Text 123

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 123:

सिद्धदर्शनं न ज्ञानान्तरं कस्मात् प्रयत्नपूर्वकम् अंजनपादलोपखड्गगुलिकादिसिद्धानां दृश्यद्रष्ट्qणां सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टेष्वर्थेषु यद् दर्शनं तत् प्रत्यक्षम् एव । अथ दिव्यान्तरिक्षभौमानां प्राणिनां ग्रहनक्षत्रसञ्वारादिनिमित्तं धर्माधर्मविपाकदर्शनम् इष्टं तद् अप्यनुमानम् एव । अथ लिङ्गानपेक्षं ध्रमादिषु दर्शनम् इष्टं तद् अपि प्रत्यक्षार्षयोरन्यतरस्मिन्न् अतर्भूतम् इत्येवं बुद्धिरिति ॥ १२3 ॥

siddhadarśanaṃ na jñānāntaraṃ kasmāt prayatnapūrvakam aṃjanapādalopakhaḍgagulikādisiddhānāṃ dṛśyadraṣṭqṇāṃ sūkṣmavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭeṣvartheṣu yad darśanaṃ tat pratyakṣam eva | atha divyāntarikṣabhaumānāṃ prāṇināṃ grahanakṣatrasañvārādinimittaṃ dharmādharmavipākadarśanam iṣṭaṃ tad apyanumānam eva | atha liṅgānapekṣaṃ dhramādiṣu darśanam iṣṭaṃ tad api pratyakṣārṣayoranyatarasminn atarbhūtam ityevaṃ buddhiriti || 123 ||

Text (123): Occult perception is not a distinct form of Knowledge. “Why?” Because the perception of subtle, hidden and remote things, that the perceivers of things have,—through their exerting of such occult, powers as are obtained by the. application of certain unguents to the eyes and to the feet, and by the use of the ‘sword’ the ‘pill’ and ths like,—is purely ‘sensuous.’

Then as for another kind of cognition that is regarded as ‘occult’—viz., the cognition of the fruition of past virtues and vicious deeds in the experiences of the living beings, of the heavens, the atmosphere and the Earth, as indicated by the movements of plants and asterisms,—this also is only inferential.

As for the cognition of virtue &c., independently of inferential ‘indicatives, this would be included either in ‘sensuous’ of in Ārṣa’ cognition.

Such then is Buddhi.—(IX-ii-13).

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

Some people regard ‘occult perception’ to be a distinct form of knowledge; and with a view to setting aside this view, the author says—‘occult perception is not a distinct form of knowledge’; and this he next proceeds to explain further. Those people are called ‘siddha’ (‘endowed with occult powers’) who are capable of perceiving such things as have definite forms and are capable of being perceived and those perceivers who have obtained their occult powers by means of unguents &c. have perceptions of such things as are too fine or subtle for ordinary perceptions, or are hidden from ordinary vision, or are too remote for ordinary perception; but this perception also is dependent upon the functioning of the senseorgans (aided by the applications &c.); and as such it cannot but ba regarded as purely ‘sensuous.’

The other kind of cognition put forward is distinctly inferential, being due to the perception of the planetary movement &c., which, thus, serve as ‘inferential indicatives’.

Then as for the cognition of virtue &c., independently of the cognition of any such ‘indicatives,’ it is either ‘sensuous or ārṣa’; for instance, when the cognition would be brought about by the agencv of the sense-organs it would be ‘sensuous and if independently of such agencies, it would be ‘ārṣa.’

The author sums up the section. Thus, in the above manner has Buddhi been described.