5.2. Perception of Abhāva

[Full title: Object of Perception: Perception of Abhāva]

Jayanta believes that abhāva (negation) is an object of perception as it is objectively real. For Naiyāyikas there are two main kinds of reality, namely, bhāva (being) and abhāva (non-being). The bhāva signifies positive realities like substance, action, quality, universal, particularity and inherence and the abhāva signifies negative reality which referred to as non-existence, negation. Non-existence is understood differently by different schools. The Sāṃkhyas and the Prābhākaras understood as the only existence of a locus is non-existence. For instance: the non-existence of a table in the room means the existence of the room alone. But the Nyāya, the Bhāṭṭa and the Vedānta state that non-existence is an entity which is different from its place where it resides. There include some positive facts in it.

Dr. S.C. Chatterjee observes:

“All objects have two characters, a positive and a negative. A thing exists positively in itself and is characterised negatively by the absence of another thing in it.”^[1]

The Vaiśeṣikas and the Prābhākara maintain that it is apprehended by inference. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntis state that non-existence is apprehended by anupalabdhi. But the Sāṃkhya and the Nyāya believe that it is known through perception. Jayanta agrees with Naiyāyikas and rejects the view of the Buddhists, the Prābhākaras, and the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas. The Nyāya theory of negation (abhāva) is mainly different from Kumārila. The Nyāya believe in the objective reality of abhāva but it is apprehended by perception. On the other hand, Kumārila hold nonapprehension (anupalabdhi) as a source of knowledge. He says that abhāva being negative can only be perceived through a negative source of knowledge.^[2] Jayanta objects this view and says it is not important or essential that an object and source of knowledge should be the same in nature. According to him, when one opens his eyes one perceives the room as well as non-existence of the table but when one closes them he/she does not see any of the two. So there is no explanation to maintain that the cognition of the room is sense-perception and cognition of the non-existence for instance of a table in the room, is other than sense-perception. He states that the form of the contact existing between sense and non-existence is viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Ibid.

[2]:

C.D. Bijalwan, op.cit., p.108.