Verse 2386-2388

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

माने स्थितेऽपि वेदेऽतः शिष्याचार्यपरम्परा ।
अनादिः कल्पिताऽप्येषा संजाताऽन्धपरम्परा ॥ २३८६ ॥
नन्वारेकादिनिर्मुक्ता स्वर्गादौ जायते मतिः ।
अग्निहोत्रादिवचसो निष्कम्पाध्यक्षबुद्धिवत् ॥ २३८७ ॥
नावलम्बेत तां कुर्वन्कथं वेदः प्रमाणताम् ।
न ह्यतो वचनादर्थं संदिग्धं वेत्ति कश्चन ॥ २३८८ ॥

māne sthite'pi vede'taḥ śiṣyācāryaparamparā |
anādiḥ kalpitā'pyeṣā saṃjātā'ndhaparamparā || 2386 ||
nanvārekādinirmuktā svargādau jāyate matiḥ |
agnihotrādivacaso niṣkampādhyakṣabuddhivat || 2387 ||
nāvalambeta tāṃ kurvankathaṃ vedaḥ pramāṇatām |
na hyato vacanādarthaṃ saṃdigdhaṃ vetti kaścana || 2388 ||

Even if the Veda is a reliable source of knowledge, the beginningless ‘line of pupils and teachers’ that has been assumed becomes like a ‘line of blind persons’.—(2386)

“The cognition that arises in regard to heaven and such things, from the Vedic sentences speaking of the agnihotra, etc. is found to be free from doubt and uncertainty,—just like the firm conviction that proceeds from sense-perception. Why then should the Veda, bringing about such cognition not be regarded as reliable? It is for this reason that the idea that one derives from the words of the Veda is never doubtful and uncertain.”—(2387-2388)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verse 2386]:

At first, it was explained that the Veda itself being unreliable, the assumption of the ‘line of pupils and teachers’ is futile. Now, it is granted (for the sake of argument) that the Veda is reliable; and then shown that in either case, the assumption of the ‘line of pupils and teachers’ is futile:—[see verse 2386 above]

In the following text, the Opponent urges the fallacy of ‘Impossibility’ against the foregoing assertion of the Buddhist to the effect—‘May it not be suspected, etc. etc.’ (Text 2385):—[see verses 2387-2388 above]

[verses 2387-2388]:

‘Āreka’—is doubt, uncertainty.—‘ādi’ is meant to include mistake, wrongness.—As declared in the Śabara-Bhāṣya (1. 1. 2)—‘The idea brought about by the assertion—Desiring Heaven, one should perform sacrifices—is not an uncertain one; i.e. it is not in the form—Heaven may or may not follow from the performance of sacrifices; in fact, the idea is a definitely certain one—that Heaven does follow; and when this is cognised for certain, it cannot be false. That Cognition or Idea alone is false which, having appeared, becomes sublated by the notion—such is not the actual case; the idea in question—that Heaven follows from the performance of sacrifices—is never found to be so sublated at any time, or in regard to any person, or under any circumstances, or at any place. Hence it follows that it is not false or wrong.’—(Translation, p. 5).

If it were not so, then why should not your mind be swinging in doubt, even when you may be actually feeling the huge flame of fire with gleaming sparks flying on all sides? In fact, under the circumstances, there would be nothing reliable for you.

Such is the sense of the Opponent (Mīmāṃsaka).

His argument may be formulated thus:—That Cognition which is free from doubt and mistake must be regarded by all intelligent men as ‘valid and reliable’;—e.g. the certain cognition of fire that the man has who desires heat for cooking and whose mind is not under delusion;—and the Cognition arising from the Vedic sentences speaking of the Agnihotra, etc. is free from doubt and mistake; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of the thing.

‘Na-avalambīta’—is to be construed with (as governing) ‘pramānatām’.

‘Tām kurvan’—bringing about such cognition.—(2387-2388)

The author answers the above argument in the following—[see verses 2389-2390 next]