Vaisheshika-sutra with Commentary

by Nandalal Sinha | 1923 | 149,770 words | ISBN-13: 9789332869165

The Vaisheshika-sutra 3.1.3, English translation, including commentaries such as the Upaskara of Shankara Mishra, the Vivriti of Jayanarayana-Tarkapanchanana and the Bhashya of Chandrakanta. The Vaisheshika Sutras teaches the science freedom (moksha-shastra) and the various aspects of the soul (eg., it's nature, suffering and rebirth under the law of karma). This is sutra 3 (‘the body or the senses are not the seat of perception’) contained in Chapter 1—Of the Marks of Inference—of Book III (of soul and mind).

Sūtra 3.1.3 (The body or the senses are not the seat of perception)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 3.1.3:

सो ऽनपदेशः ॥ ३.१.३ ॥

so 'napadeśaḥ || 3.1.3 ||

saḥ—that, i.e., perception; anapadeśaḥ—the semblance or simulacrum of a mark; a false mark.

3. Perception (as a mark inferring the body or the senses as 'its substratum) (is) a false mark.—119.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

Lest it be said, “Let the body or the senses be the foundation of the universal experience or perception, because their presence and absence are more manifest as determining perception. What is the use of the supposition of any other foundation? Thus, consciousness is an attribute of the body, being its effect, dike its Colour, etc. The same should be understood in the case of its being an attribute of the senses;” so he says:

[Read sūtra 3.1.3 above]

‘Anapadeśaḥ’ means the appearance or semblance of an apadeśa—’ i.e., mark. Thus the meaning is that the being an effect of the body or the senses is the mere semblance of a mark—inasmuch as such an argument applies to the cognition produced by a lamp is therefore not-one-pointed, i.e., multifarious.—3.

Commentary: The Bhāṣya of Candrakānta:

(English translation of Candrakānta Tarkālaṅkāra’s Bhāṣya called the Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya from the 19th century)

The sense or the object cannot be a mark for the inference of the Self.

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