Taittiriya Upanishad Bhashya Vartika

by R. Balasubramanian | 151,292 words | ISBN-10: 8185208115 | ISBN-13: 9788185208114

The English translation of Sureshvara’s Taittiriya Vartika, which is a commentary on Shankara’s Bhashya on the Taittiriya Upanishad. Taittiriya Vartika contains a further explanation of the words of Shankara-Acharya, the famous commentator who wrote many texts belonging to Advaita-Vedanta. Sureshvaracharya was his direct disciple and lived in the 9...

Sanskrit text and transliteration:

ब्रह्मस्वभावो हेतुश्चेत्सृष्टेस्तत्संनिधेः सदा ।
सर्वदा ब्रह्मवत्सर्गो न च देशाद्यसम्भवात् ॥ १४२ ॥

brahmasvabhāvo hetuścetsṛṣṭestatsaṃnidheḥ sadā |
sarvadā brahmavatsargo na ca deśādyasambhavāt || 142 ||

English translation of verse 2.142:

If it be said that the nature of Brahman is the cause of creation, its proximity being always there, the universe must always exist like Brahman. But this cannot be, since space, etc., cannot take place.

Notes:

It may be, the critic argues, that Brahman by its very nature is immutable (kūṭastha). Nevertheless, it could be the cause of the world in the same way as a magnet, remaining where it is and without undergoing any change, is the cause of the movement of the iron filings just by its proximity to them.

This argument cannot be accepted. The basic difficulty here is that since the infinite Brahman is ever-existent its proximity to the world is also ever-existent, and this would mean the creation of the world, the existence of the world, all the time. This is not acceptable. Creation and dissolution alternate like day and night. Creation (sṛṣṭi) is followed by dissolution (pralaya), and dissolution is followed by creation. The idea of eternal creation is unacceptable.

There is also another difficulty. Every object which is created comes into being at a particular time and space. Then, what about time and space themselves? While the occurrence of a thing is explained in a particular space-time context, the same thing cannot be said of both space and time. The occurrence of space is not explained by presupposing another space. Similarly, the occurrence of time is not explained by presupposing another time. There is strictly speaking neither plurality of space nor plurality of time. Therefore, the occurrence of space and time cannot be thought of in the context of another space and time, for there is no “other space”, nor “another time” (deśasya deśāntarābhāvāt, kālasya ca kālāntarābhāvāt). The explanation of the occurrence of an object in terms of space and time breaks down when we attempt to explain the occurrence of both space and time.

Further, to think of another space and another time with a view to account for space and time of the first level will lead to the fallacy of infinite regress (anavasthā), for both space and time which are posited at the second level would in their turn require another space and time at the third level, and these in their turn would require another space and time at the fourth level, and so on. It is, therefore, impossible to subscribe to the idea of eternal creation or the eternal existence of the world.

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