Further analysis of the Argument

The opponent may say that the contingency of an effect is proved by perception. So it cannot be denied. But we do not admit that it is due to some definite factor. It just happens accidentally (akasmāt).^[1] In answer, Udayana says that the statement of the opponent may have five implications. First, it may mean a denial of the cause. An effect is not produced from a cause. Secondly, it may be a denial of the production of an effect. An effect is never produced. Thirdly, it may mean that an effect is produced by itself, nothing additional is necessary. Fourthly, the meaning may be that an effect is produced from a nonentity. Fifthly, the implication may be that an effect is contingent because of its own nature. But Udayana says that none of the alternatives is acceptable.^[2] If the production of an effect is considered independent of a cause there cannot be any explanation as to why the effect should not come into being always. If it is possible for an effect to be produced at any time without a cause regulating its production, then there would be nothing to prevent the effect from being produced at any other time, or for that matter, at all other time. In fact, that an effect appears at a particular time and place and not at any other can be explained only if it is admitted that there is a cause antecedent to it which acts as a determinate.^[3]

Secondly, it may be true that if there is no production of an effect there is no need for a cause. But the production of an effect is a fact which is established by general perception. We actually find that an effect comes into existence at a particular point of time and previous to it the effect is not existing. If it were nonexistent all the time, then there would have been no problem. But the question is: what makes the nonexistent existent? If it be the nature of an effect that it is never produced it should not actually appear even when it is found to be present.^[4]

Thirdly, if an effect is supposed to be produced by itself, it would not be produced at all, because, being nonexistent before its production it cannot exert any causal influence upon its appearance. By their very nature a cause is antecedent and an effect is the consequent. Thus the same thing cannot be both a cause and an effect. Moreover, in this alternative, there will be total identity between the cause and the effect. But this is not logical. A cause and an effect are different, they serve different purposes. For example, a piece of cloth can cover the body, but a bundle of yarns cannot.^[5]

Fourthly, it is absurd to claim that an effect may be produced by a nonentity. It goes against the fact of the contingency of an effect. A nonentity is always absent. If it were capable of determining the appearance of an effect, the effect may appear at any time, because there is no regulating factor.^[6]

Finally it may be argued that an effect comes into existence at a particular time not because there is a cause responsible for the same, but because it is the nature of the effect to happen at that particular moment. We find that there are things which are uncaused and always present, e.g. ākāśa. There are also things which are always nonexistent, e.g. a lotus blooming in the sky. Again, there are things like the jar etc. which are sometime existent and sometime nonexistent. This variety in the nature of things can be explained only by assuming that they are so by nature, no additional factor makes them so. In fact, in the case of space, even those who admit a causal relation have to accept such a position. For example, so many different things are required as causes for the production of a piece of cloth, but the piece of cloth is located only in the yarns and not in any other cause. Why is it so? The only answer is that it is the nature of the cloth to be inhering in the yarns. Similar is the case with other effects like the Jar etc. which inhere only in the potsherds etc. The same rule should be applied to the case of time also. It is the very nature of an effect that it is related to only some particular point of time and not to all the time.^[7]

The opponent may still try to save his position by saying that only some kind of a prior limit may be admitted and the purpose may be served by what is called prior nonexistence (prāgabhāva) and there is no need for accepting as cause any positive category (bhāvapadārtha).^[8] The Nyāya also accepts this kind of nonexistence and that it is an antecedent to every effect. But such a position also is untenable. It is not possible to select specially only prāgabhāva and claim that it is the only one prior limit. The question is: why should not any other positive category be taken as such a limit? The opponent may at best give two answers. It may be said that at the moment such non-existence is there, no other positive category is present there. Secondly, it may be claimed that some other positive category may be present there, but it has no role in the production of the effect. The first alternative is not justified, because in that case it will not be possible to justify the presence of prior nonexistence. Such nonexistence in the case of an effect can be known only when all the other causes for the effect have assembled there together. The fact is that when all the factors necessary for the production of particular effects are found to be collectively present one has the notion that the effect is going to appear immediately and this absence of the effect just before its appearance is prāgabhāva. In short, without the admission of other positive causes it is impossible to determine such nonexistence as an antecedent.^[9] The second alternative also is equally unjustified. What does the statement that the other positive categories have no role in the production mean? It may mean that these categories may be looked upon as the limit, but they are not invaluably related to the effect. In that case even a thing which is observed to be antecedent even in only instance may be considered as a limit for the production of an effect. Thus it will lead to an absurdity that even an ass may produce smoke. Secondly, the statement of the opponent may mean that the other categories are invariable, but they do not make any contribution. To this the answer is that there is no need to search for the performance of any other function, because the invariability itself may be considered to be so. Thus it may be said that the necessary function of an antecedent positive category is: when the category is there, the effect is there and when the category is not there the effect is not there. It is not necessary that to be a cause a thing must produce some special property.^[10]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 1.5.

[2]:

Prose commentary on Ibid.

[3]:

Ibid.

[4]:

Ibid.

[5]:

Ibid.

[6]:

Ibid.

[7]:

Ibid.

[8]:

On Nyāyakusumāñjali 1.6.

[9]:

Ibid.

[10]:

Ibid.