Verse 2085

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अन्ये पुनरिहाज्ञानमलीमसधियो जगुः ।
चित्तमात्रतया नायं युज्यते श्रुतिबाधनात् ॥ २०८५ ॥

anye punarihājñānamalīmasadhiyo jaguḥ |
cittamātratayā nāyaṃ yujyate śrutibādhanāt || 2085 ||

Other people, with intellect obscured by ignorance, have asserted as follows:—“It is not right that all this is mere idea (or cognition); because this is set aside by the revealed word”.—(2085)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

In the Introductory verses the ‘Intervolved Wheel of Causation’ has been described as ‘not dependent upon any self-sufficient Revelation’; the Author sets forth arguments in support of this:—[see verse 2085 above]

‘Other people’—the followers of Jaimini.

These people argue as follows:—“Injunction alone is the basis for determining Dharma (what one should do) and Adharma (what one should not do), the only light available for all beings, being like the common ‘Eye’ of all. It must be accepted as authoritative and reliable by all intelligent men seeking to know their Duty (Dharma); not so other words composed by human beings. Because the ordinary human being has his mind beset with Ignorance, Attachment and the rest; hence his word is not capable of affording the right knowledge of supersensuous things; it is for this reason that ‘Duty’ and such other matters cannot he learnt from the words of such persons.—Nor is Duty amenable to the Sense-perception of people of limited vision; because it is beyond ‘the reach of the Senses and hence absolutely imperceptible.

“For instance Dharma (Duty) and Adharma (its contrary) are characterised by capacity to bring about what is good and what is evil (respectively); as has been asserted in Śabara’s Bhāṣya—‘That alone is spoken of as Dharma which brings about the good (or welfare) of man;—how.do you know that?—when a man performs a sacrifice, people call him dhārmika, firm in the performance of his duty; and it is only when one does something that he is called after it; e.g. the man who does the cooking is called the Cook, and one who does the chopping is called the Chopper; in the same way that is spoken of by the name Dharma which brings man into contact with the highest good

“What thus becomes explained is that Dharma is the capacity of Substance, etc. to bring about what is good. For instance, Substance, Quality and Action are spoken of as particular means of accomplishing the Good; and it is shown that the name ‘Dharma’ is applicable to these. These, Substance and the rest, are perceptible, in their own forms,—but not as the means of accomplishing the good; and it is in this latter form that they are held to be ‘dharma’, not merely in their own forms. This has been thus asserted—‘The Good consists in the happiness of the man, and this happiness is brought about by Substance, Quality and Action as indicated in the Injunction; hence it is to these that the character of Dharma belongs; even though these, by themselves, are within the reach of the Senses, yet it is not in that form that they are Dharma. The fact of these being the means of accomplishing the good is learnt from the Veda; and it is in this form that these are Dharma; hence Dharma is not amenable to the Senses’. [Vide Ślokavārtika, Sū. 2, 191, and 13-14.]—‘In that form’, as being the means of bringing about the Good.—Thus it is established that Dharma is a capacity or Potency.

“From this it is also clearly understood, by implication, that Adharma also, as contrary to Dharma, is a Potency or capacity to bring about what is not-Good.

“This capacity or Potency a man with limited powers of vision cannot perceive directly by the Senses; because capacity is always inferred from its effects; as has been declared in the passage—‘The Potencies of all things are always proved by Presumption from these effects’.—(Ślokavārtika, Sū. 2, 200.)—If it were not so, then the character of ‘having limited powers of vision’ would disappear.—Nor can the Perception of mystics apprehend supersensuous things,—simply because they are Perception,—like any other Perception.

“Nor can Inference be of use in knowing what is Dharma; because Inference can envisage only such a thing as has had its relation with something else already known; and Dharma is not such a thing.

“Nor can Analogy bring about the knowledge of Dharma; because Analogy consists in similitude and brings about the cognition of a thing not before the Eyes; e.g. the seeing of the Gavaya brings about the remembrance of the Cow; and there can be nothing which is known to be similar to Dharma,—which similarity could bring about the cognition of this Dharma.

“Nor is Presumption capable of bringing about the knowledge of Dharma and Adharma. Because Presumption consists in the assuming of something not perceived, on the ground that something else, which has been perceived or heard of, would not be possible or explicable without the said assumption. Dharma is not something without which something else would not be explicable or possible,—whereupon its Presumption could be based.

“Non-apprehension also, which consists in the absence of all Means of Cognition, serves to bring about the idea of this is not, and not any positive idea.

“Thus then, Dharma and Adharma would fall within the jaws of this Non-apprehension and would be swallowed by it, if the Vedic Injunction were not there to save them. Hence Dharma must be regarded as ‘that which is indicated by the Injunctive Word as conducive to welfare’,—and it cannot be anything that is indicated by the Senses or other Means of Cognition.

“As a matter of fact, it is the Injunction that is capable of providing knowledge of what is past, present or future,—also what is subtle or hidden or remote and such like; this cannot be done by any Sense-organ.—(Śabara-bhāṣya 1.1.2) For these reasons the Injunction must he regarded as authoritative and reliable.

“The name ‘Injunction’ is applied to words that urge to activity or to avoidance of activity, e.g. the words ‘Desiring Heaven, she should perform the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice’ urge one to activity; and the words ‘One should not injure living beings’ urge one to desist from activity.

“For you (Buddhists) the only means of establishing the authoritative and reliable character of the Injunction consists in mere Ideation with the ‘Three Principles’;—such is the meaning of your definite pronouncement (Proposition).—And this view is not correct.—Why?—Because it is set aside by the Revealed Word;—that is, it is negatived by the Veda, which has spoken of Agnihotra and other things which are quite distinct from ‘Cognition’ (Idea); in fact, the Veda itself stands apart from ‘Idea’.

“The mention of ‘mere Ideation’ is only by way of illustration. There are other propositions of the Buddhist which are set aside by the Veda,—such as ‘All things are momentary’, ‘There is no Soul’, ‘There has been an Omniscient Person’, ‘There should be freedom from attachment’ and so forth. All these words express ideas that are contrary to what is said in the Veda.”—(2085)

It might be urged against the above Mīmāṃsaka view that all this would be set aside by the Veda only if its authoritative character were established.—Hence the Mīmāṃsaka adds the following:—[see verse 2086 next]