Sūtra 4.1.9 (Perception of Taste, Smell, and Touch)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 4.1.9:

तेन रसगन्धस्पर्शेषु ज्ञानं व्याख्यातम् ॥ ४.१.९ ॥

tena rasagandhasparśeṣu jñānaṃ vyākhyātam || 4.1.9 ||

tena—by this; rasa-gandha-sparśeṣu—in respect of taste, smell, and touch; jñānam—knowledge; vyākhyātam—explained.

9. Hereby is explained (perceptual) knowledge in the case of Taste, Smell, and Touch.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

Of the attributes other than Touch, co-exsistence in the same substratum with colour is itself the necessary condition of their being perceptible by the external senses. Fot this reason, after having stated the conditions of perception of colour, he now extends them to other cases, and says:

[Read sūtra 4.1.9 above]

‘Tena’ means by the preceptual knowledge of colour. As preception of colour arises from some special characteristic of colour, viz., colourness, non-obscuration, and appreciability, so perception of taste arises from some particularity of taste, characterised as tasteness, non-obscuration, and appreciability. This should be applied to other cases. Combination with a compound of more than two substances, should be also extended. From inappreciability to the organs of the ear, the tongue, and the skin, result non-apprehension of smell, taste, and touch. Being undeveloped or inappreciable, smell and taste are not perceived in a stone, etc.; for they are perceived in their ashes. Some maintain that they are perceived indeed in the stone, etc., but not distinctly. The non-apprehension of the colour of a watery substance, the parts of which have been disjoined from one another, is due to non-developme it of the colour. So also is the non-apprension of taste. In hot water, there is non-apprehension of the colour of the fire, in consequence of its nondevelopment, and of touch, in consequence of its obscuration. In comminuted camphor, the campaka flower, etc., non-apprehension of colour, taste, and touch is due to their non-development or inappreciability. In gold, and the like, colour is indeed developed, but whiteness and luminousness are obscured. Some hold that colour also is obscured, whereas the apprehension of gold takes place with the help of other colour. Obscuration, again, is non-apprehension caused by the apprehension of a more powerful like object, and not merely relation or connection with a powerful like object. For, since connection with a powerful like object has to be ascertained by non-apprehension it is the non-apprehension which is of primary importance. Whereas the powerful like object is not of primary importance, as the necessary condition of non-apprehension; because neither non-apprehension, nor antecedent non-existence of apprehension, nor its absolute non-existence is subject to its operation, while the annihilation of apprehension does not exist there. If it be objected, “Then your proposition also, that obscuration is non-apprehension caused by the apprehension of a more powerful like object, is not proved,” we reply, “Let it be so. Still apprehension and non-apprehension alone are the necessary conditions of the strength or weakness of a like object, or of the existence of such a relation; and the same is the meaning of the word, obscuration.”—9.