2.5. Perception according to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa

[Full title: 2. The Prācina-Naiyāyika Theory of Perception—Perception according to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa]

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa wrote the work Nyāyamañjari in which he interprets Gautama’s definition of perception. Naiyāyikas maintain the main cause of perception is senseobject-contact. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa agrees with this view and like other Naiyāyikas, also explains the nature of perception and the sense-organs with regard to their object. His discussion is mostly the same as other Naiyāyikas like Uddyotakara, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also states that the perception is that cognition which is generated by the sense-objectcontact. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa counts the sense-organs as smell, taste, sight, touch and hearing. He enlists things as odour, flavour etc. and maintains that the way in which the contact of sense organ with their objects is six fold.^[1] The sense-organs cannot apprehend the concealed objects so the existence of the sense-object-contact is proved by this fact. The contact between sense organ and object is not only a condition but it is essential that the sense-organs, being the instrumental cause of the act of perception, are associated with the other conditions that exist in the process of perception. The contact of sense-organs of touch and taste with their object is observed doubtlessly. The other sense-organs share some features with sense-organs of touch and taste, it is understood that they also come in contact with the objects and generate the act of perception.

Jayanta states that the word “utpanna” suggests that:

“The sense organs determinate perception as its condition so that the object which is perceived also conditions its perception. It is not proper to conclude that the adjective clause “which arises from the sense-object contact” excludes the inner perception of pleasure, etc., from the domain of perception. It is rather included in it and is grasped by the inner sense organ. It is however, not enumerated in the list of sense organs because it is not elemental like the external sense organs.”^[2]

According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, it is purely dependent on the case that the perception of a thing produced by four or three or two phases of contact. For instance: when one perceives the colour of an object four phases of contact are involved to generate its perception. Here the soul is united with the mind which comes into contact with external sense-organ which again is associated with the coloured thing in which colour inheres. The internal perception of internal objects such as pleasure, pain, etc., involves two contacts. The external organs like eyes, have nothing to do with it. The transcendental perception of the self by a saint is generated by a single contact because in this besides from the soul and the internal organ there is no third object, viz., a subject or an object exist.^[3]

According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the word avyapadeśya Gautama wants to indicate that there is at least the existence of a state which is not endowed with a word, its denotation and their relation. Though the judgments like “this is a cow” are verbalised knowledge, there is the initial sense-perception which is capable of being defined and this has become possible through insertion of the adjunct avyapadeśya.^[4] To conclude Jayanta Bhaṭṭa says Gautama, the author of Nyāyasūtra inserts both determinate and indeterminate perception in the field of sense-perception and by the word avyapadeśya he means indeterminate perception.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa maintains that the term avyabhicāri signifies non-erroneous^[5] like old Naiyāyikas.

He then interprets the term vyavasāyātmaka. He mostly agrees with Vātsyāyana while interpreting the term. But there is difference in the examples which they provide to clear their views. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa maintains that the term vyavasāyātmaka has been inserted in the definition in order to remove doubt from the field of perception. It is not right to state that the feature sense-object-contact is sufficient to obtain this purpose because doubt is cognized by the mind which is an internal sense-organ. He states that a doubt expressed in the form “it is either a rope or a snake” is grasped by the external senseorgans.

Some scholars believe that “doubt” is not different from error and the term “nonerroneous” eliminates “doubt” from the field of perception and hence, the word vyavasāyātmaka is redundant. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refutes this view by maintaining that “doubt” is not similar as “error” because their causes are different. He says error is conditioned by the remembrance of an attribute which does not belong to the object in front of us. A man recollects waterness at the contact of the rays of the sun with his eyes and thus has illusory experience. Doubt, on the other hand, is conditioned by the recollection of the two specific features. For instance: “this is a snake or a rope” is followed by the recollection of “snake-ness” and “rope-ness”. Hence doubt is a class in itself and the term vyavasāyātmaka is important to eliminate it from sense-perception.

Some scholars maintain that the term avyapadeśya is sufficient to eliminate doubt and error from the domain of true sense-perception because it is not possible to maintain that doubt and error are indeterminate. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa does not agree with this view and says that as a piece of determinate perception is not associated with the words denoting its object, error and doubt owe their existence to the function of their sense-organ but are not verbalized. Therefore, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa affirms that the term vyavasāyātmaka is not redundant.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

sannikarṣastu indriyāṇāmarghaiḥ saha ṣaṭprakāraḥ. Nyāyamañjari , I-68.

[2]:

C.D. Bijalwan, op.cit., p.71.

[3]:

S. Chatterjee, op.cit., p.72.

[4]:

C.D. Bijalwan., op.cit., p.73.

[5]:

avyabhicārigrahaṇaṃ vyabhicārijñānavyavacchedāetham. Nyāyamañjari , I-76.