The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page describes verse 241 of the Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita (8th century), including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: both dealing with philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattva-sangraha (aka Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 verses.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तदत्र चिन्त्यते नित्यमेकं चैतन्यमिष्यते ।
यदि बुद्धिरपि प्राप्ता तद्रूपैव तथा सति ॥ २४१ ॥

tadatra cintyate nityamekaṃ caitanyamiṣyate |
yadi buddhirapi prāptā tadrūpaiva tathā sati || 241 ||

In this connection, the following points are to be considered:—if intelligence is held to be eternal and one, then, cognition also should have to be regarded as of the same character.—(241)


Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

With the next Text, the Author proceeds with the Answer to the above-stated doctrine of the Mīmāṃsaka:—[see verse 241 above]

If Intelligence is held to be eternal and one, then Cognition also—which has no form other than that of Intelligence,—should have to be regarded as eternal and one. This however cannot be desirable for you; as it would be contrary to your doctrine. For instance, the author of your Bhāṣya (Śabara) has declared [under Sūtra 1.1.5, page 9, line 17, Bib. Indica Edition] that ‘Cognition, being momentary, cannot be present at the time of another Cognition’, Jaimini also has asserted (under Sū. 1. 1. 5) that ‘Perception is that Cognition of man which is produced on the contact of an existing thing’; and if Cognition were eternal, there could be no ‘production’ of it.

It would also involve self-contradiction on the part of Kumārila himself: He has declared for instance that—‘It does not remain for a single moment, nor does it even appear in the form of wrong cognition whereby it could operate later on towards the apprehending of its object, like the Sense-organs and the like’—(Ślokavārtika, Pratyakṣa-Sūtra, 55).

Further, if Cognition were held to be only one, this would be contrary to the doctrine of ‘Six Means and Forms of Cognition’,—It would also be contrary to Perception also; as Cognitions are clearly perceived to be liable to appearance and disappearance in the course of the thinking of things with constant imposition of variations.—(241)