The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 313-315 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 313-315.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

देशकालस्वभावानामभेदादेकतोच्यते ।
सङ्ख्यालक्षणसंज्ञार्थभेदाद्भेदस्तु वर्ण्यते ॥ ३१३ ॥
रूपादयो घटश्चेति सङ्ख्यासंज्ञाविभेदिता ।
कार्यानुवृत्तिव्यावृत्ती लक्षणार्थविभेदिता ॥ ३१४ ॥
द्रव्यपर्याययोरेवं नैकान्तेनाऽविशेषवत् ।
द्रव्यं पर्यायरूपेण विशेषं याति चे(त्स्व)यम् ॥ ३१५ ॥

deśakālasvabhāvānāmabhedādekatocyate |
saṅkhyālakṣaṇasaṃjñārthabhedādbhedastu varṇyate || 313 ||
rūpādayo ghaṭaśceti saṅkhyāsaṃjñāvibheditā |
kāryānuvṛttivyāvṛttī lakṣaṇārthavibheditā || 314 ||
dravyaparyāyayorevaṃ naikāntenā'viśeṣavat |
dravyaṃ paryāyarūpeṇa viśeṣaṃ yāti ce(tsva)yam || 315 ||

“When sentience is spoken of as ‘one’, it is with reference to space, time and nature; when it is spoken of as ‘different’, it is with reference to number, characteristic, name and function.—When we speak of the ‘jar’ (singular) and its ‘colour and the rest’ (plural), there is difference of ‘number’ and ‘name’; there is also difference of ‘nature’, inasmuch as ‘inclusiveness’ (comprehensiveness) is the nature of the substance jar, while ‘exclusiveness’ (distributiveness) is the nature of the successive factors in the form of colour and the rest; and there is difference also of ‘function’; inasmuch as the purposes served by the two are different.—Similarly between the ‘sub stance’ and the ‘successive factors’.—Thus substance is not absolutely undifferentiated, as it does become differentiated in the form of the successive factors—(313-315)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

In the following texts, it is urged from the standpoint of the Jaina that the reason just put forward is ‘unproven’, ‘not admitted’:—[see verses 313-315 above]

If the Substance were absolutely different from the successive factors, then no differentiation in it would be possible; because, on the ground of their non-difference regarding place, time and nature, the two are held to be one and the same; as a matter of fact, however, the two are different as regards number and other factors; for instance, the difference regarding number is that while the substance is one, the successive factors are many; that is, the Substance is characterized by the number ‘one’, while the Successive Factors—Pleasure and the rest—are characterized by the number ‘many’; the nature of the two also is different: inasmuch as the Substance is ‘comprehensive’ in nature, while the Successive Factors are ‘distributive’ (exclusive). The term ‘saṃjñā’ stands for Name; and ‘artha’ for action, function. This has been thus stated:—‘Between the qualified and the qualification, there is non-difference, due to non-difference in their place, time and nature, but there is difference due to difference in their number^ name, nature and function, as is found between the Jar and its Colour and other properties’; that is, between the Jar and its Colour, etc., there is non-difference regarding place, etc., while the Jar is different from Colour etc., regarding number, etc.; e.g. the Jar is one while its properties, Colour and the rest, are mnay. There is difference in their name also: while the one is named ‘Jar’, the other is named ‘Colour and the rest’, There is difference regarding their nature also: while the Substance, in the shape of the Jar, etc., is comprehensive in its nature, the Successive Factors, Colour etc., are distributive. There is difference in their function also: the Jar serves the purpose of containing water, while Colour and the rest serve the purpose of lending colour to the cloth and so forth.

What has been said above (regarding the Jar and Colour etc.) should be understood to hold respecting the substance ‘Soul’ which is of the nature of ‘Sentience’ and the Successive Factors, ‘Pleasure, Pain and the rest’, In this case, the difference of ‘function’ should be understood as follows: The function performed by Sentience is the ‘apprehension of things’, while that performed by Pleasure, Pain, etc. is happiness, unhappiness, and the like. This is what is shown by the Text, in the words ‘Rūpādayaḥ,.., saṃkhyāsaṃjñāvibheditā’; the latter term is to be construed with the term ‘dravyaparyāyayoḥ’ appearing later on (under text 315); the various terms in the second line of Text 314 are to be construed along with their respective correlates: the construction being ‘Kāryabheda’ ‘difference of purpose’ constitutes the ‘difference of functions’, and ‘anuvṛtti,., vyāvṛtti’, ‘Comprehensiveness and Distributiveness’ constitute the ‘difference of nature’. One sentence ends with the word ‘dravyaparyāyayoḥ’ ‘similarly between the substance and the successive factors’ (in line I of text 315); and another sentence begins with the terms ‘Evam naikāntena.’

Thus the Substance, etc.’, this sums up the fallacy of being ‘unproven’ in the Reason (put forward by the Buddhist as against the Jaina). What is meant is that, as shown above, the Substance is not absolutely undifferentiated; as a matter of fact, it becomes differentiated through the diversity in the forms of the Successive Factors; and thus Substance not being absolutely different from the Successive Factors, the reason put forward (by the Buddhist, in Text 312) ‘because there is no difference’ is ‘unproven’, ‘not true’,—(313-315)

The answer to the above argument of the Jaina is provided in the following—[see verse 316 next]

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