The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2389-2390 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2389-2390.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

नैवं संशयसंजातेर्विपरीतान्यवाक्यवत् ।
प्रेक्षावन्तो हि नैतेषां भेदं पश्यन्ति कञ्चन ॥ २३८९ ॥
नातीन्द्रिये हि युज्येते सदसत्ताविनिश्चयौ ।
निश्चयो वेदवाक्याच्चेदन्यादृग्न किमन्यतः ॥ २३९० ॥

naivaṃ saṃśayasaṃjāterviparītānyavākyavat |
prekṣāvanto hi naiteṣāṃ bhedaṃ paśyanti kañcana || 2389 ||
nātīndriye hi yujyete sadasattāviniścayau |
niścayo vedavākyāccedanyādṛgna kimanyataḥ || 2390 ||

It is not so; because uncertainty does arise (in the case of the vedic sentence), just in the same way as in the case of another assertion to the contrary; and intelligent people do not perceive any difference between the two cases. In fact, in regard to things beyond the senses, there can be no certainty regarding their existence or non-existence.—If it be urged that—“this certainty does arise from the Vedic sentence”,—then, (the answer is)—why cannot there be certainty regarding the contrary of that, from another sentence?—(2389-2390)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

If your Reason means that the notion that intelligent men obtain from the Veda is free from uncertainty, etc.—then it is not ‘admissible’; because the notion that the intelligent man has of Agnihotra leading to Heaven is just as uncertain as that of Agnihotra not leading to Heaven; in fact, in the matter of all supersensuous things, there can be no cause for any absolutely certain cognition as to the thing being existent or non-existent; because the corroboration of the actual perception of the real state of things is equally unavailable in both cases.

As in the case of another assertion to the contrary’—The ‘vati’ affix is added to the word with the Locative ending.

It might be argued that—“the certainty is obtained from the Vedic sentence itself; why seek for another cause for it?”

The answer to this is—‘Why cannot there be, etc. etc.’—i.e. certainty contrary to what is asserted in the Vedic sentence.

From another sentence’—i.e. from one emanating from a man.

Why cannot there be’—i.e. there must be.—Hence that also should be regarded as valid and reliable; as the ‘absence of sublation’ would be equally available in both cases.—(2389-2390)

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