International Affairs

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
(January-March, 1965)

On the 1st of January the Home Minister declared that the “Left” Communist Party had been formed under China’s inspiration in order to promote her designs against India. On the 3rd, China protested to India against alleged border violations in the neighbourhood of Sikkim; this was done, apparently, to forestall India’s protests against actual border violations by China. On the 4th, the Premier of Malaysia appealed for help against attacks from Indonesia, which were expected to increase on the departure of that country from the United Nations, due a few days later; in fact, small attacks have continued, over the frontier in Borneo, and from the sea upon Malaya. On the 5th, the American President declared his readiness to resist the aggressive activities promoted by China, in particular in South Vietnam. On the 6th, the Indian National Congress discussed the proposal to make nuclear weapons in order to neutralise those of China. On the 7th, Indonesia left the U. N., and it was later announced that, together with China and some small countries, she intended to form a rival organisation. After a pause in January, Pakistan resumed her attacks on the Indian frontier, and in February and March increased them to a pitch never previously attained; the President of Pakistan visited Peking in March, and a number of other consultations took place; these attacks are attributed to encouragement from China.

China is the centre of most of the aggression in the world today. If her policy were peaceful, there would still be friction between India and Pakistan, and between North and South Vietnam, but these disputes would have no more than local importance. As it is; they form parts of a pattern which appears ever more menacing.

These somewhat diverse movements, which are rallying to China or being exploited by her, have in common a frustrated nationalism resembling that in Europe in the interwar period, which expresses itself in dictatorship at home and aggression abroad. An alliance between this spirit and that of communism is not very difficult. In fact the communism of Russia includes an element of this kind, and that of China is at least strongly nationalistic. Their common enemy is liberalism, constitutionalism, the bourgeois spirit.

Several of the leaders of the Indonesian nationalist movement were liberals, though they professed socialism, but President Soekarno has suppressed them or reduced them to insignificance. He maintains his power by appeals to an unthinking nationalistic militancy which seems to flourish on the frustration produced by his own total failure as a constructive statesman. The Communist Party of Indonesia finds this situation congenial, and it is now the strongest party in the country and is represented in the Government. Its leaders have contrived to keep on good terms with Soekarno, in the expectation that on his departure, power will fall to them without much difficulty. In this situation it is natural that Mr. Aidit, the Party Secretary, should expound his party policy in reformist terms, but while we should hope for the best we should not attach any importance to these pronouncements. The Indonesian Communist Party supports China in opposition to Russia, and is probably an important channel of Chinese influence on the Indonesian Government.

President Soekarno maintains his power by stimulating nationalistic excitement. For several years this was directed mainly against the Dutch colony of West Irian. Indonesia’s claim to the area was doubtful, but in the hope of coming to terms with the nationalism of the under-developed countries, America supported it. In 1962 Indonesia took over West Irian, but instead of becoming a satisfied power and accepting the aid for development offered by America, she turned her militant nationalism against Malaysia.

Her complaint is that the policy of Malaysia is “neo-colonialist”. The treaty between Britain and Malaysia provides for bases which Britain may use in order to keep the peace in the area; and further, when Indonesia proposed to eliminate the neo-colonialist influence through a confederation of the two Malay countries with the Philippines, it came to nothing because, she suspects, of pressure from Britain. There are, however, substantial reasons for Malaysia’s coolness towards the proposal of confederation. Her standard of living is high and rising, whereas that of Indonesia is low and falling; and after years of warfare against the communist guerillas, Malaysia is strongly opposed to communism, whereas Indonesia is likely very soon to become a communist state. In this situation Malaysia seems to feel safer with British bases in her territory, and this is more especially so as her experience of colonialism (there was no conquest: in Malay the Sultans asked for British protection) has left little hostility to Britain.

The attitude of Indonesia towards colonialism and its supposed resurrection is different, but it may be suspected that her accusations against Malaysia, a country one-tenth of her size, are a pretext rather than the real ground of her announced and active, though technically undeclared, war. Still less do these accusations explain her decision to leave the U. N. and join China in forming a rival organisation. This seems to commit her to China’s world revolution, in which Indonesia could hope for no more than the severely qualified independence of a communist country of the second rank in the highly centralised order which the great powers would try to impose. The puzzle would be solved if, like Fidel Castro, Soekarno had been a secret communist all the way through, but it is clear that he is not. The truth seems to be that he is a victim of the frustrated nationalism which he himself has done so much to propagate.

Though her ground is very different, the policy of Pakistan is beginning to show an ominous resemblance to that of Indonesia. The leaders of Pakistan were far less involved in anti-Western nationalism than those of India, and still less than those of Indonesia. They supported Britain during the Second World War, whereas the Indian leaders supported the Quit India campaign and the I. N. A.–for which the British have never quite forgiven them. The support of the British officials in India, thus obtained, was necessary to achieve the separation of Pakistan. The new state soon became a formal ally of the Western Powers, and has received much economic aid, which has not been wholly wasted. Partly because of this ground, and partly because they regarded her claim to Kashmir as just (this is a tenable view: the present writer, for one, has always held it), the Western Powers have consistently supported Pakistan’s case in Kashmir.

But after a few years it became clear that diplomatic support and U. N. majorities were not going to change the position of Kashmir. The subject then became an obsession, and Pakistan turned in desperation to China: At first the idea was merely to threaten India, and when in 1959 China’s ambitions in this direction were revealed, Pakistan offered India a settlement, including joint defence arrangements. But Nehru appears to have felt sure that however much his policy might exasperate the Western Powers, they would never tolerate the subjugation of India by a communist power, Accordingly he could afford to ignore Pakistan’s hostility, even in combination with China’s, and he rejected President Ayub Khan’s offer. Pakistan therefore turned again to China, and she has become more and more reckless in supporting China’s policies and in attacking India. In the campaign before the election at the beginning of January, both the candidates appear to have thought it advisable to show hostility to India.

The principal cause of Pakistan’s irrational behaviour is her failure to gain control of Kashmir. As a consequence of this disappointment she seems to be adopting the frustrated nationalism shown by other ex-colonial or under-developed countries. It inclines towards the illusion of power conferred by dictatorship, and the exhibitionism of an arrogant, aggressive foreign policy. It has been plausibly compared to the attitude of the adolescent boy (in western society), in rebellion against his family and all its traditions and principles, doing all he can to shock the staid old fogeys, threatening to leave home and join a criminal gang, but yet dependent upon the family and still further exasperated by his dependence. If this analogy has any validity, it can be said that India’s policy towards Pakistan has failed through indecision. She might have averted this development entirely by genuine appeasement in regard to Kashmir, or she might have knocked sense into Pakistan’s head by firmly suppressing her tantrums. India did neither, and now has a confirmed delinquent on her hands.

Those countries which have become communist may be regarded as having carried out the problem-child’s threat to join a criminal gang. Most criminals display a submerged desire to return to respectable society; in Russia this desire has always been very noticeable. China however, has never regarded herself as a child in relation to the West. Such signs of guilt-feeling as she may betray are probably due to her subversion of the elaborate system of patriarchal ideas which her forbearers cherished so devoutly and for so long. In relation to the outer world her attitude is one of confident superiority. She even makes adroit use of her temporary technological inferiority in her attempt to subjugate the rest of the world, just as Mao used the most ward parts of China to overthrow Chiang’s regime, which was based on the most advanced. Despising Russia’s ambivalence, China is an uninhibited revolutionary desperado, a most dangerous neighbour.

Indo-China, consisting of three small countries with cultural ties to France and complete military dependence on America, shows this frustrated nationalism in a slightly different form. North Vietnam, contiguous with the Russo-Chinese land mass, and receiving much material support, has been emboldened to go all the way and fight. The Buddhist majority in South Vietnam have resisted the communist attack, but have also opposed the Western Power which sustains their resistance, and have spent most of their energy in fighting their own Christian minority.

Vietnam was partitioned in 1954, and the northern half was communist from the start. Its economic policy was no more successful than that of other communist countries, whereas for the first few years South Vietnam prospered. In the communist view this contrast no doubt increased the urgency of conquering the South. On the ground that it is impossible to hold a genuine election under a communist government, the South refused to conduct the election which the Geneva agreement had laid down as the procedure for unifying the country. Taking this as a pretext, the North launched a guerilla attack in 1958. It has planned carefully, using Mao’s ideas and unlimited material and manpower, and has been highly successful. By propaganda, intimidation, the kidnapping of children, and so forth, it has induced the rural people to give the support which guerilla forces need, and by systematically assassinating local officials, rural leaders, school masters, etc., many thousands in all, it has effectively paralysed South Vietnam.

America began from 1961 to give substantial amounts of aid. The British had defeated a similar guerilla campaign in Malaya, though it cost a great effort lasting eight years; the force deployed is said to have been ten times as numerous as the guerilla force. But the guerillas in Vietnam possess what those in Malaya lacked: bases in adjoining territory protected by international frontiers. The land frontier between North and South Vietnam is quite short and can be guarded, but the guerillas have avoided this obstacle by marching through Laos. The Laos frontier runs most of the length of the narrow peninsula, and is hilly and densely forested. The territory is in fact ideal for the guerilla type of campaign. North Vietnam has sent in tens of thousands of trained men, provided latterly with fairly elaborate arms, and all America’s efforts for four years have been unable to prevail against them.

In 1963 the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem in Saigon was overthrown. He had the support of the strongly anti-communist Catholic minority, but the accusation that he persecuted the Buddhists seems to be baseless. Nevertheless the Americans connived at his overthrow, and have ever since regretted it. The Buddhist majority have displayed the most irresponsible form of frustrated nationalism, and political stability has proved unattainable in the State.

By the beginning of this year it was clear that the time of decision was approaching. When one’s opponent is within sight of victory, negotiation is only a camouflaged form of surrender. Nevertheless, the decision was a difficult one. America had the alternatives of abandoning South Vietnam to the communists of the North, or making the increased and quite different military effort necessary to defeat North Vietnam’s attack. The abandonment of South Vietnam after so many years of struggle would greatly weaken morale in all the countries threatened by China, from South Korea to Nepal, and beyond. On the other hand, the military effort necessary to defeat North Vietnam would involve a danger of intervention by China and Russia, which might lead to a world war. Those who advocate surrender argue that in any case the power of China, in alliance with Indonesia, is so great that the effort to save the small countries situated between them is doomed to eventual failure. However, it is not clear that this is so. The small countries in question, supported by Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, India, Britain and America, should be able to preserve their Independence. Even without India’s support, of which there has never been any probability, their position does not appear hopeless.

The decision was less dramatic in form, but not less momentous, that taken by President Kennedy in October, 1962, to compel Russia to withdraw from Cuba. President Johnson’s decision was in the same sense. Though apparently sudden, it was thoroughly  considered: On the 6th of February, when Mr. Kosygin had just arrived in Hanoi, a guerilla force armed with mortars fired on an American air base at Pleiku, South Vietnam, destroying a number of planes, killing eight and wounding over a hundred Americans. The next day a large force of American planes dropped bombs on military targets in North Vietnam; and since then, with brief intervals, attacks by American and South Vietnam planes have continued. At the end of February the American State Department published a documented statement to prove the involvement of large North Vietnam forces, using arms from all the communist countries, in the attack on South Vietnam.

In the next few days, Russia warned America against continuing her bombing raids, and promised aid to North Vietnam, while China repeatedly threatened to intervene. On the 18th it was announced that President Johnson’s proposed visit to Russia had been cancelled. Chinese and Vietnamese students in Moscow demonstrated before the American Embassy; China claimed that the Russian police had suppressed the demonstration, and demanded an apology. At the end of March it was reported that China was preventing the transport across her territory of Russian arms intended for North Vietnam. Britain almost alone of the Powers supported America’s action; most of the neutral Powers, including India, and France, urged negotiations instead of bombing, but none suggested any reason why North Vietnam should cease its attack when it appeared to be on the verge of success.

By the end of March, it could be said that America’s air offensive had begun to supply such a reason. Though nearly two months had passed, neither Russia nor China had intervened, North Vietnam was presumably suffering substantial losses, and looked forward to an indefinite continuance of such losses, and the morale of South Vietnam had improved. President Johnson appears to have calculated his risks correctly, and it is probable that North Vietnam will eventually cease the attack on the South and agree to an effectively guaranteed peace.

India’s appeals for negotiated settlements of disputes have become a routine; but in this instance the appeal, which has been repeated several times, has not passed without criticism. In the absence of America’s bombing attacks, a complete victory for North Vietnam could not have been long delayed. This would have been a resounding triumph for the communist camp, and most of all for China, and the danger to India would have increased. Specifically, America’s attack has led to the removal of Chinese air units from Tibet to the neighbourhood of Vietnam, and has rendered an attack by China on India unlikely at a time when Pakistan’s attacks have become stronger than ever before. America’s air offensive in Vietnam thus protects India against the deadly danger of simultaneous attacks by China and Pakistan. It is puzzling that the Government of India should publicly oppose an action by America which renders her such a valuable service. An official of the External Affairs Ministry explained the puzzle in a statement to the Press on the 5th of March: “There is a desire to maintain an attitude of neutrality, not because there are no facts available to reach definite conclusions, but because of the fear that any shift in India’s attitude might be condemned by some Afro-Asian countries as being not progressive. It has become the fashion in many Afro-Asian countries to indulge in criticism of the United States and look on China with admiration…” The problem-child threatening to join the gangsters!

On March the 22nd, a general election took place in Ceylon. The Government of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, in alliance with the Trotskyists and supported by the Communists, had brought about economic stagnation and had caused alarm by its increased dependence on Russia and China. In 1964 it signed an agreement allowing Chinese ships to use the port at Trincomalee; it was explained at the time that this permission was given only to merchant ships, but it appears that the text of the agreement contains no such restriction. Eventually a group of the Government’s supporters in Parliament broke away, and it was defeated. During the election campaign the large staffs of the Russian and Chinese Embassies were very active and circulated much propaganda material. The chief opposition party, the United National Party, in its campaign, strongly opposed Marxian ideas and the former Government’s communist alignment. The result was a defeat for the Government and a victory for the U. N. P., which with the support of the parties representing the Tamils and other groups, has a substantial majority and has formed a Government. The comparatively well educated and well informed public of Ceylon appear to have judged, as a result of experience, that socialistic economic policies and association with the communist countries are less advantageous than the former policies and associations, with all their imperial and snobbish overtones. The self-destructive, hypertrophied nationalism which is now so common among former colonies is not universal.