The Message of Sankara Vedanta to Our Times

The Message of Sankara Vedanta

to Our Times ¹

(Lecturer in Philosophy, Andhra University)

Indian philosophers, in spite of their great systems, have said little on social and political issues. But the present is an age of confusion in society and politics. New idea and ideals have invaded every society and nation. The blessed isolation and ignorance in which the peoples lived for long, thinking themselves to be the most advanced and favoured nations of God on earth, are no more possible. And in some spheres of life the changes are astonishingly many and frequent. Everywhere around us there are uncertainty and apprehension. Yet the Indian has no direct help from his philosophers, Their attitude towards society and politics has only been negative, as social and political work has only instrumental, not intrinsic, value.

But still they have a metaphysical theory, a world-conception of their own. They have a standpoint from which they can view and interpret things. Many philosophers in the West, like Hegel and Plato, have applied their metaphysical theories to their conceptions of state and society. No Indian philosopher until now has made any such attempt. But at a time when we are dissatisfied, with all available conceptions of society and morals, and anxiously ask for new ones, it is hoped that any formulation based on the highly developed metaphysics of India would be welcome and worth consideration. From various countries philosophers are suggesting new ways of thought and new modes of action. What follows is a suggestion that might have been offered by Sankara, had he lived now. We have to be satisfied, for want of time, with the explication of a principle without its elaboration, and the presentation of a standpoint without any detailed description of the perspective.

I. THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLE

Sankara is an Absolutist. But his Absolute is not an organic whole, an identity in difference. It is harmonious, not in the sense of the co-ordination of Interrelated parts, but in the sense of the absence of disharmony. It is not relational, but transcends every relation. Sankara does not believe that the finite individuals, so long as they remain finite, can live in the Absolute without any clash. Writes Hegel: ‘In the notion the elements distinguished are without more ado at the same time declared to be identical with one another and with the whole, and the specific character of each is a free being of the whole notion. ² But Sankara would say that if the elements in the notion are identical with one another and with the whole, there could be no principle of differentiation between them. Without differentiation, the category of plurality would be inapplicable to the Absolute. Hence the Absolute should be regarded as non-dualistic, not as a system of finite individuals.

From the absence of the principle of differentiation it follows that negativity or the principle of negation does not persist in Sankara’s Absolute. Yet Sankara goes beyond the Hegelian Absolutists and says not merely that negation implies affirmation, but also that it can be affirmation. His Ajnana, which is translated by the words Ignorance and Nescience, which only inadequately express its significance, is not at all a negative concept, but a positive one. ³ It is bhavarupa not abhavarupa. Similarly, the negation of finitude in which lies the salvation of every finite being, is not utter void, but the Absolute itself.

One important point which marks off Sankara from many Hegelian Absolutists is his emphasis on intution. The Absolute is not an obiect of thought, but of akhandajnana or integral experience. In it the difference between subject and object, and subject and predicate, disappears. Yet it is not of the nature of sensuous feeling, to which the word intuition is generally applied, because the Absolute is fully conscious of itself, wholly transparent to itself. It is intuition in the sense of akhandajnana, that is, experience which is integral and undifferentiated. Conceptual thought is always discursive. It tries to understand the whole as a synthesis of parts. But, as Bergson points out, the nature of an individual can not be exhausted by any amount of conceptual determinations. Even Prof. Whitehead, in explaining his infinite abstractive hierarchy, admits ‘that it is impossible to complete the description of an actual occasion by means of concepts.’ ⁴ The failure of thought, therefore, to understand the whole is inevitable. A living unity can only be intuited. We know what life is, we intuit it. But thought understands it as a peculiar synthesis of physical parts, and thus interprets the higher in terms of the lower. The Hegelian idealists claim to have always shunned this method of explanation. But it is quite plain that when, for instance, Bosanquet interprets mind as a focus of externality, ⁴⁵ he is violating this idealistic principle. Similarly, Prof. Whitehead’s conception of the whole as a concretion of elements involves the same difficulty. Hence Bergson’s view, that the individuality of anything can be grasped only through intuition, cannot be gainsaid. But while Bergson’s intuition is a kind of irrational will-force, Sankara asserts that the intuition of the Absolute contains no element of irrationality. The Absolute is chidrupa, of the nature of consciousness.

Sankara holds with Bradley the view that thought is relational. Even Kant’s reason, which is speculative and points to the three Ideas beyond the empirical world, is, for that reason, relational. Though it points to them, it can not have a comprehensive grasp of them. Sankara holds that the function of reason is negative with regard to truth. But he could add that reason not only censors but, as a consequence, drives the mind towards something less false. The view obviously follows from the Vedantic theory that cognition is svatah pramanya and paratah apramanya, that is, that the truth of a cognition is known and constituted by itself, whereas its falsehood by another. Thought cannot determine positively what truth is, but only negatively what truth is not. Its function lies in checking the aberrations of human intuitions, which are generally impure, due to their being mixed up with desires, volitions, and other states of an un-balanced mind. It is a mistake of most of the upholders of the coherence theory of truth to think that reason is constitutive of truth. But Bradley, who belongs to their own camp, has pointed out that thought, if it remains relational, cannot constitute truth, and, if, on the other hand, it becomes non-relational, it ceases to be thought. ⁶ That is why he points to feeling, though unfortunately the sensuous, ⁷ as the clue to the understanding of the nature of the Absolute. The same is the case with every individuality, because thought works with conceptual determinations which can never exhaust the nature of an individual. And truth, whether the Absolute or the finite, is individuality. Yet the falsity of an intuitive grasp is determined by thought. If an intuition is the wrong one, it would be contradicted by another. The work of relating and examining whether there is any contradiction belongs to thought. Thus though the relational consciousness cannot positively determine the right intuition by exhibiting non-contradiction between the various aspects of a whole, as well as between one whole and other wholes,–because they are all infinite in number–yet it is by it that an intuition can be falsified.

Sankara, as it is for the other Absolutists, the salvation of the particular lies in the realisation of the universal. This is accomplished by the negation of particularity by the particular. But this negation does not mean for Sankara, as it does for the Hegelians, leading a harmonious existence with other particulars. He does not believe that clash can be avoided, if the particular retains its particularity. He remarks: Bhede bhayam, in duality there is fear, but this absolute negation of particularity does not end in utter blank or void, because, for Sankara, negation of the particular, as above stated, is the Absolute. He does not believe that there could be mere nothing–a fundamental point of difference between him and the Madhyamika Buddhists.

II. APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE

Modern civilisation has, brought distant peoples into contact, but the motive of contact has been aggrandizement and dominance, not justice and friendship. Hence, though we have reason to rejoice at the widening of our outlook and the increase of our knowledge, we have equal reason to regret the jealousies and rivalries between peoples, for both are the result of the same contact. A nation or community is a particular. As such it has no right to dominate over other particulars. It is only the whole which includes and transcends every particular that has the right to so dominate. This phenomenon, the attempt by the particular to play the part of the whole, is the root cause of the world’s unrest. It appears in the political conquest of one nation by another, in the conflict between capital and labour, between caste and caste, and creed and creed. But the particular by forgetting its proper place loses its very foothold. It owes its being to the whole. By trying to usurp the place of the whole, it sets itself over against the whole and thus alienates itself from its very being. Hence the disaster.

The above is the aggressive particularity which is the predominant characteristic of most of the Great Powers. In life it is found in communities and classe, which, for some reason or other, are placed in a vantage ground. But there is another kind of particularity which is seclusive. It is a trait generally found in the peoples of the East. It aims at isolation, is afraid of change and innovation, and persistently tries to be self-centred and self-sufficient. But the prerogative of self-sufficiency belongs only to the whole. This second kind of particularity is another way of playing the part of the whole, and is equally fraught with disastrous consequences. Either particular fails to realize the whole, for the whole, like Aristotle’s God, is attractive and also all-comprehensive.

Hegel, according to these interpretators, like Royce, who believe that for him the state is not the Absolute, pointed out that man in his social relations begins to realise his oneness with the Absolute. And the nature of his relations with the other members of his society is determined by his conception of the Absolute. If the Absolute is conceived as an organic whole in which every part tries to retain its particularity by living in harmony with others, then society also should be regarded as a whole in which every member maintains and protects himself by living in concord with the others. Hegel, of course, does not support the theory of social contract. For him, it is only an early phase of social consciousness. The Absolute is the true individual, and every par of it has its being only so far as it is a part of the Absolute. Similarly, its representative on earth, the state or society, is more concrete than the members. The harmony of the state is, therefore, of the chief concern. Yet Hegel insists that the individual member should retain his particularity. It is this insistence that has occasioned the school of left wing Hegelians, like McTaggart, who conceived the Absolute as a mere society of selves. Here Sankara would say that, so long as it is the aim of every part to retain its particularity, it can never realise its identity with the Absolute. We have already shown the difficulty in Hegel’s conception of the Nation in which every part is equal to every other part and to the whole. The two aims, that of retailing one’s particularity and of realising one’s unity with the whole, are conflicting and contradictory; At best they may give rise to a state of affairs like that in the social contract, in which the members live by mutual compromises.

The spirit of mutual compromise, of organisation by division of labour and allotment of functions, which cannot be anything better than following a mutual give and take policy, is not adequate to remove discontent from the present-day world. Allotment of functions works well in the organic world. But man is not a mere organism; he belongs to the sphere of mind. In the organic world, a leg, for instance, is a leg for ever, it cannot perform the function of an eye. But in the sphere of mind, that is, at the human level, servants have been masters, and slaves generals. Organisation, therefore, tries to place man one step lower than his proper level. But such an attempt conflicts with the real nature of things. Hence the discontent and chaos that are the features of our times. What belongs to a lower level than his is shown to man as his ideal. But, on the contrary, an ideal should be higher than what we want to achieve. The conflict in the organic world is avoided by every part performing the function proper to its place and contributing to the nourishment of others. But the point is that that part has no mind, whereas the nature of man is otherwise.

The over-intellectualisation of the West is chiefly responsible for the idea that unity among the nations of the world can be attained by organisation and mutual compromises. It began with the theory of social contract in the formation of states, then discovered that man is a social being by his very nature, and formulated the theory that society is an organism of its member! But it could not understand the full significance of the fact that man is the Universal Being in essence, the realisation of which is man’s ideal. The life of this Universal Being is an integrality and individuality that cannot be understood as a synthesis of parts or aspects, because they are infinite in number. Moreover, in attending to the parts we lose the whole. That man is a social being is anaxiom of all social sciences, and not a proposition to be understood in terms of man’s transactions in society. Similarly, no counting, however long, of his transactions would exhaust the nature of his sociability. A society formed on a systematisation of a particular number of transactions would always end in discord. New situations with new complexities would appear with the advance of time, and the harmony of the society will be affected. The whole history of civilisation itself is an example.

So Sankara would urge that all the unities–society, state, international unity, the cosmos, the Absolute–are intuitions eternally present, demanding to be accepted as axioms of the corresponding sciences. They are neither the products of human intelligence, nor do they allow themselves to be resolved into an integration of elements. In this hierarchy of intuitions, we are driven by the shortcomings of the lower to the higher. The driving force in this process belongs to discursive thought. As already pointed out, its function is negative; it can only show how an intuition is false. To every finite intuition thought finds an other which effects the former’s stability, and the mind is driven upwards for a more stable, and therefore, a more comprehensive one. Hence what seems organisation, which is the product of relational consciousness, is only the working of this negative function. It is of use only when the intuitive process goes astray. When it does not, what appears to be systematisation follows so long as finitude exists, but never to adequately represent the whole.

Hence Sankara would urge that our society should have an intuitive, and not intellectual, basis. Organisation can never exhaust the unity or our social nature. With the progress of thought and time, the latter would manifest new phases for which the existing organisation can find no place, and consequently collapses. And. when the social unity is wrongly identified with the organisation, it also is destroyed. Then arises the chaos and conflict of which our times furnish an instance. But if the identification is not made, the organisation which is the product of intellect may break down, but the intuitive grasp of the unity will save the situation. It is no objection to say that the disaster is due to an identification of a wrong organisation with the unity. For, reasons have already been given to show how it is impossible for any organisation to express a unity. A unity manifests itself in the past, present, and future, in differing ways. Old phases vanish, and new phases make their appearance. And at no point of time can an organisation which includes all phases be possible.

But to have such an intuitive grasp of the wider whole so long as one retains one’s particularity would be like Jumping out of one’s skin. Hence Sankara preaches negation of particularity. The problem formulated by every nation, community, or individual, should be not how it should be able to maintain itself in the conflict with others, but how it can treat others as part of its own being. What cements one nation or party with another should be not diplomatic relations, the authors of which, in utter selfishness, aim at advantages over others, but mutual friendship and sympathy, where love that knows no bounds of particularity play the important part. Organisation should not be given the first place, not only because of the above reasons, but also because every individual would view it from his standpoint, and as existing for himself. But the negation of particularity would result in an intuitive grasp of the wider whole. It does not end in mere nothing, for the negation of the particular, as has been already shown, is the whole. And the relational consciousness in all the finite levels would do its own work, that of relating the existing manifestations of the unity. But this work is of secondary importance and necessarily follows the intuitive grasp of the unity. It is somewhat similar considerations that have led thinkers like Edward Carpenter ⁸ to say that the future society should be based on feeling, but not on intellect. But Sankara would object to sensuous feeling. He, would never preach a return to nature similar to that of animal life. At this stage the particularity of the individual is not conscious of itself, and therefore a life of mere sensibility and feeling is possible. But at the human level the particularity is conscious of itself, and therefore a higher intuition which is conscious and not irrational is needed. But it is impossible for human beings to have such an intuition where, their particularity is sacrificed, because for their finitude that very particularity is needed. Hence Sankara advises us to begin with the denial of particularity. No less a man than John Stuart Mill wrote: ‘Those only are happy who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, followed not as a means but as itself an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they find their happiness by the way. ⁹ Sankara would comment on, Mill’s assertion, saying: ‘Because the particularity is sacrificed. It is not an adjustment between two to preserve the particularity of each.’

 ¹ Submitted to the International Congress of Philosophy, Prague, 1934, and accepted by it.

2 Wallace: The Logic of Hegel. P. 289.

3 Sarvadarsapasangraha. P. 164.

4 Science and the Modern World. P. 211, cp. Adventure, of Ideas P. 226. ‘The basis of experience is emotional.’ Also see P. 326.

5 Principle of Individuality and Value, P.193.

6 Appearance and Reality, PP. 168–172

7 Sankara’s intuition of the Absolute is not undeveloped thought but its completion. Psychologically, in the history of an individual’s consciousness, it is true, feeling precedes thought. But logically, the integrality of the Absolute is the presupposition as well as the ideal of objective thought. This integrality, Sankara asserts, is grasped through a higher intuition which is not feeling. Feeling contains the element of irrationality which is not found in the higher intuition.

8 Civilisation: Its cause and Cure.

9 Autobiography; p. 77