Verse 1469-1471

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

मिथ्याज्ञानं समानं च पूर्वपक्षव्यपेक्षया ।
इष्टघातकृता जन्यं ज्ञानमुक्तं न वस्तुतः ॥ १४६९ ॥
वस्तुस्थित्या हि तज्ज्ञानमविसंवादि निश्चितम् ।
वादीष्टविपरीतस्य प्रमाणमत एव तत् ॥ १४७० ॥
अतो विरुद्धता हेतोर्दृष्टान्ते चाप्यसाध्यता ।
एतेनैव प्रकारेण द्वितीये हेत्वसिद्धता ॥ १४७१ ॥

mithyājñānaṃ samānaṃ ca pūrvapakṣavyapekṣayā |
iṣṭaghātakṛtā janyaṃ jñānamuktaṃ na vastutaḥ || 1469 ||
vastusthityā hi tajjñānamavisaṃvādi niścitam |
vādīṣṭaviparītasya pramāṇamata eva tat || 1470 ||
ato viruddhatā hetordṛṣṭānte cāpyasādhyatā |
etenaiva prakāreṇa dvitīye hetvasiddhatā || 1471 ||

When the ‘wrong cognition’, as ‘subversive of what is desirable’, is spoken of as being ‘similar’, the ‘similarity’ meant must be only that of the view of the first party,—and not real similarity; because as regards the real state of things, the cognition in question has been definitely found to be not incompatible; in fact, it is in view of this fact that it is a valid argument against what is ‘desired’ by the disputant.—Thus the reason adduced is found to be ‘contradictory’;—and the corroborative instance also is found to be devoid of the probandum.—In the same way, in the second argument, the probans is ‘inadmissible’.—(1469-1471)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Texts proceed to show that the Corroborative Instance (cited by the Opponent in 1457, that of ‘Wrong Cognition’) is ‘devoid of the Probandum’:—[see verses 1469-1471 above]

As proving the contrary of what is desired by the disputant, the cognition in question must be valid; otherwise, if it were meant that all cognitions are invalid and at all times,—in regard to another Probandum,—then, such invalidity might affect Sense-perception also. In fact, it has been spoken of as ‘wrong Cognition’, only in reference to the view of the First Party.—The term ‘pūrvapakṣa’ here stands for the ‘pakṣa’, view—of the ‘pūrva’, the First Party. One who holds the view that the Eye and the rest appertain only to an object which is essentially incapable of any additional features imposed upon it,—it is only in reference to the view of such a party that the Cognition could be spoken of as ‘wrong’; because (under that view) the Eye, etc, have been proved to be the Cause of many fleeting cognitions.

‘Contradictory’; because the character of ‘being brought about by the Three-featured Indicative’ is never present in any invalid Cognition and when the cognition so brought about is valid, then the said character is present in that same Cognition which is ‘subversive of what is desired’ (by the Disputant).

Bays the Opponent:—“When an argument to the contrary is urged against the Materialist, then the Corroborative Instance cannot be one that is admitted (by both parties). The opponent does not admit the validity of the Cognition of what is subversive of what is desired; and what is not admitted by either of the two parties cannot serve as a Corroborative Instance.

In fact, the law is that what is equally admitted by both parties—that alone can be cited against the argument of either party.”

The answer to this is as follows Though the other party has not actually admitted the validity of the cognition, in so many words,—yet, the absence of incompatibility has to be accepted, as that cannot be denied; and those who accept that, have tacitly accepted the validity also, in so far as the real state of things is concerned; consequently, the ‘contradiction’ that we have urged is in regard to the real state of things, not in regard to the theory of the other party.

Or, the Opponent’s Reason may be regarded as ‘contradictory’ on the ground of being indicative of a contradictory Reason. For instance, the ‘contradictory’ Reason would be in the form—‘What is not incompatible is valid,—e.g. Sense-perception,—the cognition bro ught about by the t hree -featured Indicative is compatible; [hence it must be valid]’;—this would be Reason based on the nature of the thing itself. The Reason here put forward cannot be ‘Inadmissible’, for, if it were not admitted, then the Subject would become featureless and there could be no Reason at all (indicative of validity). Nor can it be ‘Inconclusive’ (Doubtful),—as that would make Sense-perception also invalid.

‘Asādhyatā;—i.e. the Instance would be devoid of the Probandum.

‘In the second argument’;—i.e. in the argument “nor can the presence of three features, etc. etc.” (urged under Text 1458),

‘The Probans is inadmissible’;—because it is not present anywhere where the (valid) Inference is absent.,

‘In the same way’—i.e. by the reasoning based upon the presence of Three-features, etc. etc.—(1469-1471)