Vaisheshika-sutra with Commentary
by Nandalal Sinha | 1923 | 149,770 words | ISBN-13: 9789332869165
The Vaisheshika-sutra 3.1.4, English translation, including commentaries such as the Upaskara of Shankara Mishra, the Vivriti of Jayanarayana-Tarkapanchanana and the Bhashya of Chandrakanta. The Vaisheshika Sutras teaches the science freedom (moksha-shastra) and the various aspects of the soul (eg., it's nature, suffering and rebirth under the law of karma). This is sutra 4 (‘above continued’) contained in Chapter 1—Of the Marks of Inference—of Book III (of soul and mind).
Sūtra 3.1.4 (Above continued)
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 3.1.4:
कारणाज्ञानात् ॥ ३.१.४ ॥
kāraṇājñānāt || 3.1.4 ||
kāraṇājñanāt—because the causes or constituents are devoid of cognition or consciousness.
4. (The body or the senses cannot be the seat of perception), because there is no consciousness in the causes (i.e., the component parts, of the body).
Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:
(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)
It may be rejoined, “By ‘the being an effect of the body or the senses’ is meant the being an effect of them only in so far as they are determined by the characteristic of consciousness; whereas the whole of consciousness is not the effect of the lamp, etc. Therefore there is no indeterminateness of fluctuation.” So he says:
[Read sūtra 3.1.4 above]
It is meant (that the body or the senses cannot be the seat of perception), because of the absence of consciousness in the hands, feet, etc., or in their parts, which are the causes, i.e., components of the body. For it is observed that the particular attributes of Earth, etc., are preceded by like attributes in their causes. In like manner, if there existed consciousness in the components of the body, it might possibly exist also in the body. But this is not the case. It cannot be urged that consciousness may exist also in the components of the body; for it would entail the absence of uniformity in the actions of the body, since uniformity is never observed amongst a plurality of sentient beings. It would then also follow that, after the amputation of the hand, there will be no more recollection of that which was experienced within the limit of the hand, according to the maxim, “One does not remember that which has been experienced by another.” Moreover, the supposition would entail that, after the destruction of the body, there would be no experience of the consequences of the acts performed by the body, e.g., causing hurt, etc., for certainly Maitra does not suffer the consequences of the sins committed by Caitra. And hence there would be an annihilation of acts performed, and an accession of acts not performed.—4.