Verse 1787-1790

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अवस्थाभेदभावेऽपि यथा वर्ण्यं जहाति न ।
हेमाध्वसु तथाभावो द्रव्यत्वं त्यजत्ययम् ॥ १७८७ ॥
अतीताजातयोर्ज्ञानमन्यथाऽविषयं भवेत् ।
द्वयाश्रयं च विज्ञानं तायिना कथितं कथम् ॥ १७८८ ॥
कर्मातीतं च निःसत्त्वं कथं फलदमिष्यते ।
अतीतानागते ज्ञानं विभक्तं योगिनां च किम् ॥ १७८९ ॥
न द्रव्यापोहविषया अतीतानागतास्ततः ।
अध्वसङ्ग्रहरूपादिरूपाद्विभावादेर्वर्त्तमानवत् ॥ १७९० ॥

avasthābhedabhāve'pi yathā varṇyaṃ jahāti na |
hemādhvasu tathābhāvo dravyatvaṃ tyajatyayam || 1787 ||
atītājātayorjñānamanyathā'viṣayaṃ bhavet |
dvayāśrayaṃ ca vijñānaṃ tāyinā kathitaṃ katham || 1788 ||
karmātītaṃ ca niḥsattvaṃ kathaṃ phaladamiṣyate |
atītānāgate jñānaṃ vibhaktaṃ yogināṃ ca kim || 1789 ||
na dravyāpohaviṣayā atītānāgatāstataḥ |
adhvasaṅgraharūpādirūpādvibhāvādervarttamānavat || 1790 ||

“Just as gold does not abandon its colour, even when there are differences in its state,—similarly under all its states, the entity does not abandon its character of ‘substance’.—If it were not so, then the cognition of past and future things would be objectless.—How again, is it that it has been asserted by Tāyin that cognition rests upon these two?—How again is action, which is past and has no further existence, held to be productive of results? How too could mystics have the distinct cognition of past and future.

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Among the Buddhist writers (referred to under Text 1786) are the following:—

(1) Bhadanta-Dharmatrāta—the upholder of the view that while the thing undergoes changes, it remains substantially the same. He argues as follows:—When a certain thing has entered into its course of existence, there is change only in its mode of existence, not in the substance; for instance, the substance Gold undergoes several changes through which it comes to be called the ‘armlet’, ‘necklet’, ‘ear-ring’ and so forth,—but there is no change in the Gold, itself. In the same way, the object is something different from the Future, and other ‘modes’. For instance, when a certain object abandons its ‘f uture’ Mode and reaches the ‘present’ Mode;—and when it renounces its ‘present’ Mode, it reaches the ‘past’ Mode,—and yet the Object itself does not change; as throughout the three Modes, the same character of the ‘substance’ continues. If it were not so, the ‘future’, ‘present’ and ‘past’ objects would be entirely different from one another.—What is it that is meant by the term ‘bhāva’, ‘Mode’, here?—It is a particular quality on which the notions of ‘Past,’ etc. are based.”

(2) Bhadanta-Ghoṣaka—holds that the changes undergone by the Object are in its character. He argues as follows:—“When the Object has entered into its course of existence, it is said to be ‘past’, when it has the character of the ‘past’, but is not entirely deprived of the character of the ‘future’ and the ‘present’: for example, a man may be attached to one woman, but he need not be disgusted with other women. Similarly when the Object is ‘future’ or ‘present’ [it has these characters, but is not entirely devoid of the other two characters].”—The difference between this view and the previous one is that under this view things are spoken of as ‘past’ on account of the actual presence of a particular character.

(3) Bhadanta-Vasumitra—holds the view that the changes undergone by things is in their aspects or states. He argues as follows:—“When a thing has entered the course of existence, it is spoken of variously, according to its varying aspects (or conditions); and these variations relate to the aspect, not to the substance; as the Substance remains the same at all three points of time. For example, when the clay counting-piece is placed in the place of Units, it is denominated ‘one’, when placed in the place of Hundreds, it is denominated ‘hundred’, and tin place of Thousands, it is denominated a ‘thousand Similarly when the thing is in the state of activity, it is called ‘present’; and when it has ceased from activity, it is ‘past’, and while it has not become active at all, it is ‘future So that things are spoken of in accordance with their states, as in the ease of the clay counting-piece, where there is no change in the nature of the Substance; only different denominations are assigned to it in accordance with its varying position, which makes it indicative of varying numbers

(4) Buddha-deva (a writer of the second century A.D.)—holds the view that the changes are due to changes in ‘Relativity’.—He argues as follows:—“When an object has entered its course of existence, it is called one or the other in relation to what has gone before and what is to come. For instance, the same woman is called ‘mother’ as well as ‘daughter’; and the usage in question is also dependent upon the past and the future; when a thing has something before it, but nothing after it, it is called ‘future’; when it has something before it and also something after it, it is called ‘present’; and when it has something after it, but nothing before it, it is called ‘past’.”

All these four Buddhists are Asti-vādins, Realists (upholding the view that things have real and permanent existence),—called respectively: (1) ‘Mode-changers’, Bhāvavādin, (2) Lakṣaṇavādin, ‘Character-changers’, (3) Avasthāvādin, ‘Aspect-changers’ and (4) Anyathānyathika, ‘Relative changers’.

(1) Of these, the first (Dharmatrāta—the Mode-changer) does not differ from the Sāṅkhya, who holds the ‘Modification’ theory. So that the refutation that has been put forward against the Sāṅkhya is applicable to this Buddhist Realist. For instance, would the ‘modification’ come about without the abandoning of the previous mode or after its abandonment? If the former, then there would be comingling and confusion of the Modes. If the latter, then that would be incompatible with the permanent existence of things.

(2) As regards the second view (that of Ghoṣaka),—here also there would be the same comingling and confusion; as all things may have*all characters. As regards the man (falling in love with one woman, which has been cited as an example), he is spoken of as ‘attached’ (or ‘in love’) on account of the appearance of Attachment, which is a totally different thing; and he is said to be ‘not disgusted’, when there is mere association (meeting together); in the case of the ordinary thing however, there is no appearance of the ‘character’, nor the mere association of ‘character’,—which would constitute the ‘attainment’ of it by the thing; as, if it were, then like ‘attainment’, the ‘character’ also would become something different from the thing. Thus there is no analogy between the two cases—the ease in question and that of the example cited.

(3) As regards the third view (of Vasumitra),—that the changes in things are due to variations in their aspects or states of activity,—its refutation is going to be set forth in detail below.

(4) As regards the fourth view (that of Buddhadeva), it involves the incongruity of three states occurring under the same state. For instance, under the ‘Past’ state, the preceding and the succeeding moments would be ‘past’ and ‘future’ and the ‘middle’ moment would be the ‘present This criticism against this is quite clear.

The Examination of the ‘Idea of things continuing to exist during the Three Points of Time’ proceeds in the Text, only with reference to the third among the above views—[i.e. the view of Vasumitra, that the changes in things are due to the variations in their states of activity].—What has been stated in connection with the example of Gold (under Texts 1786-1787) is only an indication of the thesis of all these writers,—and it is not in strict reference to the view of Dharmatrāta only (the first of the views described). This is clear from what is going to be said (under Text 1791)—‘As regards the distinction among things due to their states of activity, etc. etc.’;—and under the view of Dharmatrāta the distinction is not based upon states of activity; it is only under Vasumitra’s view that it is so.

This view (Vasumitra’s) is as follows:—

“If the ‘Past’ and the ‘Future’ were not there, then such notions as ‘There lived Mahāsammata’, ‘Śaṅkha is going to be an all-world sovereign’ and so forth,—which involve the idea of what is past and what is going to be—would be entirely baseless; in fact, the Object not being there, the Idea also could not be there; because in regard to the case of everything, the Idea is in the form in which the Object is cognised; so that if the cognised Object is not there, there is nothing that could be apprehended by the Cognition; hence there would be no Cognition (or Idea) at all.

“Further, the Blessed One has declared that ‘Every cognition is produced on the basis of two things.—Which two things?—The Eye and the Colours and the Menta l Function If then the Past and the Future are not there, the cognition based upon these would not be on the basis of two things; so that there would be incompatibility with the scriptures,

“Further, a past act could not bring about its fruit, if it were devoid of essence and devoid of existence, at the time of the appearance of the fruit, as the cause of that fruit would not be there; what is non-existent cannot have the capacity to produce an effect; as ‘non-existence’ consists in the absence of all capacity.

“Then again, such ideas as ‘Māndhāna Devadatta lived’, ‘the world-sovereign Śaṅkha shall be Maitreya Tathāgata’,—which appear distinctly and severally in the minds of Mystics, in regard to the Past and the Future, could not be possible; as there can be no distinction among things that are non-existent.

“From all this it follows that past and future entities, like Shrīharṣa and others, cannot be regarded as mere ‘negations of substance’,—because they have been declared as ‘to be included under the states’.—The Blessed Lord has declared as follows:—‘O Bhikṣus, if the Past form had not existed, then the noble Śrāmka would not have heard and been entirely indifferent regarding past forms; hence, because there is a Past form of things, therefore the noble Śrāvaka has heard and has thus become indifferent to the Past, All tins severally would be much too detailed; hence thus whatever form has been past or is in future,—all this is spoken of briefly as Colour-phase’.”

In the compound (in the text)—Adhvasaṃgraha, etc. etc.’,—the term ‘adhvasaṃgraha’ stands for Colour, etc., in the sense that they are ‘included under the states’.

The ‘Etc.’ includes ‘Sensation’ and other Phases.

The second ‘ādi’ implies the further reason that all these have been taught as consisting of suffering, transitory as a whole, devoid of the Soul, and so forth.—(1787-1790)