Vakyapadiya of Bhartrihari
by K. A. Subramania Iyer | 1965 | 391,768 words
The English translation of the Vakyapadiya by Bhartrihari including commentary extracts and notes. The Vakyapadiya is an ancient Sanskrit text dealing with the philosophy of language. Bhartrhari authored this book in three parts and propounds his theory of Sphotavada (sphota-vada) which understands language as consisting of bursts of sounds conveyi...
This book contains Sanskrit text which you should never take for granted as transcription mistakes are always possible. Always confer with the final source and/or manuscript.
Verse 3.7.87
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of verse 3.7.87:
यन्निर्वृत्ताश्रयं कर्म प्राप्तेरप्रचितं पुनः ।
भक्ष्यादिविषयापत्त्या भिद्यमानं तदीप्सितम् ॥ ८७ ॥yannirvṛttāśrayaṃ karma prāpterapracitaṃ punaḥ |
bhakṣyādiviṣayāpattyā bhidyamānaṃ tadīpsitam || 87 ||87. The object which is already accomplished and which does not acquire any special feature because of coming within the range of action is īpsita (desired to be attained) inasmuch as it becomes the object of actions like eating.
Commentary
The author now explains how, in the sentence guḍam bhakṣayati = he eats sugar, sugar comes within the definition of an object.
[Read verse 87 above]
[How does sugar (guḍa) come within the definition of object (karma) in the sentence guḍaṃ bhakṣayati? As it is already there it cannot be the nirvartya kind of object. Eating does not make any difference to it as sugar. As sugar, it is already there. Its mention gives completeness to the action of eating, because unless there is something to eat, eating cannot be done. Sugar becomes īpsita, because it attains differentiation according as it becomes the object of the action denoted by this root or that. In this way, it becomes the kind of object called ‘prāpya’ (something to be reached). Although sugar is already there, in the sentence under discussion, it is presented as becoming the object of the action of eating and not of any other action. That is the special feature which it acquires here and that is why it is considered to be prāpyam karma. Nothing more than this is required for something to become this kind of object. Satisfaction is the result of eating sugar. Sugar is the means in regard to this satisfaction, but it becomes the means only when it becomes the object of the action of eating. Just as the guru is the means in regard to the production of merit but can become so only if he is served. Thus it has been shown that in the sentence in question sugar and the action of eating it are both īpsita.]
If something which is not in any way affected by an action can still be looked upon as its object, how can the distinction between transitive (sakarmaka) and intransitive (akarmaka) among roots be maintained? This is now answered.