Text 115

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 115:

एतेनासिद्धविरुद्धसन्दिग्धानध्यवसितवचनानाम् अनपदेशत्वम् उक्तम् भवति । तत्रासिद्धश्चतुर्विधः । उभयासिद्धोऽन्यतरासिद्धः तद्भावासिद्धोऽनुमेयासिद्धश्चेति । तत्रोभयासिद्धः उभयोर्वादिप्रतिवादिनोरसिद्धः यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः सावयवत्वाद् इति ।अन्यतरासिद्धः यथाऽनित्यः शब्दः कार्यत्वाद् इति । तद्भावासिद्धो यथा धूमभावेनाग्न्यधिगतौ कर्तव्यायाम् उपन्यस्यमानो वाष्पे धूमभावेनासिद्ध इति । अनुमेयासिद्धो यथा पार्थिवम् द्रव्यम् तमः कृष्णरूपवत्त्वाद् इति । यो ह्यनुमेयेऽविद्यमानोऽपि तत्समानजातीये सर्वस्मिन् नास्ति तद्विपरीते चास्ति स विपरीतसाधनाद् विरुद्धः यथा यस्माद् विषाणी तस्माद् अश्व इति । यस्तु सन्ननुमेये तत्समानासमानजातीययोः साधारणः सन्नेव स सन्देहजनकत्वात् सन्दिग्धः यथा यस्माद् विषाणी तस्माद् गौरिति । एकस्मिंश्च द्वयोर्हेत्वोर्यथोक्तलक्षणयोर्विरुद्धयोः सन्निपाते सति संशयदर्शनाद् अयम् अन्यः सन्दिग्ध इति केचित् । यथा मूर्तत्वामूर्तत्वम् प्रति मनसः क्रियावत्त्वास्पर्शवत्त्वयोरिति । नन्वयम् असाधारण एवाचाक्षुषत्वप्रत्यक्षत्ववत् संहतयोरन्यतरपक्षासम्भवात् ततश्चानध्यवसित इत् वक्ष्यामः । ननु शास्त्रे तत्रतत्रोभयथा दर्शनम् संशयकारणम् अपदिश्यत इति न संशयो विषयद्वैतदर्शनात् । संशयोत्पत्तौ विषयद्वैतदर्शनम् कारणम् तुल्यबलत्वे च तयोः परस्परविरोधान् निर्णयानुत्पादकत्वम् स्यान् न तु संशयहेतुत्वम् न च तयोस्तुल्यबलवत्त्वम् अस्ति अन्यतरस्यानुमेयोद्देशस्यागमबाधितत्वाद् अयम् तु विरुद्धभेद एव । यश्चानुमेये विद्यमानस्तत्समानासमानजातीययोरसन्नेव सोऽन्यतरासिद्धोऽनध्यवसायहेतुत्वाद् अनध्यवसितः यथा सत्कार्यम् उत्पत्तेरिति । अयम् अप्रसिद्धोऽनपदेश इति वचनाद् अवरुद्धः । ननु चायम् विशेषः संशयहेतुरभिहितः शास्त्रे तुल्यजातीयेष्वर्थान्तरभूतेषु विशेषस्योभयथा दृष्टत्वाद् इति नान्यार्थत्वाच्छब्दे विशेषदर्शनात् । संशयानुत्पत्तिरित्युक्ते नायम् द्रव्यादीनाम् अन्यतमस्य विशेषः स्याच्छ्रावणत्वम् किम् तु सामान्यम् एव सम्पद्यते कस्मात् तुल्यजातीयेष्वर्थान्तरभूतेषु द्रव्यादिभेदानाम् एकैकशो विशेषस्योभयथा दृष्टत्वाद् इत्युक्तम् न संशयकारणम् अन्यथा षट्स्वपि पदार्थेषु संशयप्रसङ्गात् तस्मात् सामान्यप्रत्ययाद् एव संशय इति ॥ ११५ ॥

etenāsiddhaviruddhasandigdhānadhyavasitavacanānām anapadeśatvam uktam bhavati | tatrāsiddhaścaturvidhaḥ | ubhayāsiddho'nyatarāsiddhaḥ tadbhāvāsiddho'numeyāsiddhaśceti | tatrobhayāsiddhaḥ ubhayorvādiprativādinorasiddhaḥ yathā'nityaḥ śabdaḥ sāvayavatvād iti |anyatarāsiddhaḥ yathā'nityaḥ śabdaḥ kāryatvād iti | tadbhāvāsiddho yathā dhūmabhāvenāgnyadhigatau kartavyāyām upanyasyamāno vāṣpe dhūmabhāvenāsiddha iti | anumeyāsiddho yathā pārthivam dravyam tamaḥ kṛṣṇarūpavattvād iti | yo hyanumeye'vidyamāno'pi tatsamānajātīye sarvasmin nāsti tadviparīte cāsti sa viparītasādhanād viruddhaḥ yathā yasmād viṣāṇī tasmād aśva iti | yastu sannanumeye tatsamānāsamānajātīyayoḥ sādhāraṇaḥ sanneva sa sandehajanakatvāt sandigdhaḥ yathā yasmād viṣāṇī tasmād gauriti | ekasmiṃśca dvayorhetvoryathoktalakṣaṇayorviruddhayoḥ sannipāte sati saṃśayadarśanād ayam anyaḥ sandigdha iti kecit | yathā mūrtatvāmūrtatvam prati manasaḥ kriyāvattvāsparśavattvayoriti | nanvayam asādhāraṇa evācākṣuṣatvapratyakṣatvavat saṃhatayoranyatarapakṣāsambhavāt tataścānadhyavasita it vakṣyāmaḥ | nanu śāstre tatratatrobhayathā darśanam saṃśayakāraṇam apadiśyata iti na saṃśayo viṣayadvaitadarśanāt | saṃśayotpattau viṣayadvaitadarśanam kāraṇam tulyabalatve ca tayoḥ parasparavirodhān nirṇayānutpādakatvam syān na tu saṃśayahetutvam na ca tayostulyabalavattvam asti anyatarasyānumeyoddeśasyāgamabādhitatvād ayam tu viruddhabheda eva | yaścānumeye vidyamānastatsamānāsamānajātīyayorasanneva so'nyatarāsiddho'nadhyavasāyahetutvād anadhyavasitaḥ yathā satkāryam utpatteriti | ayam aprasiddho'napadeśa iti vacanād avaruddhaḥ | nanu cāyam viśeṣaḥ saṃśayaheturabhihitaḥ śāstre tulyajātīyeṣvarthāntarabhūteṣu viśeṣasyobhayathā dṛṣṭatvād iti nānyārthatvācchabde viśeṣadarśanāt | saṃśayānutpattirityukte nāyam dravyādīnām anyatamasya viśeṣaḥ syācchrāvaṇatvam kim tu sāmānyam eva sampadyate kasmāt tulyajātīyeṣvarthāntarabhūteṣu dravyādibhedānām ekaikaśo viśeṣasyobhayathā dṛṣṭatvād ityuktam na saṃśayakāraṇam anyathā ṣaṭsvapi padārtheṣu saṃśayaprasaṅgāt tasmāt sāmānyapratyayād eva saṃśaya iti || 115 ||

Text (115): By this it is implied that such statements as are either (1) ‘asiddha’ (unknown, unproved), or (2) ‘viruddha’ (contrary), or (3) ‘sandigdha’ (doubtful), or (4) ‘anadhyavasita’ (unascertained), have not the character of the true ‘reason’ (or ‘indicative’).

(1) Of these the ‘unknown’ is of four kinds—(a) ‘unknown to both,’ (b) ‘unknown to one of the two,’ (c) unknown in the form wanted, and (d) ‘the unknown—subject-of-inference.’ (a) The ‘unknown to both’ is that which is not known to both the arguer and the person to whom the argument is presented; e.g., the argument—‘sound is evanescent, because it is made up of parts.’ (b) As an example of the ‘unknown to one of the two,’ we have—‘sound is evanescent because it is an effect,’ (c) We have the ‘unknown in the form wanted’ when what is meant to be iṇḍicated is fire by the presence of smoke, but what is put forward us the ‘reason’ is steam, which is not known in the form of smoke, (d) We have the ‘unknown—subject-of-inference’ in the argument—‘Darkness in an earthy substance, because it is black in colour.’

(2) That which, while not subsisting in the subject of inference, does not subsist in any individual of the same class, and subsists in its contradictories,—is what is known as the ‘viruddha,’ ‘contrary’ reason, as ii proves something quite; contrary to the desired conclusion; as an examaple of this we have the reasoning—‘This animal is a horse, because it has horns.’

(3) That Which, while subsisting in the object of inference, subsists in things of the same kind as that as well as in those of other kinds, is what is known as ‘sandigdha,’ ‘Doubtful;’ as it creates a doubt in the mind; e.g., ‘this animal is a cow, because it has horns.’ Some people hold that when in any subject there is a collision of two ‘contrary’ indicatives explained above, there arises a doubt; and this is another kind of the ‘Doubtful’ reason; as for example in regard to the mind we find that the two reasons—(1) ‘because it has motion’ and (2) ‘because it cannot be felt by touch’—are put forward as indicative of its corporeal and non-corporeal character respectively.

Objection: “This would be a case of the ‘asādhāraṇa’ reason; because the two reasons cannot reside together either in the ‘subject’ or in its contradictory,—just like ‘non-visibility’ and ‘perceptibility.”

Reply: We shall explain later on that for this very reason the reasoning in question is what is known as the ‘anadhyavasita,’ ‘unascertained.’

Objection: “In the scriptures (the Sūtras) we find it mentioned in many places that two contrary cognitions constitute the cause of doubt.”

Reply: Not so; as doubts always arise from the dual perception of objects. That is to say, a Doubt is always produced by the perception of the dual character of an object; and when both factors of the duality would be of equal authority, they would contradict each other; and as such would not give rise to any definite cognition; but they could not be the cause of any doubt; as a matter of fact, in the instance cited, there is no equality of authority in the two factors of the duality; as one of the two conclusions of the inference would always be such as is denied by the scriptures; and hence this (that has been put forward as an instance of another kind of the ‘doubtful’ reason) would be only another kind of the ‘contrary’ reason.

(4) That which subsists in the ‘subject’ of the inference, but not in any other object either of the same kind or any other, is one that is not recognised by either party; and as such, giving rise to uncertainty, incomes to be known as the ‘unascertained’ reason; as for instance—‘the effect is an entity, because it is produced. This is implied in the Sūtra—‘aprasiddhonapadeśaḥ.’

Objection: “This distinctive feature has been spoken of in the scriptures as the cause of doubt; and the reason for this is that the distinctive feature of a thing serves to distinguish it from like as well as unlike objects, (and hence the ‘unascertained,’ comes within the Sūtra that speaks of the ‘sandigdha,’ and not within that which speaks of the ‘aprasiddha’ (‘unknown’).”

Reply: Not so; because of the meaning (of the sūtra) being different. That is to say, (the author of the Sūtra having made the declaration that there arises a doubt as to whether the audible object, sound, is a substance, or a quality or an action)’—the opponent has retorted that, in as much as the distinctive feature (of audibility) is found in sound alone, there can be no doubt; and to this the author of the sūtra has replied by pointing out that the distinctive feature of ‘audibility’ does not belong specifically to either the: Substance alone, or to the Quality alone, or to Action alone; in fact, it is common among all these; as in each of these three (substance, quality and action) we find distinctive features that distinguish them from like as well as unlike objects; (and for this same reason, ‘audibility’ also would be a feature that would belong in common to substance, quality and action; and hence it would not give rise to a doubt); and thus what the sūtra has done is to paint out (that in the said manner, ‘audibility’ might very well be regarded as leading to an uncertainty or doubt) and not that a distinctive feature becomes a cause or source of doubt. For, if it were not, then, there would be doubts with regard to all the six categories. For these reasons we conclude that Doubts always arise from the cognition of features common to more than one thing.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The above definition of apadeśa serves to set aside such false “reasons” as the ‘asiddha’ etc. The qualification ‘concomitant with the subject of inference’ shows that the unknown reason is not a true ‘reason;’ the qualification ‘known to exist in an object of the same kind as the subject’ shows that the ‘contrary’ and the ‘unascertained’ are not true ‘reasons’; and the qualification ‘that which never exists in that which is the contradictory of the subject’ seta aside the ‘Doubtful’ from the category of true ‘reason.’

(1) Of the four false reasons, the author proceeds to describe the ‘unknown.’ The ‘unknown’ or ‘asiddha’ is of four kinds—(1) ‘Unknown to both’ etc. (a) The ‘unknown to both’ or ‘ubhayāsiddha’ is that which is not known either to the propounder of the argument or to one for whose benefit the argument is put forward; as an example of this we have the reasoning—‘sound is evanescent, because it is made up of parts’; as the fact of sound being made up of parts is not known either to the person putting forward the argument, or to his opponent.

(b) As an example of that which is ‘unknown to one of the two’ or ‘Anyatarāsiddha,’ we have the reasoning—‘Sound is evanescent, because it is an effect,’ where though in reality (according to us) Sound has the character of an effect, yet this fact is not known dr recognised by the Mīmāṃsaka, who denies the evanescent character of sound, and against whom the argument is brought forward; such a reason cannot establish any conclusion, until it has itself been proved (by some other reasoning),

(c) The ‘unknown in the form wanted’ or ‘Tadbhāvāsidhha’ we have in the argument where the presence of steam is put forward as the reason for proving the existence of fire, which was really meant to be proved by the mention of the presence of smoke; as ‘steam’ is not known in the form or character of ‘smoke.’

(d) The ‘unknown subject of Inference or ‘anumeyāsiddha’ we have in the argument—‘Darkness is an earthy substance, because it is black in colour;’ where as a matter of fact there is no such substance as ‘Darkness,’ as what is perceived is mere blackness impressed upon, some substance or other; consequently the reasoning that ‘Darkness is an earthy substance because it is black in colour’ affords an instance of the ‘unknown-subject,’ the ‘anumeyāsiddha’ or ‘āśrayāsiddha;’ the compound ‘anumeyāsiddha’ is to be explained as Bahuvrīhi’ ‘that (reasoning) of which the subject (anumeya) is not known; and as such though the proper form would have been ‘asiddhānumeya,’ yet, in as much as the compound belongs to the same class as ‘āhitāgni’ the precedence of the participial factor, becomes a matter option (vide Pāṇini II. ii. 37). Just as the Reason is ‘unknown to any one of the two’ or ‘unknown to both,’ so in the same manner the ‘unknown subject’ also may be of two kinds—i.e., unknown to one or both of the disputants. Secondly, just as the ‘Reason is unknown’ by one or both disputants either not knowing it, or having a doubtful knowledge of it, or having a mistaken idea of it,—so in the same three: ways would the ‘subject’ also be ‘unknown.’ Thirdly, in the case of the ‘Reason’ we find that—(1) it is ‘unknown to one disputant who is not uncertain about it, simply because he has no conception of it, while to the other disputant it is ‘unknown’ because of his having only a doubtful knowledge of it,—(2) or that to the former it is ‘unknown’ simply because he has no knowledge of it, while to the latter it may be ‘unknown’ oa account of his having no right conception of it,—(3) or that to the former it ‘unknown’ as he has no certain knowledge of it, while to the latter it is ‘unknown’ because of his having no knowledge of it,—(4) or that to the former it may be ‘unknown’ because of his having a mistaken knowledge of it, while to the latter it is ‘unknown’ because of bis knowledge of it being uncertain; and all these diversities would be found in the case of the ‘unknown subject’ also.

As for the ‘unknown’ qualification’ &c., these are included in the ‘unknown to one or to both’; and hence our author does not mention them separately.

(2) The author proceeds to describe the ‘contrary’ false Beason: ‘Contrary, &c., &c.’ Sometimes it may so happen that a man seeing a certain animal in the forest would infer thus: ‘this animal is a horse because it has horns;’ and in this case, we know that horns are, in reality, found to belong, not to any horse, but to animals other than the horse; viz., the cow. the buffalo and the like; and by reason of this concomitance the presence of horns would prove something totally different from the ‘horse’; hence proving something quite contrary to the ‘subject’ of the syllogism, the ‘reason’ is called the ‘contrary’ reason.

The example cited is one of such ‘contrary reason’ as resides in one part of the ‘contrary of the subject;’ as the horn is not present in all that is ‘not-horse,’—for instance, it is not found in the pillar (which also is as much a ‘non-horse’ as the cow or the buffalo). An example of the ‘contrary reason’ pervading over all that is the contrary of the ‘subject,’ we have in the argument—‘Sound is eternal because it is produced.’ (Where the character of being produced belongs to all that is non-eternal).

(3) That reason which, while subsisting in the ‘subject,’ subsists also in things of the same as well as of other classes, is called the ‘Doubtful’; as it always gives rises to uncertainty. As an example of this, we have the argument—‘this is a cow, because it has horns’ In this case we find that the horn exists in the cow as well as in the buffalo; and hence the ‘presence of the horn’ would leave it uncertain whether the animal is a cow or a buffalo; and as such this would be a ‘Doubtful’ reason. This is the instance of a reason which subsisting in the subject as well as its contraries, subsists only in a few of these contraries; and this reason is called the ‘anaikāntika,’ ‘Inconclusive.’ Another reason of the same class would be that which pervades over the whole range of the subject and its contraries; an example of this we have in the argument—‘Sound is eternal because it is cognisable’ (where cognisability belongs all things eternal as well as non-eternal). An example of that which subsists only in parts of the subject and its contrary, we have in the argument—‘Ākāśa is eternal, because it is incorporeal’ (where ‘incorporeality’ is such as subsists in a few eternal and also a few non-eternal things). A reason that subsists only in, a portion of the ‘subject,’ and pervades over the whole of its contrary, we have in the argument—‘Sound is a substance, because it is not made of constituent parts (where it— is only a few substances that are not made up of constituent parts, while all non-substances are so constituted).

In the text we read ‘that which is common (sādhāraṇa) to the things of the same kind &c. &c.’; and the author explains the meaning of the word ‘common’ by the words ‘samena’ &c., “Just as a certain property, being found in the ‘subject’ as well as its contrary, would give rise to an uncertainty with regard to the object to which it belongs, and would thereby become a ‘Doubtful Reason,’—so, in the same manner, when we find, in the same subject, two mutually contradictory ‘reasons’ (of equal validity), tending to two contradictory; conclusions, we have another kind of the ‘Doubtful’ Reason,’ consisting of the collision of two contradictory reasons.” Such; is the view held by some people; and the author proceeds to; refute it: ‘Some people, &c’ With a view to this, be cites an example of this kind of reason: In regard to the mind we find the two reasons—(1) ‘because it has motion’ and (2) ‘because it cannot be felt by touch’—put forward as indicative of its corporeal and incorporeal character respectively. These reasonings may be thus amplified: (1) ‘The mind is corporeal, because it has actions, like the arrow,’ (2) ‘the mind is incorporeal because it is not felt by touch, like Ākāśa.’ Here we find a collision of the two reasons, mobility and intangibility, leading to two mutually contradictory conclusions; and this gives rise to a doubt as to whether in reality the mind is corporeal or incorporeal. And certainly both reasons could not; be equally valid; as one and the same thing could not have two such contradictory characters (as corporeality and incorporeality). And as the two reasons are mutually contradictory, both could not be invalid either, as there could be no third character for the mind, apart from both corporeality and incorporeality, But we can find no reason whereby we could feel certain of the validity of either one of the two reasons. Hence on account of the two reasons—‘mobility’ and ‘tangibility’—there arises a doubt as to the mind being corporeal or incorporeal. The Viruddhāvyabhicārī [Viruddhāvyabhicārin] reason differs from the Prakaraṇasama reason only on this point that, while the former creates a doubt in the mind, the latter: simply fails to remove the uncertainty for the settling of which it is brought forward.

Objection: “This would be a case of the ‘Asādhāraṇa’ reason &c. That is to say, (each one of the two reasons—‘mobility’ and ‘tangibility’—does not create any doubt in our mind, as each leads to a definite conclusion. Then as far the collision of the two, it would be nothing more than what is known as the ‘asādhāraṇa’ reason, as the two together do not subsist in any ‘subject’ (sapakṣa) or ‘contra-subject’ (vipakṣa), apart from the mind. Just as in the case of the two qualities of invalidity and perceptibility, we find that though each of them is not an incompatible quality, yet conjointly they cannot exist anywhere apart from the mind. Though it is the collision of two such properties as are not incompatible and yet mutually contradictory that constitutes the ‘Asādhāraṇa’ reason, yet such a reason would only be; a source of uncertainty. As for the ‘negative’ (vyatireki) reason it is certain that it is excluded from the ‘contra-subject’ (vipakṣa) alone; and as such it leads to a definite conclusion. The ‘Asādhāraṇa’ (uncommon) reason, on the other hand, is such that its exclusion is never absolutely certain; as it,is as likely to be excluded from the ‘subject’ as from the ‘contra-subject.’ As, if ‘odourousness’ being excluded from non-eternal things’ would prove ‘eternity,’ it would, as reason-ably, prove ‘non-eternality’ also, as excluded from the ‘eternal thing,’ Ākāśa. But as a matter of fact, both cannot be rightly proved, as any one thing cannot have the two contradictory characters of eternality and non-eternality. Nor could both be not proved, as the two being mutually exclusive, there can be no intermediate stage (between ‘eternality’ and ‘non-eternality’). Consequently the fact of the Earth being ‘odorous’ leaves it doubtful whether the Earth is eternal or non-eternal; as has been declared by the revereq Kumārila Bhatta: ‘Where we have a certain property which is asādhāraṇa, in as much the negation of both could not subsist in any subject, its negation becomes a source of doubt.’ (Ślokavārttika—Anumāna, Śloka 88-89); and the author of the Nyāyavārttika also has thus declared: ‘Inasmuch] the character of being born of a disjunction which consists in having for its substantial cause a disjunction born of another disjunction—is not possible apart from Sound, the reason (being born of a disjunction) being precluded from all things becomes a source of doubt or uncertainty’.”

To the above, our author offers the following reply It is for this reason that we shall explain later on that such a reason is what we call the ‘Anadhyavasita’ ‘unascertained. That is to say, we shall point out later on that the collision of two contradictory properties constitutes the ‘Asādhāraṇ’ reason, and being ‘Asādhāraṇa,’ it becomes the ‘anadhyavasita.’

The author having shown that the character of the ‘Doubtful Reason’ does not belong to that reason which is Viruddhāvyabhicār [Viruddhāvyabhicārī]’ (not incompatible with the ‘contrary’),the objector brings forward the objection that such a view would be against what has been taught by the scriptures on the subject (i.e. the Sūtras)—“Nanu &c. ‘ubhayathā darśanam’—what is meant by this is that in the scriptures it has been declared in many places that when a certain ‘subject’ is found to be accompanied by two mutually contradictory properties, there always arises a doubt in the mind of the observer; and such is also the common experience of many people; and when we see something that resembles what we have seen, there arises a doubt. For instance, in the case of the self we have found ‘incorporeality’ accompanied by ‘intangibility’; and we have observed the same in the case of the mind also; then again, in the mind we also find ‘activity or mobility,’ which we have seen, in the atom, to be accompanied by ‘corporeality’; consequently observing that in the mind we have ‘intangibility’—which we have found to be accompanied by incorporeality,—as well as ‘mobility’—which we have seen, is accompanied by ‘corporeality’, there arises a doubt in our mind as to whether the mind is corporeal or incorporeal (material or immaterial). The Sūtra bearing on this point is as follows: ‘yathādṛṣṭamayathādṛṣṭamubhayathādṛṣṭatvāt samśayaḥ; and the meaning of this that, as in the case of mind we have seen that it has the property of ‘mobility,’ which we have found (in the atom) to be not incompatible with ‘corporeality’; (this would be ‘yathādṛṣṭa)’;—so also we have seen, to the contrary (‘ayathādṛṣṭa’) we have found (in the self) that it has also the property of intangibility which, in its turn, is not incompatible with ‘incorporeality’; and from this twofold observation (‘ubhayathādṛṣṭatvāt) there arises the doubt as to whether the mind is ‘corporeal or material’ on account of its ‘mobility,’ or it is ‘incorporeal or immaterial’ on account of its intangibility. Thus then, if you reject the fact of the Viruddhāvyabhicārī. Reason being a source of Doubt, you distinctly contradict what has been declared in the sūtra.”

To the above objection, the author replies as follows: Not so; as doubt always arises from the perception of a duality of objects. That is to say, there is no such contradiction as you point out. because a Doubt arises only when there is a dalu [dual?] perception of objects. This the author proceeds to explain further: That is to say &c. The meaning of this is that the source of Doubt lies in the dual perception of objects. For instance, in regard to a tall object like the wooden post, there arises a doubt as to whether it is a post or a man standing; and the reason for this lies in the previous ‘dual perception’ of tallness—viz: as found in the post and in the standing man; and the doubt is not due to the collision, in one and the same object, of two contradictory properties. And hence the Sūtra cannot be taken to mean, that doubt arises from the collision of two contradictory properties not incompatible with the object in question.

Similarly, the meaning of ‘dṛṣṭañca dṛṣṭavad dṛṣṭvâ’ may be thus explained:—‘dṛṣṭa’ is the object, the man or the post, seen on a previous occasion, to be similar to another man and another post (‘dṛṣṭavat’); and when, by some cause or other, we happen to see that man or post, at some other time and in some other place, and are not able to exercise a propers discrimination,—there arises the doubt as to the object before us being a man or a post; the particle ‘ca’ after ‘dṛṣṭam’ is added with a view to indicate that even though the object before us may not have been seen by us before, if it only happens to resemble the post and the man (which are the ‘seen’ and similar to ‘the seen’), the doubt arises.

There is another sūtra—‘yathādṛṣṭamayathādṛṣṭamubhayathādṛṣṭam’ and this points out the doubt that; arises from the remembrance of a particular object (having the appearance of the object before the eyes). For instance, we see a man in a certain condition—with shaven hair or with matted locks f.i.; and then after sometime we see the same man, in a condition other than the one observed on the previous occasion; and then not seeing the previously seen conditions, and yet recalling to our mind both the conditions, we may have the doubt as to whether the man, on this latter occasion, has his head shaven or is wearing matted locks.

Then as for the Viruddhāvyabhicārī reason, it can never be the source of doubt; as it is never put forward. That is to say, when the ‘reason’ put forward first has been recognised to fulfil the aforesaid conditions (of the true reason), then the subject in question is duly ascertained to be of the character indicated by that reason; and hence there can be no occasion for the other contrary reason to be put forward; as its way is blocked by the accomplished cognition (afforded by

the former Reason). And if the previous reason fails to bring about a definite cognition, then it becomes open to this same charge (of not leading to a definite conclusion); and there is no necessity for the bringing forward of the counter-argument (based upon the contrary reason’).

Objection: “The previous reason becomes ‘viruddhāvyabhicārī’ by reason of its not being incompatible with,—of allowing of the appearance of—the counter-argument; and the objection or fallacy to which such a reason is open lies in this very possibility of the counter-argument; because when the contrary conclusion is brought up by the contrary reason, the previous reason fails to establish the conclusion it was put forward to prove.”

Reply: If like the second argument, the first argument were also a properly equipped inferential reasoning, fulfilling all the conditions of a valid argument,—then, if it were found to fail in its purpose of establishing the conclusion, what confidence could we have in any inferential reason (as the mere fact of fulfilling all the conditions would no longer be sufficient security)?

Objection: “The first reason fails to establish its conclusion for the simple reason that the subject in question is not possessed of the dual character (indicated by the two contrary reasons).”

Reply: Who has told you that an object cannot have a dual character? The essence or character of an object consists in whatever is indicated by a means of right knowledge. If the fact of any one object not having a dual character, be such as is established by a stronger and more authoritative means of knowledge, and as such, cannot be set aside,—then, in that case, the two reasons (one indicating the single and another the dual character of the object) would not be of equal strength and validity; and under the circumstances, how could there be any doubt?

Objection: “Though in reality both are not true, yet the fact of neither of the two having any points perceived in its favour would lead us to think of them as of equal validity or reality or both.”

Reply: It may be so; but even then, Just as the equal validity of both would lead to one being set aside by the other, so too would it make us reject the latter by the former; and thus there being a mutual rejection, neither of the two would be capable of proving the conclusion it may be sought to prove; but this would not make them produce any doubt in a the mind of the observer. Specially as in such a case what happens is that there is no definite cognition at all, and not that two mutually contradictory cognitions are brought up (and a doubt would arise only in the latter case). This is what our author means by the sentence—‘when both factors of the duality would be of equal authority &c.’

Objection: “That which is an object must be either material or immaterial; there can be no third alternative; hence in the case of mind, when we perceive neither its materiality nor immateriality, we might presume the absence or presence of both and this presumption would certainly give rise to a doubt in our minds as to whether it is material or immaterial.”

Reply: It is quite true that the doubt arises; but it arises, not from the collision in the mind of two mutually contradictory properties, but from the very nature of the thing itself,—that thing which, having been perceived to be concomitant with materiality and immateriality, is cognised as subsisting in the mind, and hence brings to us the recollection of those two properties.

Our author has rejected the theory that the viruddhāvyabhicārī reason is a source of doubt, after having admitted the fact of two contradictory reasons having equal validity. As a matter of fact however, the validity of the two is not of equal strength. As the conclusion that ‘the mind is immaterial,’ which is indicated by one of the two reasons, has the disadvantage of being negatived by the scriptural text of the Sūtra, ‘the mind is atomic, by reason of the absence &c’. If (in order to avoid this predicament) it be argued that this sūtra is not authoritative, then the mind would be something omnipresent; but as there is no evidence for the existence of such a mind, the argument that ‘the mind is immaterial, because it is intangible’ would be totally without a basis (as there would be no mind in which the properties could inhere). If the existence of mmd be sought to be proved by the fact of all kinds of sense-cognition not appearing at one and the same time, then the reason in question becomes such as is set aside by the means of cognising the ‘subject’ (mind); as the simultaneous appearance of all sense-cognitions can be impossible only if the mind be atomic; as if the mind were omnipresent, then, in as much as all the senseorgans would all at once be in contact with it, there would be nothing to prevent the simultaneous appearance of all kinds of sense-cognition.

Question: “If the subject of Inference be such as is opposed to scriptural authority, what kind of fallacy would that be?”

The author says in answer to this: This would be another kind of the ‘contrary’ reason. That is to say, such a reasoning being contrary to scriptures would be only one kind of the ‘wrong conclusions’ that are opposed to well-recognised facts of Sense-perception, Inference &c.,—all such conclusions having been precluded from ‘true reasoning’ by the mention of ‘avirodhi,’ ‘un-contradictary’ or ‘not incongruous,’ in the definition of the Pratijñā or ‘Declaration of Conclusion;’ i e. it would not be a ‘doubtful reason;’ being only a kind of the ‘contradictory’ or ‘incongruous’ reasoning.

The ‘anadhyavasita,’ or ‘unascertained’ is the name given to that false reason which has elsewhere been called the ‘asādhāraṇa’ ‘uncommon;’ and the author now proceeds to explain it: That which subsists &c. For instance, with a view to prove that ‘the effect had an existence even before the operation of its cause,’ we find the reason ‘because of its production,’ brought forward by the Sāṅkhyas. And here we find that the reason, does not subsist in the ākāśa which is an entity and which therefore is sapakṣa; and yet it is not found to subsist in the ‘sky-flower’ which is a recognised non-entity, and which therefore is a distinct Vipakṣa; and thus the reason cannot prove either the conclusion or its contradictory.

The reason in question,—‘because it is produced’—cannot; be called ‘asiddha’ or ‘unknown;’ because it is not so for the Sāṅkhyas, who hold that ‘production’ is only the ‘manifestation’ of something not manifested before.

Question: “In which sentence of the sūtra is this ‘Anadhyavasita’ or Unascertained Reason indicated?”

Answer: It is indicated by the Sūtra ‘ayamaprasiddho-napadeśaḥ.’

Objection: “Like the Anaikāntika or ‘Inconclusive’ Reason, the ‘Asādhāraṇa’ or ‘Uncommon Reason’ only creates a doubt in the mind; and hence it would be more correct to say that it is indicated in the Sūtra ‘sandigdhaścānapadeśaḥ’,—and not in ‘ayamaprasiddho'napadeśaḥ.’ This objection is what is meant when our author says—nanu ca &c. The Locative ending in ‘bhūteṣu,’ has the sense of the Ablative; as the distinctive feature of things serves to distinguish them from, things of the same kind, and also from those of another kind; e.g. the distinctive feature of the Earth, ‘Odorousness,’ serves to distinguish it from other members of the same class of ‘Substance,’ as well as from Qualities and Action (which are not-substance). In Sound we find the distinctive feature of ‘audibility’; and there arises a question as to whether this feature serves to distinguish Sound from Colour and other things of the same kind as itself or it serves to distinguish it from things of different kinds? But it is clearly seen that if Sound is a Quality, then the said feature distinguishes it from Colour &c., which being Qualities are of the same kind or class as itself; but if it is a Substance, or an Action, then it would distinguish it from Colour &c„ which, being Qualities, would be ‘things of a different kind or class’? And thus the ‘audibility’ of Sound, if brought forward as a ‘reason,’ would leave it doubtful whether Sound was a Substance, or a Quality or an Action,”

The opponent having thus brought forward the charge of contradicting the Sūtra, our author offers the following reply: Not so; because of the meaning of the Sūtra being different. That is to say, the meaning of the Sūtra is not that ‘the asādhāraṇa reason is the source of doubt,’—as the objector has explained it; it means something wholly different; and our author proceeds to explain this true meaning; śabde viśeṣadarśanāt &c. Having shown that that which is comprehensible by the sense of audition is Sound, the author of the Sūtra has said that with regard to this sound there arises a doubt as to whether it is a Substance or a Quality or an Action; and the sense of this is that, with regard to that audible thing, there arises the doubt as to whether it may be a Substance, or a Quality or an Action.

On this the opponent comes forward with the following argument: “When you declare that there is doubt with regard to Sound which is perceived by the sense of audition, yon clearly imply that ‘perceptibility by the sense of audition,’ or ‘audibility,’ constitutes the source of doubt. But ‘audibility’ is a distinctive feature of Sound; and the recognition of such a feature could never make any doubt possible; as a doubt is always due to the remembrance of two mutually contradictory properties; and such remembrance would never be possible when a distinctive feature of the object in question has been duly recognised; specially when the distinctive feature perceived is such as has never been perceived along with any other property.”

The opponent having put forward this argument, the author of the Sūtra has given his reply to it; and the sense of the reply is that ‘audibility’ is not a distinctive feature of any one of the three larger categories, Substance, Quality or Action; in fact it comes to be common to all of these. Because in each of these three we find distinctive features that distinguish them from like as well as unlike objects; ‘Bheda’=that which is differentiated, different thing; hence ‘dravyādibhedāḥ’—Substance and other things, viz., Substance, Quality and Action and in everyone of these such distinguishing features are found; as for instance, in the Earth we find the distinctive feature of the, character of earth—which distinguishes it from its like objects other Substances—along with the character of Substance; in Colour we find the character of colour,—which distinguishes it from other Qualities—along with the character of quality; in Throwing Upward, we find the character of throwing upward—which distinguishes it from other Actions—along with the character of action; and similarly in Sound also the distinctive feature of Audibility is found along with the character of Quality. Consequently this distinguishing feature also becomes common to Substances, Qualities and Actions; and as such it is only right to regard it as the source of doubt; as for the individuality (or the specific feature of Sound) that could never give rise to any doubt; as it would not bring to the mind any distinguishing characters. ít is with a view to all this that the author says—It would not give rise to a doubt. We deduce all this meaning from the fact of the Sūtra having used the Locative ending in the words ‘Tulyajātīyeṣu arthāntarabhūteṣu,’ instead of the Ablative. The construction of the Sūtra may he thus explained:—On the recognition of the distinctive feature of audibility in Sound there arises a doubt as to whether it is a Substance or a Quality or an Action; and the reason for this lies in the fact of everyone of these three having distinguishing features that reside in their like objects (Sapakṣas) and also in the unlike ones (Vipakṣas).

The upshot of all this comes to be this: A distinctive feature we have found in Substance, in Quality and in Action; and in Sound also we find a distinctive feature in the shape of Audibility, hence the mere presence of a distinctive feature gives rise to a doubt as to which of the three things, possessing distinctive features, Sound is. But if the individuality, or the specific form, of an object also were the cause of doubt, then there might be doubts with regard to the six Categories as well; as everyone of these possesses a distinct individuality; and in this way there would be no end to doubts. With a view to this our Author says—‘If it were not &c.’

He recapitulates the whole thus:—‘For these reasons &c.’ That is to say, the ‘common’ property is found along with mutually contradictory properties; and the remembrance of these latter can always give rise to a doubt; hence it is the perception of the ‘Common’ property, and not that of the ‘Uncommon’ property, that creates doubt.