The case of Arthāpatti

So Udayana next takes up presumption (arthāpatti) which is admitted as pramāṇa by the Mīmāṃsaka. Briefly, this pramāṇa is admitted to explain a cognition which cannot be directly produced. When one meaning cannot be comprehended without assuming another meaning the second meaning is said to be produced by presumption. For example, a statement is made in respect of a certain boy–this healthy boy does not eat anything during the day. The apparent meaning of the sentence is absence of taking food. But then the implication of the statement cannot be justified, because a person cannot remain healthy without taking any food. There is a contradiction between health and abstention from food. This contradiction can be resolved if it is assumed that the boy takes food at night. Thus the real meaning of the above statement is that the boy eats at night only. This meaning cannot be understood by any other source of knowledge like perception etc. It is produced by presumption. Now, it is claimed that the nonexistence of God can be proved by presumption. According to Nyāya God is omniscient and all-powerful. So he should be able to induce people to good actions and prevent them from being engaged in bad actions even without giving any instruction. But God actually gives instructions in the form of scriptural statements guiding people to actions. It cannot be said that he does not know how to induce without any instruction because he is admitted to be omniscient. So there is a contradiction between inducing and instruction. It can be resolved only by the denial of God. There is no God who can guide people to action. There are only instructions. People follow them and perform good actions and do not perform bad ones.^[1]

To refute the above position Udayana says that if there is no cause there can be no effect and this rule cannot be denied by anybody. If the Vedic statements do not come from God they will not be valid. Without a valid instruction people cannot be induced to action only by the will of God. It is found that when there is a verbal instruction people follow it and act accordingly. If it is argued that there can be motivation for action even without any instruction, let it be admitted then that people are led to action simply by adṛṣṭa. Thus the Veda will be quite unnecessary. The instructions of God are justified because they guide us to actions. Moreover, presumption cannot be accepted as a separate source of knowledge, because its purpose is served by inference. One meaning can be justified by another meaning only when there is some kind of invariable relation between the two. For example, it is proved that one cannot be healthy without taking food. Taking food is the cause of health. There is a casual relation between the two. In other words, there is invariable concomitance between the two. So this is a clear case of inference. It is not correct to say that when there is a contradiction between two sources of knowledge presumption has to be admitted as resolving the contradiction, because actually one pramāṇa cannot be contradicted by another pramāna. One of them must not be a pramāṇa. It is not possible that both are pramāṇas and both give valid knowledge, but they present contradiction fact.

Next Udayana takes up the pramāṇa called nonapprehension. That it cannot disprove the existence of God has actually been shown at the beginning of the third stavaka while discussing the objection raised by the Buddhist. At the end of the stavaka Udayana gives arguments to show that non apprehension cannot be accepted as a separate source of knowledge.^[2]