The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 316 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 316.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

स्वभावाभेद एकत्वं तस्मिन्सति च भिन्नता ।
कथंचिदपि दुःसाध्या पर्यायात्मस्वरूपवत् ॥ ३१६ ॥

svabhāvābheda ekatvaṃ tasminsati ca bhinnatā |
kathaṃcidapi duḥsādhyā paryāyātmasvarūpavat || 316 ||

‘One-ness’ (sameness, identity) consists in non-difference of nature were there if this ‘one-ness’ (between two things), then ‘difference’ (between them) world be hard to prove in any way; as in the case of the forms of the successive factors themselves.—(316) commentary.

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Even admitting that there is non-difference between the ‘Substance’ and the ‘Successive Factors’,—such being the case, the ‘non-difference’ should be absolute; how then could there be ‘difference’ between them, which is the contradictory of ‘non-difference’? It cannot be right to affirm and deny a thing,—affirmation and denial being mutually contradictory. For instance, when two things are spoken of as ‘one’, what is meant is that there is ‘nondifference in their nature (character)’,—this ‘non-difference’ being inseparable from ‘negation of difference’; and when there is such ‘non-difference of character'’ (between the ‘substance’ and the ‘successive factors’), how could there be, at the same time, ‘difference’, which is the negation of ‘non-difference’? This argument may be formulated as follows:—In a case where there is non-difference between two things, there can be no room for difference, which is the contradictory of ‘non-difference’; e.g. as is found in the case of the same ‘successive factors’ and the ‘substance’, in regard to the specific individuality of each, where there is non-difference of character; and between ‘substance’ and ‘successive factors’, non-differencel is clearly present (hence there is perception of what is contrary to the Probandum, i.e. difference).—(316)

Thus in reality, there being non-difference between ‘Substance’ and the ‘Successive Factors’, there cannot be any difference between them as regards their ‘characteristics’ also; this is what is shown in the following—[see verses 317-318 next]

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