Verse 1472-1474

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यत्तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्त्या सम्बन्धं परिनिश्चितम् ।
तदेव साधनं प्राहुः सिद्धये न्यायवादिनः ॥ १४७२ ॥
अनुमानविरोधादिरीदृशेऽस्ति न साधने ।
नैव तद्ध्यात्महेतुभ्यां विना सम्भवति क्वचित् ॥ १४७३ ॥
परस्परविरुद्धौ न धर्मौ नैकत्र वस्तुनि ।
युज्येते सम्भवो नातो विरुद्धाव्यभिचारिणः ॥ १४७४ ॥

yattādātmyatadutpattyā sambandhaṃ pariniścitam |
tadeva sādhanaṃ prāhuḥ siddhaye nyāyavādinaḥ || 1472 ||
anumānavirodhādirīdṛśe'sti na sādhane |
naiva taddhyātmahetubhyāṃ vinā sambhavati kvacit || 1473 ||
parasparaviruddhau na dharmau naikatra vastuni |
yujyete sambhavo nāto viruddhāvyabhicāriṇaḥ || 1474 ||

Exponents of the true reasoning have all declared that that reason alone is capable of proving the conclusion whose relationship (with the probandum) is known with certainty,—such relationship being either in the nature of sameness of essence or of being an effect;—and against such a probans, there can be no such defect as that of ‘being contrary to inference’ and so forth. Because no such inference could be possible except through essential sameness or being the cause. Mutually contradictory properties cannot belong to the same thing. Consequently there can be no possibility of any pbobans which might be concomitant with the contrary of the desired conclusion.—(1472-1474)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Text provides the answer to the argument urged (under 1459):—[see verses 1472-1474 above]

‘Against such a Probans’—i.e. in a Probans that is related through essential sameness and through being an effect.

‘Except through essential sameness, or being the cause’;—i.e. except through, being the same, or being the Cause,—there can be no Probans (Inferential Indicative); if there were, it would be featureless and not a Probans at all.

It has been argued that—“What is meant to be the Probandum is not present in the Subject (Minor Term)

The answer to that is that, if the Probandum is not present in the Minor Term, then the aggregate (of the ‘Three features’) as a whole is not present in the Probans; hence on account of the absence of a part of the aggregate, such, a Probans would be clearly ‘inadmissible’.

It has been argued that—“in the case of all Inferences, there is possibility of particular Inferences to the contrary”.

This is not right. Because that alone is called ‘Contradictory’ which is found to prove the contrary of the desired Probandum; and no particular case is meant to be the Probandum (in the argument under dispute, which is in reference to the definition of Inference). As a matter of fact, in the case of an Inference based on the nature of things, there is no possibility of there being any (valid) Probans proving the contrary; because in the same thing, two mutually contradictory properties cannot coexist.—(1472-1474)