5. Theory of Error/Illusion

It has been observed that according to the theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge, knowledge is valid by itself and invalid when there are some defects or obstacles in the path of knowledge. Here a question can arise if all knowledge is intrinsically valid, how can error at all come into being? Different schools of Indian philosophy have given divergent theories to justify the reasons for error. The theory of error is also known as Khyātivāda in Indian philosophy.^[1]

Naiyāyikas advocate Anyathākhyāti^[2] theory of error. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believes that an error is a misapprehension where we have a wrong synthesis of the presented and the represented things. Here one is confused the represented thing with the presented one. The word “anyathā” indicates “elsewise” and “elsewhere” which suggest the presented thing is apprehended elsewise and the represented thing have existence elsewhere. For instance: two things the shell and the silver which are completely different and real but their synthesis “shell-silver” is not real. We misapprehended the shell as silver which exists somewhere else i.e. (in the market).

The Mādhyamikas believe that nothing is real in this empirical world. It holds Asatkhyāti view that error comprises in the manifestation of the non-existent as existent. For instance: the silver and the shell both are unreal when we have illusory cognition of a shell as silver. The silver is not real because it disappears when the illusion vanishes. The shell is also unreal as it is a part of sublating cognition; other factors are silver and the synthesis between the silver and the shell.

Here, it may be noted that Mādhyamikas maintain that ultimate principle is void (śunya) which is not—

1. Real
2. Unreal
3. Both real and unreal
4. Neither real nor unreal.

They believe that the true nature of things is indeterminate. The Mādhyamikas position is different from the Vijñānavādins who believe that in error everything seems as external in place of internal, the Śunyavādins hold that there is nothing which can be called external and internal, and everything is void. In the “Shell-Silver” example both silver and shell are unreal, it is only perception of the unreal as real.^[3]

The Yogācāras maintain Ātmakhyāti theory of error. According to them, all objects are within consciousness not external to it. They hold that cognition is not different from its objects. If this is the case then it must came into being either before or after the object or at the same time. But this is not the case as it does not appear before the object because at that moment there is no object. It does not appear after the object because cognition of the object vanishes instantly. In case of occurring at the same time, the cognition and its object are not different. So, the Vijñānavādins maintain that cognition is not distinct from its objects. According to them, error exists when one projects subjective ideas as objective.^[4]

The theory of error maintained by the Prābhākaras (scholar of Mīmāṃsakas) is known as Akhyāti or Vivekākhyāti.^[5] The Prābhākaras hold that error is the outcome of the lack of recognition between two cognitions and their separate objects. He takes error as a partial truth. It is imperfect knowledge. Imperfect knowledge is called error. All knowledge are true, there is no distinction between truth and error. Error is an only nonunderstanding of the distinction between the two cognitions and their objects. For this reason the view of error is known as Akhyāti (non-apprehension). Error occurs when we disremember the fact that in place of single cognition there are two cognitions and their objects are completely different and not related to each other. For instance: Two imperfect cognitions occur when a person misunderstands a shell as a piece of silver and says, “this is silver”. It is due to common attributes restore in memory the impression of silver which the person saw earlier somewhere else. There is merely nonapprehension of distinguish between these two cognitions which are imperfect and their presented objects which are partial.

Kumārila (other scholar of Mīmāṃsaka School) agrees with Prabhākara in believing the intrinsic validity of knowledge. But he disagrees with him in maintaining the logical distinction between truth and error. He considered error as misapprehension and not merely non-apprehension. He says error is not because of non-distinction between two imperfect cognitions but it is because of a positive wrong synthesis of two cognitions which are imperfect and unrelated are joined in such a way that it looks unitary knowledge in error. We misapprehend the shell as silver. Thus, error is not nonapprehension but misapprehension which is also known as Viparīta-khyāti.^[6]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

S. Chatterjee, op.cit, p.36.

[2]:

Ibid, p.39.

[3]:

C.D. Sharma, op.cit., p.231

[4]:

NVT, pp.85-87, Nyāyamañjari, p.187.

[5]:

M.G. Jha, The Prabhākara School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, p.28

[6]:

Ibid., pp.28-32.