Verse 977-979

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

विध्यादावर्थराशौ च नान्यापोहनिरूपणम् ।
नञश्चापि नञा युक्तावपोहः कीदृशो भवेत् ॥ ९७७ ॥
चादीनामपि नञ्योगो नैवास्तीत्यनपोहनम् ।
वाक्यार्थेऽन्यनिवृत्तिश्च व्यपदेष्टुं न शक्यते ॥ ९७८ ॥
अनन्यापोहशब्दादौ वाच्यं न च निरूप्यते ।
प्रमेयज्ञेयशब्दादेरपोह्यं कुत एव तु ॥ ९७९ ॥

vidhyādāvartharāśau ca nānyāpohanirūpaṇam |
nañaścāpi nañā yuktāvapohaḥ kīdṛśo bhavet || 977 ||
cādīnāmapi nañyogo naivāstītyanapohanam |
vākyārthe'nyanivṛttiśca vyapadeṣṭuṃ na śakyate || 978 ||
ananyāpohaśabdādau vācyaṃ na ca nirūpyate |
prameyajñeyaśabdāderapohyaṃ kuta eva tu || 979 ||

“In the case of the whole mass of denotations like injunction and the like,—there is no idea of the ‘exclusion of others how could there be any Apoha even when the negative is coupled with negation?—Particles like ‘cm’ and the rest can have no connection with the negative; hence here also no Apoha is possible.—In the case of what is expressed by a sentence, the ‘exclusion of others’ cannot even be indicated.—In the case of such expressions as ‘ananyāpoha’ (‘non-exclusion of others’), no denotation is apprehended at all (apart from the positive).—Wherefore too could there be anything ‘excluded’ in the case of such words as ‘prameya’ and ‘jñeya’ (which embrace all conceivable things)?”—[Ślokavārtika-Apoha 140-141]—(975-976)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following texts proceed to show that the theory cannot cover all cases and as such it is contrary to experience:—[see verses 977-979 above]

‘And the like’—is meant to include Invitation, Addressing and the like. There is ‘no idea’—apprehension—of the ‘exclusion’—denial—of other things; and the reason for this lies in the fact that ‘there is nothing to be denied that could figure in the denial’, as pointed out above (under Text 974).

In such expressions as ‘na na-pacati devadattaḥ’ (‘Devadatta is not non-cooking’), where one negative is coupled with another negative,—what sort of Apoha could be possible? None at all; since two negatives always imply the affirmative.

Further, in the ease of particles like ‘ca’,—i.e. of all nipāta adverbs, prefixes, prepositions, and so forth,—all which have been regarded as words; and yet these can have no connection with the negative, as such a combination would not be expressive of anything at all. That is to say, in the case of the word ‘Jar’, when it is connected with the negative in the expression ‘non-jar’, one has the notion of something else, in the shape of the Cloth; and hence the denotation of the word ‘Jar’ without the negative is held to consist in the ‘negation (exclusion) of that other thing (Cloth)’; in the case of the particles ‘ca’ and the like, there is no connection with the negative, in such expressions as ‘na ca’; and what is not connected with the negative cannot be negatived (or excluded). Hence in this case no Apoha is possible; i.e. there must be absence of Apoha.

Further, in the case of sentences, what is expressed by them is held to be of one mixed form, like the variegated colour; consequently the ‘exclusion of others’ cannot be indicated in their case; because there is no counter-entity known to exist in any accomplished form. It has been asserted that ‘in the case of such sentences as Caitra, bring the cow, the ‘exclusion of others’ is assumed to be in parts—such as that of ‘non-caitra’ and the rest. But this would be a case of denotation of words, not of the Sentence. As it is one impartite whole, and does not admit of such dissection. Thus then your theory of the denotation of words does not cover all cases.

Then again, in the case of such expressions as ‘Na anyāpohaḥ Ananyapokaḥ’, there is nothing apprehended as denoted, except something positive,—Because what is understood to be denoted is not merely the form of the Apoha; as the double negative always expresses the positive.

The particle ‘ādi’ (in the compound ‘ananyāpohaśabdādau’) stands for such synonyms as ‘ananyavyāvṛtti’, ‘ananyavyavaccheda’ and so forth.

Objection:—“What is said here has already been said (under 977) in the words ‘Nañaścāpi nañā, etc.’; so that there is needless repetition”.

True. But the reiteration is made with a view to showing that the words of the Apohist himself—that ‘the denotation of words consists in the Exclusion of Others’—show that he regards the denotation to be positive. Because what the term ‘anyāpoha’, ‘Exclusion of Others’, excludes (or denies) is what is denoted by the term ‘ananyāpoha’, ‘Non-exclusion of Others’; and this latter is clearly understood to be positive.

Then there are such words as ‘cognisable’, ‘knowable’, ‘predicable’ and so forth; and there is nothing that is excluded by these; as all things are ‘cognisable’, etc. by their very nature. If anything were assumed to be excluded by these words, it would be entirely cognised in the form of ‘exclusion’; and as such would remain ‘cognisable’; because what is not cognised cannot be excluded. Then, as there is nothing that could be excluded in this case, the theory of the Apohist cannot be universally true.—(977-979)