The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1468 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1468.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

त्रिरूपलिङ्गपूर्वत्वं ननु संवादिलक्षणम् ।
तल्लक्षणं च मानत्वं तत्किं तस्मान्निषिध्यते ॥ १४६८ ॥

trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvaṃ nanu saṃvādilakṣaṇam |
tallakṣaṇaṃ ca mānatvaṃ tatkiṃ tasmānniṣidhyate || 1468 ||

When the inference is spoken of as ‘brought about by the three-featured indicative’, what is meant to be indicated is that it is compatible (with the real state of things); and this same (compatibility) is what characterises the valid cognition; why then is it denied?—(1468)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

First of all, the author points out the ‘contradictory’ character of the Probans in the first argument propounded in Text 1457—viz.: “Because it is brought about by the three-featured Indicative”,—‘What is meant is that it is compatible, etc. etc.’;—that is, what is meant to be indicated is that it is compatible; the sense being that, because the cognition that proceeds from the Three-featured Indicative is indirectly appurtenant to the thing concerned, it is not incompatible, just like Sense-perception, as has been asserted in the following statement—‘Inasmuch as the Probans and the Probandum are indirectly appurtenant to the Thing, and are entirely free from any wrong notions regarding it, there can be nothing deceitful about it.’

This same’;—i.e. compatibility; as has been thus declared—The cognition that is not incompatible is right (or valid) In the case of Sense-perception also,—even for one who admits its validity—there is nothing that can be pointed out as determining its validity,—except this absence of incompatibility; and this same condition is present in the case of the cognition proceeding from the three-featured Indicative; why then is the validity of the cognition brought about by the Three-featured Indicative sought to be denied, on the ground of its being brought about by the Three-featured Indicative?

What is indicated by this is the incongruity between the Probandum and the Probans (as put forward by the Opponent (in 1457), For instance, where there is the character of being brought about by the three-featured Indicative, there is absence of incompatibility;—and where there is absence of incompatibility, there is validity; and’validity and invalidity are mutually exclusive,—the incompatibility consisting in the fact that where the one is present the other cannot be present and where the one is absent, the other is present; so that by implication the Probans put forward by the Opponent is ‘Contradictory—(1468)

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: