Verse 980-981

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अपोह्यकल्पनायां च वरं वस्त्वेव कल्पितम् ।
ज्ञानाकारनिषेधाच्च नान्तरार्थोऽभिधीयते ॥ ९८० ॥
नचाप्यपोह्यता तस्मान्नापोहस्तेषु सिद्ध्यति ।
एवमित्यादिशब्दानां न चापोह्यं निरूप्यते ॥ ९८१ ॥

apohyakalpanāyāṃ ca varaṃ vastveva kalpitam |
jñānākāraniṣedhācca nāntarārtho'bhidhīyate || 980 ||
nacāpyapohyatā tasmānnāpohasteṣu siddhyati |
evamityādiśabdānāṃ na cāpohyaṃ nirūpyate || 981 ||

“Rather than assume the thing to be excluded, it is ear better to assume the entity itself.—As the idea of things being of the form of cognitions has been rejected, what is denoted cannot be anything internal (subjective); nor is it possible for any subjective thing to be ‘excluded’. Thus there can be no Apoha in the case of the words in question.—Lastly, in the case of such words as ‘eva’, nothing is found to be ‘excluded”—[Ślokavārtika-Apoha 140-141]—(975-976)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Objection:—‘In the Hetumukha (a work of that name) it has been declared that there is Inference of the Cognisable as consisting of the Exclusion of the Non-cognisable which is assumed for the purpose. So that how can our Apoha-theory fail to apply to the case of these words?”

Answer:—[see verses 980-981 above]

If all that is cognisable is assumed to be excluded as ‘cognisable’,—then it is far better to admit the positive entity itself to be denoted by the word; which is what is accepted by all men. That is to say, in so doing there would be no assumption of the Unseen, nor the denial of the Seen. That is why it is spoken of as ‘far better’.

Some (Buddhists) have held the view that—‘what is denoted by all words is only the reflection of conceptual thought, and it is this that is excluded, differentiated and expressed’.

The answer to this is—As the idea of things, etc. etc. That is, we have already rejected the idea that things are of the nature of cognitions; and we have done so on the ground that Cognition is formless, while the thing has a form and is clearly perceived as existing in the external world; consequently there being no internal (subjective) form resting in Cognition, it cannot be right to regard any such thing as denoted by words.

Nor is it possible for any such subjective thing to be rejected,—for the same reason that no such thing exists.

In the case of the words in question—i.e. words like ‘Cognisable’.

Then again, there are such words as ‘evam’ (‘thus’, ‘ittham’ (‘in this way’, and so forth; in the case of these, nothing is found that can be ‘excluded’; as there is no counter-entity in this case, in the form of what could be excluded.

It might be argued that—‘in such expressions as ‘na evam’ (‘not thus’, there is something probable that could be regarded as ‘excluded’.

This also is not possible in this case, as already pointed out. Because here also, in the expression ‘na naivam’, there is negation of negation; and the ‘evam' remains in its own unnegatived—positive—form. So the same reason that we had urged before becomes applicable here also.—(980-981)

All the above has been set forth as put forward by Kumārila. With the following Texts, the Author proceeds to set forth objections put forward by Uddyotakara against Apoha [In Nyāyavārtika on 2. 2. 63, pp. 332-333]:—[see verses 982-988]