A comparative study between Buddhism and Nyaya
by Roberta Pamio | 2021 | 71,952 words
This page relates ‘Perception of Cognition’ of the study on perception in the context of Buddhism compared to Nyaya (a system of Hindu philosophy). These pages researches the facts and arguments about the Buddhist theory of perception and its concerned doctrines while investigating the history of Buddhist epistemology (the nature of knowledge). The Nyaya school (also dealing with epistemology) considers ‘valid knowledge’ the means for attaining the ultimate goal of life (i.e., liberation).
5.3. Perception of Cognition
[Full title: Object of Perception: Perception of Cognition]
There are different of opinions regarding the way of the cognition of cognition. The Jainas, the Prābhākaras Mīmāṃsakas, the idealist Buddhists, the Sāṃkhyas and the Advaita Vedāntis hold with some disagreement with one another, that cognition is known by itself. Cognition being consciousness is aware of itself by its very nature. The Prābhākaras have discovered the theory of tripuṭīsaṃvit and thus hold that knowledge manifests knowledge, the object and the knower or the subject. The Advaita Vedāntis hold that knowledge is self-luminous and self-shining. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas maintain that knowledge is not perceptible. It cannot be known directly. It is inferred from the cognizedness (jñātatā). The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas are of the view that knowledge is perceived by internal perception.
The idealists Buddhist and the Advaita Vedāntins believe that knowledge is not perceptible. The Buddhists assert that knowledge manifests itself while Advaita Vedāntins is of the view that knowledge is self-luminous. For Buddhists the idea of self-luminosity is positive whereas for Vedāntis it is negative. The Bhaṭṭas state that knowledge is inferred from cognizedness or prākaṭya (manifestness) produced by the cognition in the object.[1] Keśavamiśra refutes the Bhaṭṭa view and maintains that cognizedness is nothing other than the character of being the object of cognition.
Prābhākaras maintain that every knowledge manifest itself, the cognizing self and the object. As lamp shows the related object and does not need another lamp to show it, similarly knowledge manifests other objects and is also self-luminous (sva-prakāśa). Jayanta holds that cognition is not self-luminous because a logical determination of self-luminosity is not possible. Cognition is perceptible as it is a temporary specific quality of the self like pleasure.
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
C.D.Sharma, op.cit., p.225.