Sūtra 4.1.8 (Requisites of perception of colour)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 4.1.8:

अनेकद्रव्यसमवायात् रूपविशेषाच्च रूपोपलब्धिः ॥ ४.१.८ ॥

anekadravyasamavāyāt rūpaviśeṣācca rūpopalabdhiḥ || 4.1.8 ||

aneka—more than one; dravya—substance; samavāyāt—from combination in; rūpa—colour; viśeṣāt—from some special characteristic of; rūpa—colour; upalabdhiḥ—perception.

8. Perception of colour (arises) from its combination with a compound of substances more than two, and from (its possession of) some special characteristic of colour.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

In this way having, immediately after the section on the eternality of the ultimate atoms, finished the section on the perceptibility of external objects, as a subsidiary topic, by their being the inferential marks of the ultimate atoms, and intending to set forth, by introducing an example, the section on the perceptibility of Attributes, he says:

[Read sūtra 4.1.8 above]

‘Rūpaviśeṣa’ means the species or peculiarity inherent in colour, and that consists of the characteristics of being developed to the degree of appreciability, of being unobscured, and of being colour. From this, perception of colour takes place. Lest it might be said that, such being the case, the colour of the ultimate atom as well as of the dyad would be perceived, so it has been added—‘anekadravy a-samavāyāt.’ The word ‘aneka’ denotes multitude; hence ‘anekadravya’ means that to which many substances belong as its substratum, e.g., a molecule of the atoms, and the like. To term ‘anekadravya-samavāyāt’ therefore, means from combination with such a compound substance. The water-pot, etc., although they are originated by two parts, (i.e., potsherds, etc.), really contain a multitude of substances as their substratum, in the serial arrangement of the parts of these parts, and so on. As taste, touch, etc., lack in the characteristic of colourness, so there is no ocular perception of them. In the case of ocular fire or light, non-visibility is due to the absence of the degree of appreciability. Development or appreciability is only a particular universal entity or ‘class’ belonging to the particular attributes of colour, etc., and is pervaded by, or included in, colourness, etc.

Objection:—This being so, no relation of higher and lower (classification) will be at all established even by whiteness, fragrantness, sourness, etc. If, however, you suppose a manifoldness of development or appreciability, pervaded by, or included in, them respectively, then there will be a redundancy of supposition, and the term development or appreciability, also will have various meanings.

Answer:—It is not so; for, development or appreciability denotes the upādhi or condition, namely, the characteristic of the attribute capable of being apprehended by each individual external sense, while non-development or non-appreciability denotes only the absence of the upādhi or condition. Some say that appreciability is simply the non-existence of non-appreciability. This should be considered, since non-appreciability also cannot be similarly established. It may be said that non-appreciability is a particutar attribute beyond the cognizance of the senses. If it be so, then it would follow that appreciability is a particular attribute within the reach of the senses. If it be asked, “"What is the determinant of sensuousness?,” we reply that both of us, (i.e., the disputants) are equally at a disadvantage here. They also say that appreciability is the one and only one ‘class’ present in all particular attributes, and that the non-establishment of the relation of higher and lower is no fault in the case of the class inhering in attributes.—8.