The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 47-48 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 47-48.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यत्स्वारम्भकावयवसन्निवेशविशेषवत् ।
बुद्धिमद्धेतुगम्यं तत्तद्यथा कलशादिकम् ॥ ४७ ॥
द्वीन्द्रियग्राह्यमग्राह्यं विवादपदमीदृशम् ।
बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकं तेन वैधर्म्यैणाणवो मताः ॥ ४८ ॥

yatsvārambhakāvayavasanniveśaviśeṣavat |
buddhimaddhetugamyaṃ tattadyathā kalaśādikam || 47 ||
dvīndriyagrāhyamagrāhyaṃ vivādapadamīdṛśam |
buddhimatpūrvakaṃ tena vaidharmyaiṇāṇavo matāḥ || 48 ||

“(A) that which is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of its own component parts is subject to a cause that is endowed with intelligence,—for instance, the jar and other objects.—the thing in dispute,—which is perceptible by means of two sense-organs and also imperceptible,—must be preceded (and produced) by a cause endowed with intelligence,—atoms supplying the corroborative instance ‘per dissimilarity’.”—(48)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Text proceeds to set forth two Reasons propounded by Aviddhakarṇa (an ancient Naiyāyika) in proof of the existence of God:—[see verse 48 above]

The argument has been thus formally stated:—“The thing under dispute, which is perceptible by means of two sense-organs or not perceptible at all, must be regarded as produced by an Intelligent Cause,—because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of its component parts,—like the Jar, and unlike the Atoms [the Jar being the Corroborative Instance per Similarity, and the Atoms being so per Dissimilarity].”—Now in this formulated argument—‘What is perceptible by means of two Sense-organs’ stands for the three kinds of Substance, Earth, Water and Fire—which are perceptible by means of the two organs of Vision and of Touch, because they fulfil such conditions of perceptibility as being large, being composed of several substances, being coloured and so forth;—the ‘imperceptible’ are Air and the rest, simply because the conditions of perceptibility are ‘being large’, ‘being composed of several substances’, ‘being coloured’ and so forth,—and all these conditions are absent in Air and other things; as has been declared in the following passage—“Perception follows from Largeness, Presence of several Substances and Presence of Colour; the Atom is imperceptible because it contains no other substances; Air is imperceptible because it is devoid of the presence of Colour;—the term ‘Saṃskāra’ stands for subsistence, presence in composition;—and the Diad (Two-Atom-Compound) and other things are imperceptible because of the absence of largeness.”

Now, in this argument, if the Probandum to be proved were stated in the general (unqualified) form that ‘Things perceptible by two sense-organs and those imperceptible are produced by intelligent causes’,—then it would be superfluous, proving what is already admitted by both parties, in regard to such things as the Jar and the like, over which there is no dispute at all. It would involve the fallacy of ‘contradicting one’s own doctrine’, because the Naiyāyika does not admit such imperceptible things as the Atom, Ākāśa, and the like to be ‘produced by an Intelligent Cause’; and also because these latter are eternal (hence not produced at all), the said assertion would involve that contradiction of a perceived (well-recognised) fact.—It is for the purpose of avoiding all these difficulties that the qualifying term ‘under dispute’ has been added; the term ‘Vipratipatti’ standing for different opinions, and that which forms the subject of diverse opinions is said to be the matter under dispute.—With this qualification, what become the ‘subject’ of the argument are only the Body, Sense-organs, the various Regions and so forth; and what is asserted does not apply to the Atom and such other things.

Similarly, if the Probandum (to be proved) were stated in the form that ‘the things under dispute are produced by a Cause’,—then the argument would be futile—proving what is already accepted by both parties. In order to avoid this, the qualification has been added—in the form ‘produced by an intelligent Cause’. This argument, thus stated, cannot be futile as addressed to the Sāṃkhya, as there is no Intelligence (Buddhi) for the Sāṃkhya apart from Primordial Matter; and certainly a thing cannot be produced by itself.

Arrangement of component parts’;—the ‘arrangement’,—i.e. conjunction in the form of ‘aggregation’,—of the parts that go to make up the Things; by this the Things in question are characterised—differentiated; consequently they must be as asserted. Mere ‘characterisation by components’ would include the universals ‘Cow’ and the like (which also are held to be consisted of components in the shape of the individual animals) and thus render the Reason ‘too wide’; hence the qualification ‘its own components’; what the universal ‘Cow’ and the rest are differentiated by is the arrangement of the parts that go to make up the Substance,—not by the arrangement of the parts that go to make up the Cow itself.

The ‘Intelligent Cause’ thus proved is ‘God’.

It is this proof that has been stated in these two Texts.—The compound ‘Svārambhaka, etc.’ is to be analysed as meaning ‘that which has for its Viśeṣana—differentia—the peculiar, characteristic,—arrangement, disposition—of its own component parts’, This indicates the invariable concomitance of the Reason (Middle Term) [with the Probandum]. The presence of the Reason in the Subject is indicated by the words ‘which is perceptible by means of two organs, etc. etc.’—The expression ‘vivādapadam’ stands for ‘what forms the matter under dispute’.—(47-48)

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: