5.1. Perception of the Universals

[Full title: Object of Perception: Perception of the Universals]

Jayanta maintains that:

“The objects which are grasped through perception are odour, flavour, colour, touch and sound, their respective substance, e.g. earth, qualities such as number belonging to these substances, movements such as lifting up and the universals inhering in them and their negation.”^[1]

The problem of the universal has been solved by the different schools of Indian philosophy. There are three views regarding universal, viz., Nyāya -Vaiśeṣika expounds the realistic view, Buddhists expounds the nominalistic view, The Vedāntis expounds the conceptualistic view.

According to Naiyāyikas, sāmānya (universal) is a reality. The locus of it is viśeṣa (particular). It is an eternal reality. It is one, but exists in many. The theory of universal is connected with the theory of determinate perception. According to the Naiyāyikas, the universals which inhere in perceptible objects are perceived by the senses which perceive their substratum. The senses of sight and touch perceive the universals of substances. When one perceives the jar he perceives the universal “jarness” inhering in it. This perception is happened due to saṃyukta samavāya. The universal belonging to qualities and actions are perceived by saṃyuktasamavetasamavāya. Jayanta maintains that universals are perceived.^[2]

The Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya and the Prābhākaras state that samavāya (inherence) relation exists between the universals and its particular while the Bhāṭṭas and the Vedāntis hold that the relation is that of identity (tādātmya). According to Prabhākara, samavāya relation is many and non-eternal. Vaiśeṣikas hold that samavāya relation is one and eternal but cannot be perceived. Jayanta, like other Naiyāyikas maintain that samavāya relation is one, eternal and can be perceived.

The Buddhists reject the idea of universal maintained by Nyāya. According to them,

“The particular alone is real and the universal does not exist over and above the particulars. According to them it is simply the name of certain objects which is commonly applicable to them and which differentiates them from other objects because other objects are referred to by other names. So the idea of sameness with regard to a number of individuality solely depends upon the fact that they are referred by the same name.”^[3]

The Buddhists maintain the nominalistic view of class essence. The Buddhists state that all particular cows are called cows because they are not non-cow and therefore, there is no place of universal. The Nyāya replies to this view of Buddhists that their comprehending notion is in a positive form and not in negative form.

Further, Kumārila states that the universal and the particular are similar as well as different. The relation between the universal and the particular is that of identity. The relation between the two is not of inherence. Prabhākara maintains the universals are not identical with particular but it subsists in it and the universals are perceptible.

Advaita Vedanta states that:

“Universals are identical with the substance in which they are experienced to reside and they have no independent entity apart from the particulars.”^[4]

According to Advaita Vedānta, the perception of universals happens with the perception of the particular by the medium of saṃyuktatādātmya in case of the universals of substance, saṃyuktābhinnatādātmya in case of the universals of qualities and actions and tādātmyavadabhinna in case of the universals of sound. So the universal is perceived with the perception of the individuals. Dr. S.C. Chatterjee maintains that these three forms are similar to the second, third and fifth forms of sense contact of Naiyāyikas. The only difference is Naiyāyikas talk of relation of inherence (samavāya) while Vedāntin believe in the relation of identity.^[5]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

C.D. Bijalwan, op.cit., p.104.

[2]:

D.N. Shastri, op.cit., p.334.

[3]:

C.D. Bijalwan, op.cit., p.106.

[4]:

Ibid.

[5]:

S. Chatterjee, op.cit., p. 176