From Nehru to Rajiv: FortyYears of India’s Foreign Policy

FROM NEHRU TO RAJIV
Forty Years of India’s Foreign Policy

Prof. A. PRASANNA KUMAR
Andhra University, Waltair

Attempting to sketch the foreign policy of India, stretching over a period of forty years, from 1946 to 1985, in an article like this, would be a hazardous exercise. Still, I venture to do it; and in doing so I am aware of the limitations this attempt inevitably suffers from. I have chosen to start from 1946 as it was in that year that Jawaharlal Nehru talked about some specific outlines of India’s foreign policy after freedom was won. From that year to the present, constitute forty years of momentous changes for India in particular and the world in general. This is a period sandwiched between two cold wars–­one that had begun when India was moving from bondage to freedom and the other, the second cold war, that has begun almost in the neighbourhood of India. These forty years have seen six Prime Ministers in India (including Charan Singh’s six-month stint and excluding, of course. Gulzarilal Nanda’s brief interludes as acting Prime Minister). Four wars have taken a heavy toll of our scarce resources during this period. India’s policies, domestic and external, were influenced by the politics of the bi-polar world system that emerged after the second world war. The bi-polar world later became multi-polar. Yet as Kissinger said, the world is still militarily bi-polar though politically multi-polar. India continues to be a “force” in international fora, being now the leader of NAM. But how effective is India’s role and how much of weight does she carry in world politics, compared to what it was thirty years ago? India is without doubt, the dominant power in South Asia and the number one State in the sub-continent, flatteringly told sometimes that she is going to be a “super power” by the turn of the century. Yet, no country in the region regards India as a genuine friend, with some of her neighbours trying to embarrass India now and then with accusations of “hegemonistic” ambitions. Our defence expenditure which was a meagre Rs. 300 crores thirty years ago, has now soared to over Rs. 7600 crores. Yet our borders are not more secure now than in the past.

The most dangerous developments of the recent past have occurred in our neighbourhood. The super power rivalry in the Indian Ocean bas escalated to alarming proportions. The United States has not only built powerful bases in the ocean zone but has dumped highly sophisticated military-ware in the Middle East and at our doorstep in Pakistan. Russia’s occupation of Afghanistan has created a severe security problem for the region. It is against this dark ground that India’s challenging task has to be viewed. Can India guard her integrity and protect her security without compromising on her avowed goals of non-violence, non-alignment and goodwill towards all? Have India’s options become harder and narrower? Can India overcome the challenge by peaceful means through diplomatic channels, without building pipelines of military supplies from abroad? These are some questions that every thinking Indian might ask today as we pass through the mid-eighties, hoping to land in a safe, secure and prosperous 21st century. In studying foreign policy it might be considered arbitrary, if we discuss it under such titles as “the Nehru era” or “the Indira era” or “the Janata period.” Every leader has his or her own approach to the issues of his or her times. It may be right to say that our foreign policy is but a continuation of a process begun forty years ago, though some differences in approach can be found at different periods. Just as a streak of unity is said to underlie India throughout her long history, the basic philosophy of India’s foreign policy has remained unaltered and the goals that Nehru had set for India and the role he had envisioned for India and Asia in world politics continue to be relevant today.

The foreign policy of a democratic nation, said Dean Acheson, is expected to reflect that nation’s “total culture”.¹ Jawaharlal Nehru must have thought on those lines when he proclaimed that India’s foreign policy was “inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom”.² Nehru declared in 1946, when he was the Vice-President of the Interim Government, that India would follow “an independent policy, keeping away from the power politics of groups aligned one against the other.” “India”, said Nehru. “would work for international co-operation and goodwill and oppose racial discrimination.” The motto too was stated: “Closer relations with neighbours and good relations with all”.³ Distressed at the raging of cold war winds then, Nehru struck a note of caution too when he said that “it would have been astonishingly foolish to fall into this business of the cold war either on grounds of principle or on grounds of expediency”.⁴ Nehru seemed to have been constantly inspired by the heritage of the great Asian civilizations, like the Chinese and Indian, and he did not hesitate to emphasise, whenever occasion warranted, the greatness, if not superiority, of these ancient civilisations. He summoned the Asian Relations Conference at Delhi in March, 1947 and that marked the beginning of a new era for Asian consciousness and identity in world affairs. For about a decade from then on the proclamation was made in no un­clear terms that Asia would show the way to the world; India would lead Asia in this effort; and he (Nehru) would lead India in pursuit of this goal. It was more than a move­ment. It was a mission. Buddha’s concern for humanity, Ashoka’s renunciation and Gandhi’s non-violence constituted the core of Nehru’s philosophy. The days of secret diplomacy the narrow nineteenth century diplomatic methods and the crude cold war politics could all be given a burial, Nehru thought. Nehru’s speech at the Columbia University in 1949 in which he stated the goals of India’s foreign policy was another instance of his determination to strike a new path in world affairs. The goals of India’s foreign policy, he said, included “maintenance of freedom both national and individual”, “the elimination of want, disease and ignorance which afflict the greater part of the world’s population”. ⁵ These are goals not just for India but for the entire world. No wonder India’s foreign policy became “a fascinating study” to some Western scholars. As Geoffrey Tyson put it: “Nehru did not need to go to New York to make pronouncements of international affairs; the world press came to Delhi to hear him”.⁶ Delhi became a necessary diplomatic stopover for world leaders and diplomats visiting Asia.

Yet, Nehru was aware of the hazardous path he was treading. E. H. Carr once wrote that “foreign policy is not an exercise in sainthood.” Nehru was in agreement with this view. In Glimpses of World History Nehru admitted that the world was a hard place for “the idealist.” He fully understood “the power dynamics underlying international relations.” As K. Subrahmanyam observed, Nehru’s non-alignment “was a sophisticated policy of retaining maximum available options at any given time in a bi-polar world”. ⁷ Nehru’s policy as Escott Reid perceptively pointed out, “United India” and helped “to ease relations between the West and Peking”.⁸ The creation of a new third force, practically a moral force, arresting the spread of military alliances the fight for the liberation of the oppressed peoples of Asia and Africa through non-violence and the zeal to build bridges of understanding and goodwill among states, small and big, and among people of all climes became the features of a new movement launched under India’s leadership. “We are not neutral between right and wrong. We are neutral between hatred and fear,” declared Nehru. Yet some Western scholars and writers like Henry Kissinger poured scorn on India’s policy. Said Henry Kissinger: “The most strident advocates of neutrality are often the people who in dress, learning and manner of thinking are closest to the West”.⁹ Behind “their anti-colonialism lies psychological chaos”, said Kissinger, adding that Nehru and the non-aligned leaders were “tempted to play a leading role in international affairs which was a fertile field of manipulation for ambitious men because of their intractable domestic problems”.¹⁰ Kissinger accused the third world countries of behaving like “arbiters” not “neutrals”, Exhorting the United States and the USSR “not to compete for the allegiance of the uncommitted” Kissinger lamented that “We sometimes act as if we and the communists were engaged in a debate in the Oxford Union, with the uncommitted nations acting as moderators and awarding a prize after hearing all arguments”.¹¹ Such strong comments were made particularly at a time when India looked “blatantly partisan” in the eyes of many critics for her sharp condemnation of Israeli aggression against Egypt (ed by the Western powers) and her reluctance to condemn Russian invasion of Hungary. Criticism of India’s different positions on two similar issues seemed justified. Michael Brecher, however, made a sharp distinction of India’s perception of the two crises. Said Brecher: ¹² “Nehru’s condemnation of Western powers over Suez and his initial rationalization of Russia’s occupation of Hungary were due to two sub-conscious responses: (1) a continuing mistrust of Western actions because of the lengthy history of Anglo-French colonialism in Asia and Africa and willingness to give Russia a fair hearing because of the absence of direct Russian penetra­tion into South and South East Asia and (2) an unstated belief that violence that is bad but white violence against non-whites is worse”. This explanation apart, India lost many friends because of the manner in which India’s spokesmen, Krishna Menon being the shining example of them, harangued in world fora and the United Nations. The “liberation” of Goa was described by the Washington Post “as a world class instance of post-colonial hypocrisy”. ¹³ China’s aggression against India in 1962 caused immense damage to India’s policy and to the non-aligned move­ment as a whole. In a way the Chinese attack “exposed” the limitations of India’s policy. A more practical approach became necessary in the light of new developments. For India the ’Sixties were the most troubled decade both internally and externally. Two Prime Ministers, Nehru and Shastri, died suddenly. Two wars rocked the nation that was passing through a severe food shortage. Another war with Pakistan was thrust on India. India’s treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971 was criticised as the last straw on the of non-alignment, though Mrs. Gandhi made it clear that there was no question of making a compromise of our policy of non-alignment. Critics should remember that by taking American aid and advice during India’s war with China in 1962, India had not walked into the “American trap”. Equally the Indo-Soviet treaty did not make India a “satellite” of the Soviet Union. In that precarious situation when there was a collusion between Pakistan, China and America and with the Nixon administration being determined to give India “a hen” there was no alternative for India except to strengthen her ties with the Soviet Union which had stood by India through thick and thin. Mrs. Gandhi’s brilliant reply to a Press reporter during her visit to the United States in 1982, summed up her approach to foreign policy. When a reporter pointedly asked Mrs. Gandhi whether India was tilting to the left or to the right, Mrs. Gandhi shot , “We are tilting neither to the left nor to the right, but standing straight.” Mrs. Gandhi provided the right direction to India’s policy stressing India’s security and invulnerability in the region. India’s decision not to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974 confirmed India’s determination to keep her nuclear options open. Mrs. Gandhi rebutted charges that India was growing nuclear ambitions by pointing out that there was a difference between a nuclear country and a nuclear weapon country. The Simla Agreement with Pakistan, the magnanimity shown by India in the return of POWs and the efforts to repair relations with Pakistan could not, however, allay Pakistan’s fears about India. Both Mrs. Gandhi’s Government and the Janata Government tried to improve relations with Beijing and the process of normalisation of relations with China is still on, though the pace of progress is slow. If India’s relations with China have, in the last ten years, not deteriorated, India’s relations with the other neighbours have not much improved. It is here that a more vigorous policy is called for in view of the recent developments.

Though Russia’s occupation of Afghanistan has been described as a serious threat to Pakistan, there has not been any serious move from Moscow to destablise Pakistan. Yet. Pakistan has used the issue to acquire massive supply of arms, planes and missiles, none of which can be used against any country but India. India is opposed to Russian presence in Afghanistan. India is privately opposed to continued Russian presence, though publicly India has not opposed it. As Rajendra Sareen sums up: “India has a vital stake in seeking the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The restoration of Afghanistan as a buffer between the Soviet Union and the sub-continent is of crucial significance for the peace of the region”.¹⁴ Once the Russians withdraw from Afghanistan, India will be more free to pursue the zone of peace concept which she and Sri Lanka had first talked about nearly fifteen years ago. Pakistan’s threat perception has increased despite flow of arms from abroad. So has India’s fear of Pakistan’s designs including nuclear intentions. Now that the Chinese “threat” has receded India can play a more advantageous role by first of all attending to the Pakistan factor. Together, India and Pakistan, can help in defusing tension in the region as a first step toward normalization of relations between them to be followed by a sort of detente between the super powers in the region as a whole. Should such a scenario develop, the other countries in the region would automatically give up fears about India’s intentions. Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bhutan would not fear India “as too big not to swamp the others.” Nor would Bangladesh accuse India of trying to play the “big brother” all the time. India’s immediate problems are the ethnic riots in Sri Lanka and Pakistani’s war hysteria.

Thus as India now thinks of moving into the 21st century as a strong and stable country, one has to reflect on the legacy that India has inherited from a great past and of the foundations so ably laid by Nehru, Patel and other stalwarts in our domestic and foreign policy. There have been occasions when India was accused, perhaps not without justification, of moving away from the chosen path. There are still some “embarrassments” to us which we cannot easily shake off. Yet, during the first two hundred days of his prime minister-ship Rajiv Gandhi has struck the right note in his foreign policy pronouncements. First of all, he has most reassuringly conveyed to our neighbours that India does not wish to seek a dominant position in the region at “the expense” of others. The manner in which he set at rest all doubts about India’s intentions with regard to the Tamil-problem in Sri Lanka is a point in this regard. He has made it clear to Pakistan that India does not believe in the disintegration of that country though Pakistan cannot afford to take India for a ride using the India card to get massive arms aid from abroad. Secondly the Prime Minister’s first visit abroad, to the Soviet Union, has been a tremendous success and the relations between the two countries continue to be good. More importantly the relations with the United States appear to be taking a turn for the better and that can help in defusing tension in the sub-continent gradually. India’s options seem to have become wider and a new era of more positive relations with the Western countries can be ushered in without alienating India’s old and trusted friends. The fact that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has referred to Jawaharlal Nehru’s vision and approach to foreign policy on more than one occasion is indicative of the new Prime Minister’s determination to correct a few “imbalances” that may have crept into our policy-making system. There is every reason to hope for a fresh and a more constructive approach to India’s policy.

All this is not to argue that India should give up her pre­eminent position in the region or that India should show any let up in her efforts to strengthen her defense. India’s options, including the nuclear, should be kept open. No less important it is for India to guard her frontiers and the long coast-line with more strength and seriousness. We cannot get to those times when we were perhaps deluded into thinking that our “friends” would not covet our territory. We were perhaps complacent then. Over the years we have plugged the loopholes of our defence system and are “now well-equipped to meet any threat to our integrity” as we are constantly assured. Yet, we cannot afford to lose sight of the high goals that we had set before ourselves – peace, goodwill and elimination of want and disease. It was a tryst with destiny: It is still a commitment to humanity. And if the land of Gandhi and Nehru cannot pursue such goals, which country in the world can do it?

References

¹ Quoted in Cecil V. Crabb Jr. American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age. Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1960. P. 5.
2. India’s Foreign Policy, Publications Division. P. 83.
³ Dr. B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, History of the Congress. Vol. II, PCC XIV.
⁴ India’s Foreign Policy. Op. cit., p. 83.
⁵ Tyson, Geoffrey, Nehru – The Years of Power, Pall Mall Press, London. Pp. 69-70.
⁶ Ibid.
7 Power and Foreign Policy. World Focus, 1980, Annual Number. P.7.
⁸ Envoy to Nehru P. 228.
⁹ Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. Harper Bros., 1957 P. 259.
¹⁰ Ibid.
¹¹ Necessity for Choice, Chatto and Windus. Pp. 330 - 331.
¹² Nehru, A Political Biography. Oxford University Press, 1959. P. 556.
¹³ Guardian Weekly, December 4, 1983.
¹⁴ Pakistan–The India Factor, Allied Publishers, 1984. P. 30.
¹⁵ J. D. Sethi, South Asia–Stability and Regional Co-operation (Ed. M. G. Agwari), CRRID, 1983. P. 78.