Netaji & Freedom Struggle

NETAJI AND FREEDOM STRUGGLE

Prof. Hazara Singh*

The celebration of birth centenary of Netaji Subhas Chander Bose overlaps that of golden jubilee of independence and thus provides an occasion for assessing the role of that crusader against imperialism not only in the freedom struggle but also in the eradication of colonialism in the Far East.

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had been the President of Indian National Congress during the crucial years of 1939-46. His posthumous book INDIA WINS FREEDOM (The complete version) refers to the conflicting attitude of top national leaders towards freedom struggle.

It was a very critical time in the history of the Congress. We were affected by the world shaking events outside. Even more disturbing was the difference among ourselves. I was the Congress President and sought to take India into the camp of democracies if only she was free. The cause of democracy was one for which India felt strongly. The only obstacle in our way was India’s bondage. For Gandhiji, however, it was not so. For him the issue was one of pacifism and not of India’s freedom. I declared openly that the Indian National Congress was not a pacifist organisation but an instrument for achieving India’s freedom. To my mind therefore the issue raised by Gandhji was irrelevant.’ (1:31)

Gandhiji stressed his commitment to pacifism to the extent that he disapproved India’s participation in the Second World War along with the Allies even if it led to independence. (1:39) Though he had stated in 1919 that imperialism was the worst crime against humanity, yet Gandhiji, caught as he was in the whirlpool of his faith in non- violence, observed:

‘We do not seek our independence out of Britain’s ruin’. (2:8) Maulana Azad corroborates this inclination of Gandhiji:

‘.....He had held that India should stand for non-violence and not deviate from it for any reason. That is why in spite of my efforts he would not consent to any mass movement for he felt such a movement might lead to violence. In fact it was with great difficulty that I could persuade him to agree to the individual Satyagraha or Civil Disobedience Movement.’ Even then he laid down so many conditions, that the movement could be nothing more than a moral gesture.’ (1:73)

In spite of his utopian attitude Gandhiji held a great sway over the Congress Working Committee. In July 1940 all of its members except Jawaharlal Nehru and C. Rajgopalachari wrote to the Congress President that the communication be considered as their resignation, if he took any policy decision not finding favour with Gandhiji. (1:33-34) The situation was similar to the one created in 1938 after the re-election of Subhas Chander Bose as Congress President, when twelve members of Working Committee including Maulana Azad sent an identical ultimatum to Bose, which compelled him to resign and form a new political party, Forward Bloc, for carrying on his revolutionary programme.

The Mahatma had been so tenacious in his commitment to pacifism that he even sought audience with Viceroy Linlithgow and suggested to Nazis with spiritual force. (1:35) Thus Gandhiji preached a precept which the western intelligentsia accepted academically but hesitated to practise; whereas the Indian masses believed that he would bring freedom for India by some magic or superhuman method. (1:83)

Maulana Azad records about Nehru that he looked at various affairs from international point of view rather than what was in national interest. (1:66) Jawaharlal held the view that the Congress should side with democracies in their war against fascism without insisting of a firm assurance from the British about the date of independence. He felt inclined to give a talk from All India Radio in that context. Maulana Azad observes that if he had not prevailed upon Nehru in time, the latter’s action would have made the position of Indian National Congress quite ridiculous. (1:65)

According to Maulana Azad the other members of Working Committee viz. Sardar Patel, Dr Rajendra Prasad and Acharya Kripalani seldom tried to judge things on their own and were accustomed to subordinate their judgement to that of Gandhiji, who invariably found a way out of each and every situation. (1:76)

Maulana Azad deplores the role of Rajgopalachari who of his own after the failure of Cripps Mission persuaded the Madras Provincial Congress Legislature Party to pass two resolutions, viz.

i)                    Supporting the demand of All India Muslim League for the creation of Pakistan; and     
ii)                   Seeking approval of Congress High Command for forming again the Government in Madras. (1:67)

The first resolution was stunning because it offered support by a predominantly Hindu province for the creation of Pakistan to which the Muslim majority provinces like Punjab, N.W.F.P, Sindh and Bengal were still indifferent. The second resolution seeking permission for forming again the Congress Government in Madras questioned the very wisdom of having launched the Individual Civil Disobedience Movement which appealed to Indian people not to support the war efforts.

As for himself Maulana Azad stresses that he favoured accepting any offer by the British Government for co-operation during war if it contained a firm time-bound assurance regarding the independence of India. (1:58) This inclination of Maulana Azad was sheerly wishful as Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of U.K.contradicted, not once but thrice, the statement of F.D. Roosevelt, President of U.S.A., that the Atlantic charter guaranteed, that after the war all nations would be given the opportunity to decide their future according to the principle of self-determination. Churchill stated emphatically in the House of Commons that the so-called charter would never be applied to India. Thereafter Roosevelt admitted that his statement had no political validity and did not bind Churchill. (1:108 - 109)

It is important to note that Gandhiji had not been a member of Congress Working Committee ever since he took to constructive programme during twenties, but still he controlled its reins. On July 5, 1942 he wrote to Maulana Azad that as they differed sharply in their views regarding achievement of independence, therefore, the latter should not only resign from Congress Presidentship but along with Nehru keep away from Working Committee also. (1:77) Though Gandhiji withdrew that letter within hours, yet it had its taming effect both on Nehru and Azad. The latter confesses that he felt unhappy about the whole situation and did not oppose the resolution passed by the Working Committee on July 14, 1942 urging direct action (non-violent open rebellion), because he was not hopeful about its outcome. (1:83­-84) If Sardar Patel and others subordinated their judgement to that of Gandiji, Maulana Azad succumbed there to in spite of his tall claims.

All these incidents reflect the confusion which had been pestering the top Congress leaders. Maulana Azad refers casually toSubhas Chander Base in this book, but that observation is meaningful.

‘.....I also saw that Subha Bose’s escape to Germany had made a great impression on Gandhiji. He had not formerly approved many of his actions, but now I found a change. He admired the courage and resourcefulness Subhas Bose had displayed in making his escape from India. His admiration for Subhas Bose unconsciously ‘coloured his view about the whole war situation.’ (1:40)

STRATEGY OF BOSE

Subhas Chander Bose was convinced that the passive policies of Congress instead of injecting any good sense in the British colonial outlook would rather harden it. He planned to escape from India to crusade for independence from abroad. His assessment was that

i)                    the rightist forces within the Congress had succeeded in dislodging him from the Congress Presidentship;
ii)                   the leftist forces could not be mobilised against the Gandhiites on one hand and the British on the other;
iii)                 the British could not be driven out without any armed uprising in India; and
iv)                 the Second World War having created an opportunity for such an uprising, he should secure the armed help of a friendly country, viz. the Soviet Union. (3:59)

Accordingly he managed his escape from India to Kabul in January 1941 with the support of Kirty Party owing affiliation to the Communist Party of India with an intention to reach Moscow. It was not known then that Russia had a secret non-­aggression alliance with U.K. and would consider it harmful to incur latter’s wrath by giving armed support to Bose for India’s liberation. (2:14) The Russian Embassy at Kabul gave a cold shoulder to Bose. (3:90) Accordingly he revised his plan and reached Berlin with the help of Italian Legation.

EVENTS IN THE FAR EAST

The blizzardous advance of Japanese forces in the Far East and the fall of Singapore, considered to be an invincible naval fortress of the Empire, on February 15, 1942 made the British so panicky that they formulated a scorched earth policy regarding India which included blowing up of important bridges and destroying industrial installations in order to deny them to the Japanese in the event of their invading India. (1:73) The Japanese landed in Burma in early 1942.

‘Many British and Austrlian soldiers as could be evacuated by sea were shipped off. Those who could not be sent by sea were escorted under air protection by the Burma Road, a route reserved of Europeans only, even local Europeans and Anglo-Burmese men and women were assured this safe route of escape to India.

Indian soldiers were left behind to surrender or fend their way through thick jungles and rugged mountains, without food or water. More than a million Indian citizens were made to evacuate and to seek a journey to home with their children and babies in arms, through thick unexplored jungle country. It is estimated that 900,000 of these Indian refugees perished in the jungles and mountains.’ (2:41)

This callous action of the British manifested that in spite of their claim of being champions of democracy, they practised racialism: even against their co­ defenders.

IMPACT OF BOSE

The speeches of Bose from Berlin Radio influenced Mahatma Gandhi so profoundly that despite his commitment to non-violence he was all set to launch the ‘Quit India’ Movement, an open non-violent rebellion, (1:78) which acquired the war cry ‘Do or die’; a slogan not consistent with his policy of pacifism.

The assumption of Supreme Command of re-organised India National Army, named thereafter as Azad Hind Fauj on August 25, 1943 and the establishment of Provisional Government, Arzi Hakumat-­e-Azad Hind, by Subhas Chander Bose on October 21, 1943 rendered the British quite jittery. As many as 88 confidential orders were issued in persuasion of Denial Policies regarding removal of transport means and large-scale lifting of paddy from the denial areas for creating famine-like conditions so that adult male population might feel compelled either to seek recruitment to army or move away to other places in search of livelihood.

This nefarious strategy of desired scarcity of food, causing devastation in Bengal, had the sole design behind it i.e. to offer nothing in the form of human resources in case Netaji successfully appeared with his victorious army. The main bulk of the revolutionary forces would draw from the soil of Bengal, they apprehended. (2:62)

More than four million human lives perished in that famine. The responsibility for that in human action lay squarely on Winston Chruchill the then Prime Minister­ cum-War Minister of Britain. While accusing the Nazis for having perpetrated a state-sponsored genocide against the Jews the world opinion should also take notice of the fact that the British Government too was guilty of an equally gruesome war crime against humanity in Bengal.

Rear Admiral Mountabatten, Suprem Commander of Allied Forces in the Far East, dreaded Netaji’s charisma so much that the 3rd Indian Division positioned by him around Imphal to face the I.N.A was Indian in name only. Its twenty four battalions in the forward areas consisted of English, Nigerian, Amerian and Burmese soldiers, but no Indian, as it was apprehended that they would leave the British side and join the I.N.A (2:103)

VICTORY IN DEFEAT

After the surrender by Japan in August 1945, I.N.A. had to stop its operations. The British Indian Army was sent in September 1945 to re-occupy the British positions in Singapore and Malaya.

‘On learning the truth about the I.N.A the British Indian Army also started itching for India’s independence. The effect of I.N.A was so deep that at the time of arranging victory parade, the Allies were forced to hoist the Indian National Flag also along with the national flags of the victorious big five powers – U.S.A, U.S.S.R., Britain, France and China. (2:122-23)

For meeting the exigency the Indian National Flag was sent for from the I.N.A Headquarters at Ipoch (Malaya). It is unprecedented in the history of wars that the victors got forced to hoist the flag of the vanquished as well in their victory parade.

The mutiny in the Royal Indian Navy at Karachi and Bombay during February 1946 was the repercussion of patriotic sentiments stirred by the heroic deeds of I.N.A. Maulana Azad states

‘Mrs Asaf Ali took up the case of naval officers and became their ardent supporter. She came to Delhi to win my support. I told her that the officers had not acted wisely and my advice to them was that they must go to work unconditionally.’ (1:141)

It is a sad reflection on the ability of Congress leaders that they failed to give proper lead to that patriotic upheaval in the navy. The British not only crushed that mutiny but also made full use of the indifference of the Congress for wrecking the I.N.A by categorizing its captured personnel as White, Grey and Black-White were retained with their original seniority; Grey were discharged with permissible benefits and Black (who did not repent their action of joining the I.N.A. but admitted boldly that they did so to fight against the British to liberate India) were dismissed. The Interim Government formed under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru in September 46, acquiesced to that colonial concept of discipline in the army and felt no qualm of conscience letting the fighters for freedom to be punished as deserters. A rare human resource, exceptionally patriotic and dedicated, who could have been easily absorbed in other para-military forces was suffered to be wasted.

Clement Attlee, post-war Prime Minister of Britain, stated on March. 15, 46 that imperialism was dead as dodo. Commander-in-Chief Auchinleck got convinced that the British Indian Army, Navy and Air Force could no longer be kept as tamed to the Crown and counseled the Raj to pack up and quite.

Clement Attlee during his visit to India in 1956 admitted

“It was Nataji Subhas Chander Bose and the I.N.A. the immediate cause of independence but for which the transfer of power might not have been as quick and unequivocal as it was’. (2:144).

References:

1. Azad Abul Kalam Maulana, India Wins Feedom (The complete version), Orient Longman Ltd., Madras, 1988, pp. 283

2. Maikap S.C., Challenge to the Empire, Publication Division, Ministry of Information & Broadcastmg, Government of India, New Delhi, 1993, pp. 152

3. Talwar Bhagat Ram, The Talwars of Pathan Land and Subhas Chander’s Great Escape, People’s Publishing House, New Delhi, 1997, pp. 267

* A noted freedom fighter