A comparative study between Buddhism and Nyaya
by Roberta Pamio | 2021 | 71,952 words
This page relates ‘Classification of Perception (Introduction)’ of the study on perception in the context of Buddhism compared to Nyaya (a system of Hindu philosophy). These pages researches the facts and arguments about the Buddhist theory of perception and its concerned doctrines while investigating the history of Buddhist epistemology (the nature of knowledge). The Nyaya school (also dealing with epistemology) considers ‘valid knowledge’ the means for attaining the ultimate goal of life (i.e., liberation).
7. Classification of Perception (Introduction)
According to Buddhists, perception has four kinds:
- Sense Perception (Indriya Pratyakṣa)
- Mental Perception (Manasa Pratyakṣa)
- Self-cognition (svasaṃvedana)
- Yogic Perception (Yogi Pratyakṣa)
Controversy on the Diṅnāga’s Classification of Perception
Having defined perception to be non-conceptual and non-verbal, Diṅnāga continues to discuss four kinds of perception: sense perception (indriya pratyakṣa), mental perception (manasa pratyakṣa), self cognition (svasaṃvedana pratyakṣa), and yogic perception (yogi pratyakṣa).[1] There is controversy about the number of perception accepted by Diṅnāga among modern scholars. Hattori, Nagatomi and Franco[2] claim that Diṅnāga accepts three kinds of perception, namely, sense, mental and yogic perception.
These scholars base their claim on one passage in Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya [pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam]:
“The self awareness (svasaṃvedana) of desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain, etc., is [also recognized as] mental perception because it is not dependent on any sense organ.”[3]
Hattori squeezes self-cognition into a second kind of mental perception[4] while Nagatomi regards it as the second aspect of mental perception.[5] Wayman and Z. Yao think that Diṅnāga accepted four kinds of perception. However, Z. Yao thinks that Wayman’s explanation is illegitimate because the latter uses Dharmakirti’s interpretation to read Diṅnāga.[6]
According to Z. Yao, the above Hattori’s translation from Sanskrit is fine, but it is not the same to the Tibetan interpretation version of Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti, which means:
“As for desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain, and so forth, on account of their independence on sense organ, [they can be regarded as] perception [in terms] of cognizing themselves.”
The Tibetan version matches a passage in Nyāyamañjari:
“The mental realm (mānasa), when occurring in the form of immediate experience (of objects), is also devoid of conceptual construction. Again, the self-cognition of desire and so forth, and the yogic [intuition] that is devoid of doctrinal conception, are both perception.”
This passage indicates selfcognition of desire, yogic intuition and so forth are perceptions.
In Kuiji’s commentary of Nyāyapraveśa, a work attributed to Śaṅkarasvāmin, a disciple of Diṅnāga, four kinds of perceptions are described:
“There are roughly four types of [perception] that are devoid of conceptual construction: (1) five consciousnesses, (2) the mental [consciousness] that accompanies the five [consciousnesses], (3) self-cognition, (4) the yogic [intuition].”
By comparing the above Tibetan and Chinese passages Z. Yao comes to conclusion that Diṅnāga did accept four kinds of perception.[7]
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
V. Vanbijlert, op.cit., p. 59. S. R. Bhatt and A. Mehrotra, op.cit., p. 43.
[2]:
This is the main concern of his article, “Did Diṅnāga Accept Four Types of Perception?” Journal of Indian Philosophy 21, pp. 295-299.
[3]:
“rāga-dveṣa-moha-sukha-duḥkhādiṣu ca svasaṃvedanam indriyānapekṣatvān mānasaṃ pratyakşam” M. Hattori, op.cit., p.94 n. 1.47
[4]:
Ibid., p.27.
[5]:
Z. Yao, op.cit., p.61.
[6]:
Ibid., p. 60.
[7]:
Z. Yao, op.cit., p. 63.