International Affairs: A Survey

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: A SURVEY
BANGLADESH

World Community’s Response and India’s Responsibilities

The tragedy of Bangla Desh once again demonstrates that the spirit of liberty and the demands of democracy are no match for the ruthlessness of dictators. The spontaneity of the revolt has by now petered out and even though it is still tough going for the West Pakistani soldiers, even confirmed optimists cannot speak of a military victory for the Mukti Fauz. Thanks to the world community’s ingenuity to sweep enormous human tragedies under the rubric of internal affairs, millions are allowed to be butchered and driven out of their homes.

Pakistan’s ‘success’ does not, however, mean a cause for her jubliation. The nature of the West Pakistani ruling elite has been exposed, the diabolic potentialities of its military dictators demonstrated and the flimsyness of the bond of religion as a sufficient condition for nationhood revealed. In the long run erstwhile benefactors of Pakistan cannot put much store by her. The civil war has proved that a stable Pakistan so assiduously believed in by the western powers, had been a facade covering up a crude military dictatorship which for over a decade exploited and impoverished the eastern wing and in the final act is bent on liquidating a substantial part of the intellectuals and able bodied in this region. A recognition of this fact should convince them of the folly of equating India and Pakistan in their foreign policy calculations. But alas all these ‘long run’ effects are of no consolation to the victims of the genocide in East Bengal.

The Unique Nature of the Civil War

The unique nature of the civil war must be appreciated. Never before in recent times have a majority of the population of a country taken up arms demanding secession after their constitutional efforts to wrest home rule have been ruthlessly crushed and their leaders humiliated, arrested and slaughtered. The people of East Pakistan constitute 54% of the country’s population and the spontaneity of the uprising can no longer be questioned. The President Yahya Khan is not able to rope in even a handful of Awami League representatives to join a puppet civil administration in the eastern wing settles the point.

Besides this moral aspect of the claim, the movement has behind it the legitimising force of the general election conducted by the military regime itself. The Awami League under Sheik Mujibur Rehman’s leadership and with a Six point Programme as its manifesto fought the elections winning an unprecedented victory in which it gained 160 of the 162 seats that the eastern region was allotted in the 300 member National Constituent Assembly. It will be recalled that it was Yahya Khan’s refusal to summon the Constituent Assembly to session that led to the succession of events starting with Mujibur Rehman’s call for non-violent civil disobedience and culminating in the ghastly tragedy of civil war.

The Six point Programme of the Awami League is as follows: (1) The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in the true sense and for a parliamentary form of government. (2) The Federal Government should deal with only two subjects–defence and foreign affairs, with all residuary subjects vested in the federating states. (3) There should be either two separate freely convertible currencies for the two wings or one currency with two separate reserve banks to prevent inter-wing flights of capital. (4) The power of taxation and revenue collection shall be vested in the states. The Federal Government will receive a share to meet its financial obligations. (5) Economic disparities between the two wings shall disappear through a series of economic, fiscal and legal reforms. (6) A militia or para-military force must be created in East Pakistan. These are indeed extreme demands and the concept of a strong and united Pakistan will certainly be jeopardised if these are accepted. Hence one can understand President Yahya Khan’s misgivings in acceding to them. Obviously even Sheik Mujibur Rehman must have regarded these as negotiable, formally insisting on all points to gain better bargaining position. But it must be stated that this programme of the Awami League was not new and it was actually formulated as early as February 12, 1966. For five years this party rallied the people round this programme and finally obtained an overwhelming mandate from the people of East Bengal. Never during these five years did the military regime condemn the programme as seditious. Even more important is the point that Sheik MujiburRehman did not at any time–not even during his civil disobedience campaign or during his talks with Yahya Khan–demand secession. This demand, on the contrary, was the effect of unprovoked military crack down on the Awami League and its supporters and the merciless punitive action taken against them to avenge the massive political defeat suffered by General Yahya Khan. The civil war was thus the result of the blood bath perpetrated by the West Pakistani leadership upon the people of the Eastern region coming, as it was, on top of the political perfidy of the President in refusing to honour the popular verdict.

Morality and legality are thus squarely behind the people of Bangla Desh. And yet the great powers of the world chose to be indifferent, treating the civil war as a matter of Pakistan’s internal concern–a matter of restoring law and order. That the process of restoring law and order required the literal occupation of the eastern part by 80,000 West Pakistani troops does not seem to bother the present arbiters of world public order, by a bit.

Indifference of the International Community

The circumstances of the case clearly warrant the recognition of Bangla Desh by every nation that swears by democratic human rights and democratic institutions. However, it should be conceded that in the international community the benefit of doubt normally goes in favour of the territorial integrity of the existing membership and that hence it was too much to expect outright support for a separate Bangla Desh. But then the colonial type exploitation of the eastern region during the past decade, the trickery of the Pindi regime after the elections and the savagery of the army since the start of the civil war demand at least an outright condemnation of the military regime and an honest effort by the great powers to exert pressure on Pindi to come to sanity. The irony of the situation is that these powers are in a situation to put the screws on Pindi and yet it is they that have explicitly cordoned and constructively endorsed the whole grisly affair. While the British Government’s readiness to support Pakistan does not come as a surprise to any one in this country, it is the American that is much more culpable because of its direct bearing on Pakistan’s military potential. The State Department has without a moment’s hesitation and compunction held it to be an internal affair of Pakistan. It took an unconscionably long time for Washington even to realise what that was going on in the eastern region was not a mere rebellion incited by a few irresponsible separatists but a national uprising, the suppression of which is entailing the physical occupation of the region by a substantial section of the Pak army. The brutality with which the ill-armed partisans and the unarmed civilians are dealt with seemed to have only slightly moved Pakistan’s arms suppliers. Thus came out the statement from the State Department, that since the start of the civil war all the arms shipments are cancelled. But then shipments are in fact reaching Pakistan. The State Department’s explanation was that these must have been weapons and spare parts already in the ‘pipeline’ i.e., those whose supply was cleared before the start of the civil war though actual release of stock might have occurred after that date. Strangely enough, the State Department pleads its inability to assure that further supplies of arms would not be released by the Defence Department. As recently as on July 9th, a State Department spokesman admitted “that more U. S. military equipment worth millions of dollars may be shipped to Pakistan despite a ban ordered by the U. S. Government” (Reuter report, “The Statesman,” July 10, 1971). And it is not uncommon in the U. S. for the Pentagon to pursue its own ‘foreign policies’ unconcerned with the commitments entered into by the State Department. A close look at the explanation reveals that far from trying to close loop-holes for the trickling of military hardware to Pakistan, the State Department was trying to keep them open.

This is more than confirmed from yet another enigmatic revelation that it is not as though the State Department was incapable of preventing the Defence Department from delivering further materials. Witness this statement of an American official as reported by Associated Press: “A single State Department telephone call to the customs authorities could stop further U.        S. military shipments to Pakistan. There was no such stop order now.” Now, this statement meant that it was deliberate U. S. policy at this time to go on trickling military aid to General Yahya Khan’s autocratic regime. And why? The specific answer is contained in the State Department’s letter of May 8, to Senator Fulbright Chairman of the Senate’s Foreign Relations committee: “The continuing military supply programme...continues to be an important element in our overall bilateral relationship with Pakistan.” And: “It would, therefore, appear desirable for the U. S. to be able to continue to supply limited quantities of military items to Pakistan to enable us both to maintain a constructive bilateral political  dialogue and to help insure that Pakistan is not compelled to rely increasingly on other sources of supply.” (International Herald Tribune, June 24, 1971) While the candour is praiseworthy, the priority accorded to the goal of keeping Pindi out of others’ embraces over the humanitarian consideration of keeping arms out of Pindi’s reach is worse than cynical. Or perhaps Washington is just opposed to an independent Bangla Desh. Known for their penchant for perspective planning, the policy makers in Washington might have concluded that a free Bangla Desh would be a sitting duck for the Chinese to bag. American commitment to the containment of communism has at most times been stronger than its commitment to democracy, notwithstanding the implications of the projected Nixon visit to Peking.

The Russians have shown a little more of concern. At the start, Kosygin strongly urged Yahya Khan to seek a political settlement. However, subsequently even the Kremlin’s concern got quite muted in its expression. There have been reports that the Russians are also continuing their supplies to Pakistan though these have been vigorously denied. It should be realised that the Russians too have a vested interest in not alienating Pindi because they are also eager not to drive Pakistan into Peking’s fold.

This brings us to the Chinese attitude. It is a notorious example of cynical disregard of all ‘revolutionary’ norms that they should support Pakistan wholeheartedly dismissing the whole human tragedy as an internal affair. For this various explanations can be suggested. Firstly, there is the anti-Indian dimension. A free Bangla Desh under the Awami League would mean a pro-Indian development. But, this perspective alone does not sufficiently explain Peking’s stand. Secondly, there is the view that Peking’s policy aims at profiting under either of the circumstances resulting out of the situation. If, because of great power silence and international indifference, the civil war goes in Pindi’s favour then, obviously, Peking by its support will have earned Pakistan’s eternal gratitude. On the contrary, in the event of Bangla Desh emerging successful, Peking might be banking upon the eventual drift of new unit into the Chinese ideological fold. The Chinese in their supreme confidence in their own analysis might have reckoned that the extremist-radical forces under Maulana Bhashani would over the present bourgeoise Bangla Desh leadership. China may be calculating on having the best of both bargains–that of retaining Pindi’s gratitude while being fairly sure of grabbing Bangla Desh. Now, if this interpretation of the Chinese motive is correct then certainly Peking made a gross miscalculation in reckoning without Maulana Bhashani’s patriotism. For, as it turned out the Maulana not only identified himself with the Bangla Desh struggle but revealed his disenchantment with the Heavenly Beings in Peking. Not only has the Maulana identified himself with the struggle for Bangla Desh but parties far more pro-Chinese than himself have formed into a liberation group pledged to work in coordination with the Mukti Fauz which is dominated by the Awami League. So much for the so-called contradictions between the supporters of Bangla Desh and the extreme radicals. A third explanation can also be suggested. In all probability China looks at the future of Asia in terms of a power equation between herself and Russia and is keen on relying on Pakistan’s support. The prospect of an American withdrawal from South East Asia makes the Sino-Soviet rivalry more intense. In this, having concluded that India would play the role of a Soviet client state, the Chinese are determined to retain Pakistan as their own client. But there are also analysts who hold that the prospect of active Chinese support for Pakistan was exaggerated. One scholar; for example, analysed Premier Chou En Lai’s letter to President Yahya Khan and found that while Chou assured Pakistan that in the event of Indian ‘aggression’ China will “as always fully support” Pakistan in its “struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national independence,” no military commitments have however been made. (G. D. Deshingkar in Sunday Statesman, July 11, 1971.) The author also stresses the point that the Chou letter nowhere assured China’s support for the ‘territorial integrity’ of Pakistan. While the last point seems to be rather far-fetched in view of Chou’s assurances to Pakistan’s sovereignty and national independence,” yet it seems probable that China never contemplated active involvement in the sub-continent. Perhaps Indian calculations were based on an obsession about the Chinese intentions.

The responses of the Middle Eastern countries are even more callous to the plight of the East Pakistanis. Countries like Turkey and Iran have always been notoriously partisan towards Pakistan. That the Arab countries, particularly the radical ones, should remain unmoved is indeed tragic though, many would say, not unexpected. Their radicalism invariably vanished before considerations of Islamic blood-ties. Not only have they failed to administer caution to Pakistan, but even a token word of sympathy for the plight of the refugees, is not forthcoming, Coming from countries who beat their breasts and vail about the tragedy of a million and a half of Palestinian refugees, this behaviour represents the height of political self-seeking. Egypt’s behaviour is most revealing. President Sadat had not the courtesy even to receive a person of the stature of Jayaprakash Narayan when thelatter visited Cairo. It is time that Indian Government remembers these acts of political ingratitude before it rushed to out–Arab the Arabs over West Asian Politics.

India’s Policy

The reaction within this country was one of deep and indignant anguish. Yet opinions vary as to what the Government should do. These range from those that urge forthright India’s intervention on behalf of Bangla Desh partisans to those that are opposed to India’s supporting BanglaDesh. In between lies the view of a major section of the public emotionally committed to Bangla Desh but quite at a loss to decide about the advisability of India going the whole hog by overt military intervention. The attitude of the Government of India is no less hamstrung by such ambivalence. Not to speak of overt military support, New Delhi is averse to extend even recognition to Bangla Desh.

Problems of Recognition

Considerations of international law seem to have some influence though in the nature of things they could not have been weighty enough to be decisive. For the law relating to recognition is vague affording only general guidelines for recognition of secessionist movements. Theoretically the criteria are rather hard. In the case of a civil war, foreign states must decide whether the new state has “really already safely and permanently established itself or only makes efforts to this end without having already succeeded.” (L. Oppenheim: International Law (Ed.) H. Lauterpacht, Vol. I, P. 128) Judged from this, Bangla Desh does not make the grade. State practices, however, vary and in many instances effective control of some part of the territory by the rebels was treated as sufficient to gain recognition. In effect, thus, it very depends whether ‘important’ states recognise a new state. In fact there are cases where new states got recognised, even when the secessionist movements were very weak simply because big powers chose to detach a part of a country to confer oh it statehood. The U. S. recognition of Panama is a case in point. America ‘recognised’ Panama when the U. S. was at war with Panama’s parent country, Columbia. The Americans recognised and fought in aid of Panama so as to liberate it from Columbia.

Judged from precedents, the nature of the struggle in Bangla Desh, given both its qualitative and quantitative ramifications, more than warrants recognition. But, as already mentioned the extreme indifference of the big powers rendered the issue of legal warrantibility quite meaningless. The silence of the big powers and the discretion of the rest made India’s position even weaker on this point.

But the real question is whether India is prepared for a confrontation with Pakistan. Because, legal questions apart, recognition whether accompanied by intervention or not, constitutes an ‘ unfriendly’ act and Pakistan would almost certainly declare war. Can we cope with a full-scale war? In such an eventuality China’s entry into the picture cannot be ruled out either–at least, India cannot altogether neglect this dimension.

Nor can India’s role stop at mere recognition. The emotional involvement of West Bengal and the indignation felt all over the country at the carnage in Bangla Desh raise the moral issue of intervention. After all, the talk of recognition has relevance only as means to legitimise material support for Bangla Desh. But the frustrating fact is that we are not in a position to extend such material support. For one thing, overt aid to the Mukti Fauz is bound to be counter-productive. In the absence of a lead from others. India’s action while being insufficient to tilt the military balance in the area, would only help convert the moral issue of Bangla Desh into an Indo-Pakistani issue. The projection of the ghastly event as an Indo-Pakistani conflict would bring in its train the familiar nuances of greater power stances with Pakistan getting the benefit of doubt. Pakistan would most certainly welcome any such opportunity to down the role of a victim of Indian collusion and aggression. Viewed thus India could not concede to Pindi a better diplomatic victory than by recognising and intervening in Bangla Desh. It is thinking more or less on these lines that is probably inhibiting Indian policy. But, of course, there is criticism that India’s inhibitions were borne out of pusillanimity. Some point out that at the start of the civil war, Pakistan had barely two divisions in East Bengal. Some reports say that actually Pakistan anticipated that India would expert pressure on her western region to tie down her troops in this region and thus help paralyse Pakistan’s efforts to establish its hold over the eastern region. In the event India did nothing, and Pindi with relief despatched an additional two and a half divisions to the eastern region. Thus, it would seem, the idea of an Indian attempt to help liberate Bangla Desh by exerting military pressure on Pakistan was in the beginning not “an un-manageable proposition.” Had only India then showed firmness and nerve through troop movements and threatening action, Yahya Khan would probably have capitulated for a settlement. In 1950, it is recalled when Pakistan sought to create more trouble in Kashmir and stirred up passions in East Bengal leading to a refugee exodus, Nehru did amass troops on the border and warned of military action unless Pakistan behaved itself. (K. Subrahmanyam in The Sunday Statesman, July 11, 1971) Then resulted the Nehru-Liaquat Pact. Firm and bold gestures do yield, political pay offs. India’s present sense of helplessness thus seems to be self-wrought–the result of adventureless and weak-kneed inhibitions.

The Refugee Problem: Case for Review of Policy

Thus on the issue of Bangla Desh, India is compelled to react warily, ruling out intervention. But it now seems quite probable that what we could not do in the name of Bangla Desh we might have to accomplish in the name of internal security–both economic and military. For, events in East Bengal, it should be repeated, not only pose pure moral issues like national self-determination and human rights, but, they lead to consequences directly affecting India’s internal stability and economic security. The gravity of the situation involving the sudden arrival of nearly seven million refugees–given our meagre resources, the political situation in West Bengal and the monsoon weather–cannot be exaggerated. The political and emotional implications are no less than economic and security reasons.

Of the seven million refugees at least four million are Hindus. It seems as though the affair came as a God-send for Pakistan to get of its minority community. Such heavy concentration of desperate refugees in border areas has dangerous potentialities of sparking off communal riots. There is no prospect of most of these refugees going . A new and permanent liability has accrued to India. Threats to our infernal security from diverse forces–epidemics, frustration, communal passions, agent provacateurs–become imminent as days pass by.

And the economic implications augur even worse. The housing and feeding of refugees, even on the most wretched of standards, involve colossal and staggering commitments. Our commitment comes to 70 lakhs a day counting at the rate of a rupee a day per person! If one realises that this estimate does not include overheads like expenditure on housing facilities and administrative and medical services, the gross Indian commitment would easily reach the figure of a crore of rupees every day! This figure can be cross-checked with the estimates of the U. N. High Commissioner for refugees according to whom 400 million dollars are needed for the next six months. This would mean a monthly bill of 50 crores of rupees. Even on the assumption that this estimate includes aid for sufferers within Bangla Desh areas, it is still safe to conclude that the cost of maintaining the refugees on Indian soil alone is not less than a crore a day. It is sad irony that India is obliged to spend almost as much on maintaining the six million victims of Pakistani aggression as the latter is spending in maintaining the instruments of aggression in Bangla Desh. For, the Associated Press Correspondent, Mort Rosenbaum, estimated that Pakistan is spending 1.5 crores of rupees a day to keep its armed forces in the eastern region. (vide the recent publication Bangla Desh, Delhi. P. 64.)

In spite of visits of experts from international agencies a various national and international charitable organisations, aid has been rather paltry. So far there is no firm indication that the U. N. would take over even a part of India’s burden.

It is this situation that provides the occasion for current speculation about a review of Indian policy. Leaving aside question of rallying round to the cause of Bangla Desh, we cannot allow the situation to drift along as at present. We cannot simply take any more of refugees nor feed for much longer the present ones. In this situation what other effective alternative is open to the Government but to ‘intervene’ and bring about the emergence of a political situation that would stop refugee influx and even lead to the early return of the existing refugees. Perhaps, these four months of Pakistani repression served to expose the real nature of the Pakistani regime even to the blinkered eyes of her ‘friends.’ A new Indian initiative in recognising Bangla Desh might set the trend for others to follow. This is the considered view of people like Jayaprakash Narayan. Judging from the impact of the events on the public opinions of many of the countries a recognition by India is not likely to be construed as motivated by anti-Pakistani considerations. State practice recognised intervention for self-defence, in the interests of humanitarian grounds and in stray instances for removal of international nuisance. In 1898, the U. S. itself intervened in neighbouring Cuba on the plea that Spain’s inability to control its rebelling colony and its adopting repressive measures of particularly arduous nature constituted a nuisance. Though this instance is no longer held to be good law, the Bangla Desh events represent a combination of almost all the ‘grounds’ for intervention. The ramifications of the refugee problem impinge upon India’s internal security, the mass killings constitute a mass burial of human rights and an indefinite extension in time of the carnage is worse than an international nuisance. There is enough justification for intervention.

Of course, the risks attendant on recognition and intervention are still very much more. Justifications in law wither before the cold-shouldering of the great powers and the risk of war cannot be lightly dismissed. Yet how long can India be made to bear the burdens alone–the burden of conscience including. Hence it is not unlikely that New Delhi is seriously assessing this option and a revision of policy is most likely to come about unless the world community does something in two distinct directions.

First, in the immediate future the burden of the refugees should be taken over by international agencies. Incidentally the cyclone havoc in East Bengal last year and the present catastrophe revealed how woefully inefficient the world organisation’s disaster-relief operations are. The United Nations agencies have been slow arriving on the scene and niceties of obtaining Pindi’s clearance even to make a survey made matters only worse.

Things now seem to be catching up. The U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Prince Sadruddin, made an on-the-spot assessment both in East Bengal and on the Indian side of the border. Though initially he seemed to be only too impressed with Yahya Khan’s reception arrangements for the millions he drove out, the High Commissioner did recognise the enormity of the burden India is bearing single-handed. He announced to the Economic and Social Council meeting in Geneva that world aid now totaled less than 200 million dollars, whereas for the coming six months at least 400 millions are needed to feed and house the refugees. Thus leaving alone the prospect of reimbursing India for the sums it spent so far, the prospects of such aid meeting at least future needs seem pretty dim. It is to be hoped much more of international aid comes forth and soon.

A ‘Political’ Solution

But obviously tackling the refugee problem could at best be a short term goal. What is needed is a solution of the main issue. Any solution must mean an immediate cessation of Pakistan army regime in East Pakistan and a restoration of civil government. President Yahya’s promises of a return to civil rule, and the convening of a Constituent Assembly and his assurances that normalcy has been restored are at best insincere ruses and at worst blatant lies, as the Report of the World Bank Team (The Cargill Report) exposed. By present indications, Pindi seems to have only one solution to the problem, that being a ‘final solution’. As the London Spectator stated, “It is easier to imagine Germany’s gas chambers than Pakistan’s choleric slaughter in the Bengal plain, but it remains the case and it ought to be declared that the Pakistani crime now matches the Hitlerian in dimension and horror and threatens monstrously to exceed it. Difficult and unpleasant though it may be, each one of us ought to endeavour to the best of his ability to imagine the enormity of the Pakistani crime.” (The Spectator, June 19, 1971) What is required now is not to bring Pindi to its senses but to bring it to its knees. The big powers must force it to abandon its insane policy and agree to a political solution.

In this context, it is heartening that the International Consortium aiding Pakistan decided to suspend all aid transactions till proof of Pakistan’s civilised behaviour is forthcoming. This has been the outcome of the Report of the World Bank Team. Parliamentary delegations from the U.K. and Canada, West Germany and other European countries have done a fine job of enlightening international public opinion. A team of American Congressmen succeeded, in persuading their colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee to recommend to Congress stoppage of aid to Pakistan till she implements a viable political solution. Thirty-three American Senators, a third of the Senator’s total membership, have come out against any further aid till a political solution is soon implemented by Yahya Khan. What could this political solution be?

Sentiments notwithstanding, it is clear that the triumph of Bangla Desh under Mujibur Rehman and his close associates now running the Bangla Desh Government, can be ruled out. Though people like Arthur Bottomley suggest that Yahya Khan can have no option but to release the Sheik and negotiate with him–it would seem that this is un realistic. Equally impossible is the solution of genocide now being implemented by Yahya Khan. The installation of a civil government, representing the people–and this should naturally include such of the Awami League leaders as could be persuaded to join–with full powers of home rule (at least as a temporary measure) to make its role of reconciliation credible, should be the first step. The question of the convening of a new Constituent Assembly and the finalisation of the political system can be considered only after the reconciliation regime had time to do its job. The situation has become so bitter that it is doubtful whether even a few Awami League members can be found at all to join any other civilian government but that of a free Bangla Desh. If some one is found, it is doubtful whether he would retain the confidence of the people. It is inevitable that Pakistan should negotiate with as many of the Awami League leaders as are prepared to try reconciliation, though they may till now have been supporters of Bangla Desh. To them must be entrusted the task of rehabilitating other leaders. Of course, it is doubtful, if the front-rank leadership will ever join the scheme. But till some way is found to bring in, at least, a respectable number of Awami Leaguers and they on their part giving up their free Bangla Desh stand–there could be no political solution. This would mean such a terrible sacrifice and a supreme act of forgiveness on the part of much of the Bangla Desh leadership–that normally cannot be expected. Still that remains the only hope.

In the final analysis a substantial part of the demands of Sheik Mujibur Rehman will have to be conceded and in return the concept of Bangla Desh will have to be given up. Short of either of the extremes this seems to be the only way out. In short an autonomous though not free Bangla Desh of Sheik’s dreams will have to materialise. That this would be the case without the Sheik participating in it is a great pity. But such is the fate that history often times decrees to its heroes.
July 15, 1971