might admit distinct classes in regard to ‘Throwing Upwards’ &c., and not in regaid to ‘coming out’ &c.”

Reply: Not so; as any such distinction as you propose would give rise to a cross-diversion of classes. That is to say, if on the mere ground of exclusive and inclusive notions we were to regard ‘coming out’ and the rest to be distinct classes, then we would have a cross-division or intermixture of classes. For instance, when two men are looking at a man ‘coming out’ from one room and ‘entering’ the other, the two men simultaneously have the notions of the actions, ‘Coming out’ and ‘catering’,—one of them, having the notion ‘he comes in or enters’, and the other the notion ‘he goes out but if the two men are behind a curtain, and on the removal of the curtain they find that the man is not in the room where he was before, but in another room, then they have no notion either of ‘coming out’ or of ‘entering’; the only idea that they have is that of the man having ‘gone’ form one to the other—a notion of ‘going’ only. Similarly, when the leaf of the bamboo falls in a whirlpool of water, and many men are looking on it, then it so happens that at one and the same time they have the notions of ‘whirling’, ‘jailing and ‘entering’; hence if these were regarded as distinct classes, we would have a ‘mixture’ of classes (a cross-division).

In regard to ‘throwing upward’ &c.,on tie other hand we find no intermixture of notions. And it is for this reason that we regard these latter only as forming distinct classes, and thereby giving rise to notions of exclusion and inclusion; while as regards ‘Coming out’ &c., these notions are; regarded as being due to the distinct effects produced by them.

Question: “How can there be distinct notions at one and the same time (with regard to the same object)? That is to say, if you hold that in the case of ‘throwing upward’ &c., just as we have no cross-division, so too we have no inclusion of many actions,—then we ask how, with regard to and the same action (the falling of the leaves in the whirl-pool), people could have such distinct notions as those of ‘whirling’ ‘falling’ and ‘entering’?”

To the above we make the following reply: What you say is not quite correct; as the different actions are due to the difference in the conjunctions and disjunctions of the whole object and its parts, with distinct points in space.

That is to say the person, who will be looking on the object and will perceive the gradually appearing and disappearing conjunctions and disjunctions of its parts on several sides of it with the points of space, will have the notion of ‘whirling’ with regard to it; while one who observes only the disjunction of the object as a whole from the points of space above, and its conjunction with those below it, will have the notion of ‘falling’ with regard to it; while lastly he who observes its conjunction with the inner part of the whirlpool, and its disjunction from the outer parts, will have the notion of ‘entering.’ And thus it is established that the distinct notions that we have with regard to ‘Coming out’ &c., are due to the difference in the effects produced by them. Hence it is that we regard the distinct notions with regard to ‘throwing upwards’ &c., to be due to distinct ‘classes’, while those with regard to ‘Coming out’ and the like to be due to the difference of these effects.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

“Conscious” action is that which is preceded by a certain effort on the part of one to whom the action belongs; and ‘unconscious’ action is that which is not preceded by any such effort. In such substances as the parts of the body and the stick &c. in contact therewith, or in substances other than these, whatever action appears, which is not preceded by any effort or consciousness on the part of any person, has to be regarded as a form of ‘going.’

An objection is raised: “You have declared that there are five classes of Actions, in the form of ‘Throwing upward’ and the rest; but this is nob right, as all these actions do not in any way differ from ‘going.’ To explain further,—In regard to ‘Throwing upward’ we have the notion of the thing going up, and in the case of ‘Throwing downwards' that of its going down; and so on, which leads us to conclude that all these are only different forms of ‘Going?”

Reply. What you say is not right; as we are distinctly conscious &c., &c. That is to say, in the case of the cow, we find that we have a notion inclusive of all cows, and also a notion exclusive of all other animals, the horse &c.; and this leads ns to assume the class ‘Gow;’ and in the same manner, in regard to ‘throwing upwards,’ also we have an inclusive notion with regard to such actions, and another notion exclusive of all other kinds of action, and as such we are fully justifying in assuming the class ‘Throwing upward.’ This is easy to understand.

Then the author proceeds to show that there is, in the case of these five classes of actions, a difference of their characteristic marks also. [The word ‘api’ is to be construed next to the word ‘karyārambhāt.’] The word ‘upalakṣaṇa’ is here used in the sense of that which marks the individual; and this mark is the one that is imprinted by the class to which the individual belongs. What the author means is that in regard to the actions in question we have not only distinct exclusive and inclusive notions as establishing distinct classes, but also a difference in the effects produced by each class of these actions,—these effects being in the form of conjunctions and disjunctions with different points in space, as expressed by the prefixes ‘ut’ &c. Some people explain the word ‘upalakṣaṇa,’ in the present passage as meaning ‘signification’; the meaning in this case being, that the words ‘utkṣepaṇa,’ ‘avakṣepaṇa’ &c., have distinct significations; and as such each one of these must be regarded as distinct. If all of these were identical then ‘Throwing Downward’ also would, like ‘Throwing upward,’ be the cause of conjunctions and disjunctions with points of space above (and this is not really the case.)

Another objection is raised: “If in the case of ‘Throwing upward’ &c., distinct classes are accepted on account of our having inclusive and exclusive notions with regard to them, then, in as much as we have such notions with regard to such actions as ‘Coming out,’ ‘Entering’ and the like, we must regard these latter also as constituting distinct classes; and in that case, the restriction of the number of Action-classes to five only would not be right If the difference of our notions with regard to the latter set of actions be regarded as due to the difference in the effects produced by them, then the same may be said to be the case with ‘Throwing upward’ and the rest also.

Reply: If we regard ‘coming out’ &c., as distinct classes then we shall have a ‘Cross-Division’; i.e., the anomaly of one and the same action belonging to various mutually contradictory classes. This the author proceeds to explain further—In a case where a man goes out of one room into the other, with regard to this same man and the same action, the man in the room from which he has gone has the notion of his ‘going out,’ while another man in the room wherein he goes has the notion of his ‘coming in.’ And if these notions of ‘coming in’ and ‘going out’ were due to distinct classes, then we would have the absurdity of one and the same action (the ‘going’ of the man) being included in two such contraditory classes as ‘Coming in’ and ‘Going out.’ But when the two observers are behind a curtain, and on the curtain being removed they find that the man is not in the room where he was before, the only idea that they have is that of his having ‘gone,’ and not that of ‘coming in’ or ‘going out.’ Hence we conclude that the action in question is a form of ‘going’ only; and as for the difference in the idea that we have, this must be regarded as due to the difference in the attendant circumstances (the effects produced, and so forth). Another instance is cited—that of the whirlpool.

The following question is raised—“How could there be notions of ṃany actions with regard to one and the same substance,—when in any one substance, there cannot be more than one action, at one and. the same time?”

And in answer to this the Author says—The different notions etc. This is easily understood. When the actions of the component parts are found to bring about conjunctions and disjunctions of the sides of the object, we have the notion of ‘whirling’; and the difference in the effects produced in regard to the object as a whole, gives rise to the notions of ‘falling’ and ‘entering?