Sūtra 4.19

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 4.19:

न तत् स्वाभासं दृश्यत्वात् ॥ ४.१९ ॥

na tat svābhāsaṃ dṛśyatvāt || 4.19 ||

na—is not. tat—it. svābhāsam—self-illuminating, dṛśyatvāt—because of its knowability; because it is the knowable.

19. It is not self-illuminating, being,, the knowable.—179.

The Sankhya-pravachana commentary of Vyasa

[English translation of the 7th century commentary by Vyāsa called the Sāṅkhya-pravacana, Vyāsabhāṣya or Yogabhāṣya]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

A doubt may arise that the mind itself may be self-illuminating as well as the illuminator of the objects, as in fact it is believed by the Vaināśikas to be like lire, which illuminates itself as well as other objects. Therefore says:—‘It is not self-illuminating being the knowable.’ As the other organs and the object of sound, &c., are not self-illuminative on account of their being knowable, so also should the mind be understood to be. Fire is no analogy here. Fire does not illuminate any form of itself which might have been non-luminous before.’ The illumination spoken of here is meant to be the illumination which is brought about by the contact of the luminous and the dark, not of the self-luminous. There can be no contact of anything with its own nature. Further, the statement that the mind is self-illuminating means that it is not perceivable by any other entity. This is in the same way as when it is said that the Ākāśa is self-supporting, it is meant that it has no support at all. Living beings are seen acting in accordance with the consciousness of the movements of their Will-to-be. ‘I am angry,’ ‘I am afraid,’ ‘I am attached here,’ ‘I am repelled there,’ these notions are proper only on account of the knowledge of self-identification not being taken in.—179.

The Gloss of Vachaspati Mishra

[English translation of the 9th century Tattvavaiśāradī by Vācaspatimiśra]

Mentions the Vaināśikas:—‘A doubt may arise, &c.’ This is the meaning. It may be so if the mind be the sphere for the functioning of the Self. The mind however is self-illuminative and it illuminates other objects also as it illuminates itself. How then can it be the sphere for the constant knowledge of the Puruṣa? How moreover docs it in its unchangeability differ from the changeable mind. Therefore, ‘It is not self-illuminating, being knowable.’ It might be so if the mind were self-illuminating, (self-knowing), but it is not. Being changeable, the mind is pervaded by perceptibility, like the colours of blue, &c. Whatever is pervaded by perceptibility, is not capable of becoming self-illuminative, because the modification contradicts itself. The act and the object cannot both be the same. The cooking is not cooked: the cutting is not cut. The Puruṣa, however, being unchangeable as he is, is not the object of the act of consciousness. In him therefore self-illumination is not improper. His illuminativeness does not depend upon any other, he is self-illuminative and is not the object of the act of consciousness. Hence the mind is the object of the act of knowing on account of its being the knowable; it is not self-illuminative. The meaning is that because the mind is seized of the reflection of the self the object of its modifications are illuminated.

But the fire is both the knowable and the self-illuminous as a jar, &c., are brought to light by fire not so fire is brought to light by another fire. For this reason says:—Fire is no analogy hero. Why not? ‘The fire does not illuminate, &c.’ The moaning is that fire may not be brought to light by other fire, but it is illuminated by consciousness. It is thus not illuminated by itself, and for this reason there is no over-lapping (Vyabhicāra). ‘The illumination spoken of hero, &c.’ The words ‘spoken of here’ differentiate from the illumination which is of the nature of the Puruṣa, the illumination, that is to say, which is of the form of the action. This is intended to bo said: Whatever action there may be, it is scon in relation to the subject, the instrument and the object. As cooking is seen in relation to Caitra, fire and rice, so also illumination. Illumination also is action. This also must therefore be like that. Relation lives in different objects; it is not possible in the absence of distinction. Further the assertion that the mind is self-illuminating, means that the mind is not perceivable by any other entity.

Let that be. Let the mind be not perceivable by any other entity. The mind would not cease to bo if the act of knowing, which is neither its cause, nor its pervade, ceased to be. For this reason he says: ‘By the’ consciousness of the movements of his own Will-to be.’ The Will-to-be is the mind. Its movements are its functionings. Living beings are creatures. The various mental modifications of anger, greed, &c., are felt by each mind for itself, together with their substratum the mind, and also together with their objects. They in this way establish the objectivity of the mind. Renders the consciousness of the movements of the Will to-be plainer:—‘I am angry, &c.’—19.