Sūtra 7.2.2 (Proof of Separateness)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 7.2.2:

तथा पृथक्त्वम् ॥ ७.२.२ ॥

tathā pṛthaktvam || 7.2.2 ||

tathā—similarly; pṛthakatvaṃ—separateness; Individuality.

2. Similarly, Separateness (is a different object).

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

With a view to prove separateness also, by means of its similarity to Unity, he says:

[Read sūtra 7.2.2 above]

The practice of discrimination or separation verily exists, in the form, namely “This is separate from, other than, a different object from, this.” For, separation means definite apprehension or grasp, having regard to certain limits. Here, again, Colour, etc., are not the cause, since they are not its invariable antecedents, and also because the limits (of them) are undefinable.

Objection.—Separateness is nothing but anyonya-abhāva, mutual non-existence, non-existence which opposes identitity; for, like “This is separate from, other than, a different object from, this,” the intuition “(This is) different from this” rests on anyonya-abhāva.

Answer.—It is not so. Although the terms separate, etc., are synonymous, they do not convey the sense of anyonya-abhāva,’since in that case the use of the ablative (‘from,) would not be possible or reasonable, because the intuitions, “This is separate from this,” and “This is not this,” contain different subject-matter. Nor is separateness an object or entity which possesses anyonya-abhāva, for, then, in “A cloth is a not water-pot,,, there would also be the use of the ablative.

Objection.—The intuitions,” It is separate, “and” It is distinct, “having the same form, Separateness is nothing but distinctness.

Answer.—It is not. For, in that case, while Maitra possessed the distinction of a staff, the intuition, “This Maitra is separate form [from?] Maitra.” would also arise. Likewise it would entail the application of separateness to Ether it is distinguished by Sound, and to the Soul when it is distinguished by Understanding.

For the same reason, dissimilarity or difference in property also is not Separateness, inasmuch as it would entail, in the case of a water-pot, which has been burnt to redness, such usage as “This water-pot is separate from the dark water-pot.” For, it is the possession of properties repugnant to a thing, that constitutes difference in property from that thing. And this appears in the state of redness immediately after darkness.

Nor is it Genus itself, which is Separateness. For, the limits of a Genus are undefinable. Moreover, it would entail inter-mixture of classes; for, if it exist only in existent things, then its denotation would be neither less nor more than that of existence, and if it exist in substance only, then, than that of Substance-ness.—2.